The following definitions apply to this Criminal Code:

(1) ACT. A bodily movement, and such term includes possession of property.

(2) VOLUNTARY ACT. An act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and such term includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate it.

(3) OMISSION. A failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law.

(4) CONDUCT. An act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

(5) TO ACT. Either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

(6) CULPABLE MENTAL STATE. Such term means "intentionally" or "knowingly" or "recklessly" or with "criminal negligence," as these terms are defined in Section 13A-2-2.

The following definitions apply to this Criminal Code:

(1) INTENTIONALLY. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct.

(2) KNOWINGLY. A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists.

(3) RECKLESSLY. A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication, as defined in subdivision (e)(2) of Section 13A-3-2, acts recklessly with respect thereto.

(4) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance which is defined by statute as an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A court or jury may consider statutes or ordinances regulating the defendant's conduct as bearing upon the question of criminal negligence.

A person is criminally liable for an offense if it is committed by his own behavior or by the behavior of another person for which he is legally accountable as provided for in this article, or both.

A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another person if he is made accountable for the behavior of such person by the statute defining the offense or by specific provision of this title.

(a) A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another if, acting with the culpable mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question, he causes an innocent person to engage in such behavior.

(b) As used in this section, an "innocent person" includes any person who is not guilty of the offense in question, despite his behavior, because of:

(1) Criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption.

(2) Unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose.

(3) Any other factor precluding the mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question.

A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense:

(1) He procures, induces or causes such other person to commit the offense; or

(2) He aids or abets such other person in committing the offense; or

(3) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, he fails to make an effort he is legally required to make.

Unless otherwise provided by the statute defining the offense, a person shall not be legally accountable for behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if:

(1) He is a victim of that offense; or

(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incidental to its commission; or

(3) Prior to the commission of the offense, he voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or assist its commission and either gave timely and adequate warning to law enforcement authorities, or to the intended victim, or wholly deprived his complicity of its effectiveness in the commission of the offense. The burden of injecting this issue is on the defendant, but this does not shift the burden of proof.

In a prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability is based upon the behavior of another person pursuant to this article, it is no defense that:

(1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the behavior in question, or has been previously acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense.

(2) The defendant belongs to a class of persons who, by definition of the offense, are legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.

A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.

The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability." If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of "mental culpability."

(a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context thereof indicates to the contrary.

(b) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.

(c) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly and intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(a) A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.

(b) A person is nevertheless criminally liable for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he intended, contemplated or risked is that:

(1) A different person or property was injured, harmed or affected; or

(2) A less serious or less extensive injury or harm occurred.

(c) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.

(a) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief of fact unless:

(1) His factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the commission of an offense; or

(2) The statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such a factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or

(3) The factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification as defined in Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title.

(b) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless his mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in a statute or the latest judicial decision of the highest state or federal court which has decided on the matter.

(c) The burden of injecting the issue of mistake of law under subsection (b) of this section is on the defendant, but this does not shift the burden of proof.

(d) A mistake of law, other than as to the existence or meaning of the statute under which the defendant is prosecuted, is relevant to disprove the specific state of mental culpability required by the statute under which the defendant is prosecuted.

(a) In general. - The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives a required element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

(b) Consent to bodily harm. - When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense only if:

(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or

(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport; or

(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title.

(c) Ineffective consent. - Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct; or

(2) It is given by a person who by reason of immaturity, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable and known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct; or

(3) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or

(4) It is induced by force, duress or deception.