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| Home > Statutes > Usa Missouri |
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USA Statutes : missouri
Title : CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LIMITATIONS
Chapter : Chapter 516 Statutes of Limitation
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No action for the recovery of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be
commenced, had or maintained by any person, whether citizen, denizen,
alien, resident or nonresident of this state, unless it appear that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, grantor or other person under whom
he claims was seized or possessed of the premises in question, within ten
years before the commencement of such action. (RSMo 1939 § 1002)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 850; 1919 § 1305; 1909 § 1879
CROSS REFERENCE: Adverse possession, actions to establish title by, RSMo
527.180
General Application
(1951) Three-year limitation statute (§ 140.590) applies to suit to quiet
title and to cancel as void collector's deeds issued under Jones-Munger
Law. Contentions that § 140.590 was repealed by quiet title act (§
527.150) and by §§ 140.330 and 140.570 denied. History of § 140.590
discussed. Pettus v. City of St. Louis, 362 Mo. 603, 242 S.W.2d 723.
(1956) Enforcement of covenants of restriction, which run with land, is
governed by the ten-year statute of limitations (§ 516.010) rather than
the five-year statute. McLaughlin v. Neiger (A.), 286 S.W.2d 380.
(1959) The ten-year statute of limitations runs against a county to
deprive it of title to islands, swamplands and abandoned river beds.
Hamburg Realty Co. v. Walker (Mo.), 327 S.W.2d 155.
(1962) This section is not applicable in action for declaratory judgment
to determine boundary between school districts. Reorg. Sch. Dist. R-I v.
Reorg. Sch. Dist. R-III (A.), 360 S.W.2d 376.
(1969) Acceptance or approval by governmental authority is not necessary
for a common-law dedication if the intention of the dedicator to make the
dedication is clear by the instrument and it is in fact accepted by the
public as demonstrated by the use made of it, which need not be for the
statutory period under this section. Hoechst v. Bangert (Mo.), 440 S.W.2d
476.
(1976) Held, statute of limitations relative to a declaratory judgment
begins to run from the date controversy arose and not from date of
original grant of easement. Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Company
(C.A. Mo.), 528 F.2d 837.
Statute Runs, When
(1955) Where widow occupied property owned by her husband partly as
homestead and remainder adversely, and the same was sold for taxes to her
son by prior marriage under Jones-Munger law, heirs of husband as
remaindermen held not entitled to recover property in action commenced
almost three years after widow's death and fourteen years after tax sale.
Hunott v. Critchlow, 365 Mo. 600, 285 S.W.2d 594.
Statute Arrested, When
(1952) Where wife conveyed through straw party to husband to enable him
to sign bonds, but continued in possession, collected rents and kept
property in repair, resulting trust arose and action to enforce same by
wife was not barred by limitations. James v. James (Mo.), 248 S.W.2d 623.
(1953) Limitations do not begin to run against remaindermen until they
become entitled to possession of land on death of life tenant. Revare v.
Lee (Mo.), 257 S.W.2d 676.
(1955) Where constructive trust in land was found and the trustee did not
repudiate the trust ten years before action brought, claim was not barred
by limitations. Swon v. Huddleston (Mo.), 282 S.W.2d 18.
Adverse Possession
(1951) Where plaintiff and predecessors held land under deed describing
same and containing words "together with accretions thereto" for more
than ten years, they were entitled to an accreted tract as well as main
body of land even though record title was not perfect. Kirschman v.
Cochran (Mo.), 241 S.W.2d 9.
(1951) Where defendant purchased real estate at foreclosure sale, even
though such foreclosure may have been barred under § 516.150, and held
same under claim of right for more than ten years, she had title thereto.
Martin v. Lewis (Mo.), 244 S.W.2d 87.
(1952) Adverse possession defined. City of Kirksville v. Young (Mo.), 252
S.W.2d 286.
(1954) Where lot owners on acquisition of property and their immediate
predecessor obtained, held and used portion of adjoining lot for garden
for more than ten years and at all times assumed that it was their
property and acted on such assumption, title by adverse possession was
established. Barker v. Allen (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 191.
(1956) Where school lot of about half acre had been used for over thirty
years, and conveyances of surrounding land had excepted such lot, owner
of surrounding land held not entitled to such lot after it ceased to be
used for school purposes, although no conveyance to school district could
be found. Feeler v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 4 (Mo.), 290 S.W.2d 102.
(1957) Entry into possession by purchasers at tax sale prior to lapse of
one year from date of sale was wrongful and possession adverse and fact
that purchasers had obtained quit-claim deed from former owners and
attempted to negotiate for such with defendant would not destroy hostile
nature of their possession. Feinstein v. McGuire (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 513.
(1958) It is the intent to possess, and not the intent to take
irrespective of the true owner's right, which makes a holding adverse.
Walters v. Trucker (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 673.
(1958) If the possessor occupies land, intending to hold it as his own,
his occupancy is adverse and it is not necessary that he intend to take
the land from the true owner or that he be indifferent to the facts of
the legal title. Mooney v. Canter (Mo.), 311 S.W.2d 1.
(1958) School district can acquire title to property by adverse
possession. Where one is put in possession of land by parol gift the
possession of the donee is adverse from its inception. Southern Reynolds
Co. School Dist. R-2 v. Callahan (Mo.), 313 S.W.2d 35.
(1960) In action to quiet title and to partition land based on tax
collector's deed which had been held void and on a conveyance by the life
tenant, evidence of adverse possession as against remaindermen held
inadmissible. Klorner v. Nunn (Mo.), 339 S.W.2d 838.
(1961) Evidence held sufficient to show that plaintiff's possession of a
portion of a city lot was adverse and that it was not permissive in its
inception. Ennis v. Korb (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 671.
(1961) Two brothers inherited land from their father and one was
adjudicated dead upon his failure to appear for more than seven years.
Then after the other brother claimed the land adversely for more than the
required length of time, and made valuable improvements on it, the absent
brother appeared and sought to recover his part. The court held that the
evidence was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession in the
brother. Raplogle v. Raplogle (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 735.
(1964) This section was not a bar to suit to set aside deed for lack of
delivery commenced by grantor almost 12 years after execution where
grantor remained in possession and defendants, being apparent
remaindermen not entitled to possession, had held nothing adversely to
plaintiff. Rebmann v. Rebmann (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 663.
(1965) Where corporation was in possession of property for more than ten
years under color of title, and during the entire period collected rents
from other occupants, paid taxes, insured property and collected proceeds
of two fire losses and where possession was not permissive but under
claim of right, the corporation acquired title to realty by adverse
possession and was entitled to compensation for taking by condemnation.
Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of City of St. Louis v. Zitko
(Mo.), 386 S.W.2d 69.
(1965) Where city had taxed entire lot and owner had paid tax this fact
alone would not defeat the city's claim of adverse possession to a
portion of the lot infringed on for street purposes. Terry v. City of
Independence (Mo.), 388 S.W.2d 769.
(1965) A municipality or other public body may acquire a prescriptive
right-of-way over lands of another for street or road purposes. Terry v.
City of Independence (Mo.), 388 S.W.2d 769.
(1968) Evidence held to support title by adverse possession. All elements
of adverse possession discussed. Mitler v. Warner (MO.), 433 S.W.2d 259.
Pleadings
(1952) Petition claimed that plaintiff was fee simple owner of land; that
plaintiff had been in adverse possession thereof and that defendants
claimed some interest therein, and asked court to try, ascertain and
determine title and interest of parties. Defendant's answer claimed fee
simple title and contained like prayer. Judgment holding plaintiff had
title acquired by adverse possession held within issues made by
pleadings. City of Kirksville v. Young (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 286.
Evidence
(1956) Open, continuous and uninterrupted user of real estate for
statutory period creates presumption that user was adverse but the
presumption disappears on appearance of some substantial evidence,
however slight, that user was permissive. Bridle Trail Ass'n. v.
O'Shanick (A.), 209 S.W.2d 401.
(1957) Where adverse possession of grantors lacked over two months of
extending over statutory period, and grantee plaintiff produced no
evidence as to his possession, presumption of continuance of possession
in grantee would not be allowed as plaintiff had knowledge of actual
facts. Feinstein v. McGuire (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 513.
(1961) Evidence held sufficient to establish that plaintiff had hostile
possession of the property, i.e. under a claim of right, for the required
time. Martin v. Pauly (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 748.
(1984) After title to the surface estate has been severed from the
mineral estate, title to the mineral estate cannot be acquired by adverse
possession of the surface alone. General Refractories Co. v. Raack
(Mo.App.), 674 S.W.2d 97.
The right of any person to the possession of any lands,
tenements or hereditaments shall not be impaired or affected by decent,
cast in consequence of the death of any person in possession of any such
estate. (RSMo 1939 § 1003)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 851; 1919 § 1306; 1909 § 1880
If any person entitled to commence any action in sections
516.010 and 516.090 specified or to make any entry be, at the time such
right or title shall first descend or accrue, either within the age of
eighteen years, or mentally incapacitated, the time during which such
disability shall continue shall not be deemed any portion of the time in
sections 516.010 to 516.090 limited for the commencement of such action
or the making of such entry; but such person may bring such action or
make such entry after the time so limited, and within three years after
such disability is removed; provided, that no such action shall be
commenced, had or maintained or entry made by any person laboring under
the disabilities specified in this section, after twenty-one years after
the cause of such action or right of entry shall have accrued. (RSMo 1939
§ 1004, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1990 H.B. 974, A.L. 1991 S.B. 138)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 852; 1919 § 1307; 1909 § 1881
(1976) Held, running of the twenty-four years under this section during
the life of grantor barred heirs from exercising three-year extension
under § 516.050. Pemberton v. Reed (A.), 545 S.W.2d 698.
The possession, under color of title, of a part of a track or
lot of land, in the name of the whole tract claimed, and exercising,
during the time of such possession, the usual acts of ownership over the
whole tract so claimed, shall be deemed a possession of the whole of such
tract. (RSMo 1939 § 1006)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 854; 1919 § 1309; 1909 § 1882
(1960) Evidence as to adverse possession held insufficient to require the
setting aside of the trial court's finding to the contrary. Dunlap v.
Hartman (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 10.
If any person entitled to commence such action or to make such
entry die during the continuance of any disability specified in section
516.030 and no determination or judgment be had of the title, right or
action to him accrued, his heirs, or any person claiming from, by or
under him, may commence such action or make such entry after the time in
sections 516.010 to 516.090 limited for that purpose, and within three
years after his death, but not after that period. (RSMo 1939 § 1007)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 855; 1919 § 1310; 1909 § 1883
(1976) Held, running of twenty-four years under § 516.030 during the life
of grantor barred heirs from exercising three-year extension under §
In all cases where the holder or owner of the legal or equitable
title or estate to real estate situate within this state, conveyed any
such real estate or any interest therein by deed, mortgage, bond for
deed, contract for sale or conveyance of real estate, or by other
instrument executed prior to the first day of January, 1900, and the
spouse failed to join therein, then such spouse so failing to join
therein, or the heirs at law, personal representatives, devisees,
grantees or assignees of such spouse so failing to join therein shall be
barred from recovering any right, title, interest or estate in and to the
lands described in such instrument so executed by the other spouse unless
suit is brought therefor within two years after this section takes
effect; but in case the right under such distributive share has not
accrued by the death of the spouse making any such instrument, then the
one not joining therein is hereby authorized to file in the office of the
recorder of deeds of each county wherein such land or any part thereof is
situate, a notice duly sworn to by the claimant or claimants, setting
forth the claim of the affiants, together with the facts upon which such
claim or claims rest, the residence of such claimants and a complete
description of the land so claimed and affected thereby; and if such
notice, as herein provided, is not filed as required by this section
within two years from the date this section goes into effect, then such
claim or claims shall be forever barred, and no action shall be brought
in any court in this state for the recovery of such lands or any part
thereof or any interest therein. (RSMo 1939 § 1009)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 857; 1919 § 1312
In all cases where the holder or owner of the legal or equitable
title or estate to real estate situate within this state, conveyed any
such real estate or any interest therein by deed, mortgage, bond for
deed, contract for sale or conveyance of real estate, or by other
instrument executed on or subsequent to the first day of January, 1900,
and prior to the first day of January, 1935, and the spouse failed to
join therein, then such spouse so failing to join therein, or the heirs
at law, personal representatives, devisees, grantees or assignees of such
spouse so failing to join therein shall be barred from recovering any
right, title, interest or estate in and to the lands described in such
instrument so executed by the other spouse unless suit is brought
therefor within two years after this section takes effect; but in case
the right under such distributive share has not accrued by the death of
the spouse making any such instrument, then the one not joining therein
is hereby authorized to file in the office of the recorder of deeds of
each county wherein such land or any part thereof is situate, a notice
duly sworn to by the claimant or claimants, setting forth the claim of
the affiants, together with the facts upon which such claim or claims
rest, the residence of such claimants and a complete description of the
land so claimed and affected thereby; and if such notice as herein
provided is not filed as required by this section within two years from
the date this section goes into effect, then such claim or claims shall
be forever barred, and no action shall be brought in any court in this
state for the recovery of such lands or any part thereof or any interest
therein. (L. 1951 p. 357)
Whenever any real estate, the equitable title to which shall
have emanated from the government more than ten years, shall thereafter,
on any date, be in the lawful possession of any person, and which shall
or might be claimed by another, and which shall not at such date have
been in possession of the said person claiming or who might claim the
same, or of anyone under whom he claims or might claim, for thirty
consecutive years, and on which neither the said person claiming or who
might claim the same nor those under whom he claims or might claim has
paid any taxes for all that period of time, the said person claiming or
who might claim such real estate shall, within one year from said date,
bring his action to recover the same, and in default thereof he shall be
forever barred, and his right and title shall, ipso facto, vest in such
possessor; provided, however, that in all cases such action may be
brought at any time within one year from the date at which this section
takes effect and goes into force. (RSMo 1939 § 1008)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 856; 1919 § 1311; 1909 § 1884
In all cases in which the legal title has not yet emanated from
the government of the United States, but in which there has been an
equitable right or title for more than twenty years, under which a
claimant has had a right of action by the statutes of this state, and in
which the land has been in the possession of any person for twenty years,
claiming the same in fee, any person claiming against the possessor shall
bring his action under the legal title within one year after it issues
from the government, and in default thereof, he shall be forever barred,
and his right and title shall, ipso facto, vest in such possessor. (RSMo
1939 § 1010)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 858; 1919 § 1313; 1909 § 1885
Nothing contained in any statute of limitation shall extend to
any lands given, granted, sequestered or appropriated to any public,
pious or charitable use, or to any lands belonging to this state. (RSMo
1939 § 1011)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 859; 1919 § 1314; 1909 § 1886
(2004) Section does not preclude school district from asserting
limitation period in section 516.010 as defense to quiet title action in
land previously used for a school. Basye v. Fayette R-III School District
Board of Education, 150 S.W.3d 111 (Mo.App. W.D.).
No action for breach of a covenant restricting use of land
caused or resulting from the size, height, cost or location of buildings
or other visible improvements on the premises in violation of the
covenant, including a proceeding to compel the removal of buildings or
visible improvements on the land because of the violation of the terms of
the covenant, shall be commenced after two years from the date this
section takes effect or from the date when the right of action accrues,
whichever is the later. Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of
the statutes tolling the statutes of limitations, saving any causes of
action which may have been otherwise barred thereunder, establishing a
time when a cause of action accrues, or excluding certain lands from the
operation and effect of any statute of limitations, no disability or lack
of knowledge on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the
two-year period; and for the purposes of this section, the right of
action shall be deemed to accrue immediately upon the completion of the
building or visible improvements which are in violation of the covenant.
(L. 1963 p. 669)
1. Any action to recover damages for economic loss, personal
injury, property damage or wrongful death arising out of a defective or
unsafe condition of any improvement to real property, including any
action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of
the defect or unsafe condition, shall be commenced within ten years of
the date on which such improvement is completed.
2. This section shall only apply to actions against any person whose sole
connection with the improvement is performing or furnishing, in whole or
in part, the design, planning or construction, including architectural,
engineering or construction services, of the improvement.
3. If any action is commenced against any person specified by subsection
2 of this section, such person may, within one year of the date of the
filing of such action, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 of
this section, commence an action or a third party action for contribution
or indemnity for damages sustained or claimed in any action because of
economic loss, personal injury, property damage or wrongful death arising
out of a defective or unsafe condition of any improvement to real
property.
4. This section shall not apply:
(1) If an action is barred by another provision of law;
(2) If a person conceals any defect or deficiency in the design, planning
or construction, including architectural, engineering or construction
services, in an improvement for real property, if the defect or
deficiency so concealed directly results in the defective or unsafe
condition for which the action is brought;
(3) To limit any action brought against any owner or possessor of real
estate or improvements on such real estate.
5. The statute of limitation for buildings completed on August 13, 1976,
shall begin to run on August 13, 1976, and shall be for the time
specified in this section.
6. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section, if an occupancy permit
is issued, the ten-year period shall commence on the date the occupancy
permit is issued.
(L. 1976 H.B. 1363, A.L. 2002 S.B. 840)
(2000) Sale, assembly and installation of a prefabricated product does
not constitute substantial on-site construction within meaning of
section. Lay v. P & G Health Care, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 310 (Mo.App.W.D.).
1. Except where fraud is involved, no action to recover damages
for an error or omission in the survey of land, nor any action for
contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of an error or
omission may be brought against any person performing the survey more
than five years after the discovery of the error or omission.
2. This section shall become effective January 1, 1990. (L. 1989 H.B.
190, et al.)
Effective 1-1-90
Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real
property, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the
following sections, after the causes of action shall have accrued;
provided, that for the purposes of sections 516.100 to 516.370, the cause
of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the
technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage
resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if
more than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting
damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained. (RSMo
1939 § 1012)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 860; 1919 § 1315; 1909 § 1887
(1972) In suit against abstract company the cause of action shall be
deemed to accrue and limitations shall commence to run only from the time
when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of
ascertainment. Thorne v. Johnson (A.), 483 S.W.2d 658.
(1976) Held, statute of limitations begins to run when public service
commission determined that rate charged was improper, not when improper
charges were made. DePaul Hospital v. Southwestern Bell Telephone (A.),
539 S.W.2d 542.
(1984) Plaintiff's ignorance of his cause of action for legal malpractice
prevented the statute of limitations from running where that ignorance
was totally caused by the actions of his attorney in failing to dismiss a
suit and allowing a default judgment to be entered against his client on
a counterclaim without notifying the client. Anderson v. Griffin, Dysart,
Taylor, Penner (Mo.App.), 684 S.W.2d 858.
The time for commencement of any suit provided for in sections
516.380, 516.390 and 516.400, shall not be tolled by the filing or
pendency of any administrative complaint or action and no such suit may
be brought or maintained unless commenced within the time prescribed by
said sections. An administrative order authorizing the commencement of
any such suit shall not be considered as evidence of the violations
alleged in any such suit. (L. 1993 S.B. 180 § 16)
All actions against physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered
or licensed practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists,
chiropractors, professional physical therapists, and any other entity
providing health care services and all employees of any of the foregoing
acting in the course and scope of their employment, for damages for
malpractice, negligence, error or mistake related to health care shall be
brought within two years from the date of occurrence of the act of
neglect complained of, except that:
(1) In cases in which the act of neglect complained of is introducing and
negligently permitting any foreign object to remain within the body of a
living person, the action shall be brought within two years from the date
of the discovery of such alleged negligence, or from the date on which
the patient in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered such
alleged negligence, whichever date first occurs; and
(2) In cases in which the act of neglect complained of is the negligent
failure to inform the patient of the results of medical tests, the action
for failure to inform shall be brought within two years from the date of
the discovery of such alleged negligent failure to inform, or from the
date on which the patient in the exercise of ordinary care should have
discovered such alleged negligent failure to inform, whichever date first
occurs; except that, no such action shall be brought for any negligent
failure to inform about the results of medical tests performed more than
two years before August 28, 1999. For purposes of this subdivision, the
act of neglect based on the negligent failure to inform the patient of
the results of medical tests shall not include the act of informing the
patient of the results of negligently performed medical tests or the act
of informing the patient of erroneous test results; and
(3) In cases in which the person bringing the action is a minor less than
eighteen years of age, such minor shall have until his or her twentieth
birthday to bring such action.
In no event shall any action for damages for malpractice, error, or
mistake be commenced after the expiration of ten years from the date of
the act of neglect complained of or for two years from a minor's
eighteenth birthday, whichever is later. (L. 1976 S.B. 470 § 2, A.L. 1999
H.B. 274, A.L. 2005 H.B. 393)
CROSS REFERENCE: Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after
August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305
(1985) The reduction of the limitation period for medical malpractice
actions should be applicable only to claims where the alleged act of
malpractice occurred after the effective date of the section. Goodman v.
St. Louis Children's Hospital (Mo. banc), 687 S.W.2d 889.
(1985) The ten-year maximum was designed to limit the "foreign object"
exception to the two year statute, and not to limit the time within which
an infant who suffers damage from malpractice within his first two years
may file suit. McLeran v. St. Luke's Hospital of Kansas City (Mo. banc),
687 S.W.2d 892.
(1992) American Red Cross is health care professional providing health
care services, therefore falls within the two year statute of limitations
of this statute and blood contaminant is not "foreign object" for
purposes of exception to statute of limitation. Smith v. Paslode Corp.,
799 F.Supp. 960 (E.D. Mo.).
(1993) Where plaintiff contracted HIV virus from blood transfusion, Red
Cross is health care services provider and statute of limitations for
medical malpractice claims applies; furthermore, statute's foreign object
exception does not apply because, although HIV was foreign to plaintiff's
body before transfusions, once plaintiff became infected with HIV virus,
virus cannot be removed. Smith v. Paslode Corp., 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir.).
(1994) Patient's suit for strict product liability against health care
provider for implant of defective medical device was not barred by
statute's two year statute of limitations as statute covers all actions
for malpractice, negligence, error or mistake related to health care
which all require some type of fault. Strict liability requires no fault.
Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App.
S.D.).
(1996) Actions brought pursuant to this section are not tolled under
516.170. Batek v. Curators of University of Missouri, 920 S.W.2d 895
(Mo.banc).
(1997) A nine-year lapse in treatment between surgery complained of and
subsequent procedures was not continuing care that would toll the statute
of limitations for a medical malpractice claim. Shah v. Lehman, 953
S.W.2d 955 (Mo.App.E.D.).
Within ten years:
(1) An action upon any writing, whether sealed or unsealed, for the
payment of money or property;
(2) Actions brought on any covenant of warranty contained in any deed of
conveyance of land shall be brought within ten years next after there
shall have been a final decision against the title of the covenantor in
such deed, and actions on any covenant of seizin contained in any such
deed shall be brought within ten years after the cause of such action
shall accrue;
(3) Actions for relief, not herein otherwise provided for. (RSMo 1939 §
1013)
(1975) An action to collect sum allegedly due for holiday pay for firemen
where such claim was based on a city ordinance is a claim on an
"obligation" and must be brought within five years. Barberi v. University
City (A.), 518 S.W.2d 457.
(1976) Action to recover liquidated damages for breach of a covenant in a
lease not to assign or transfer interest in the lease was not based upon
a writing for the payment of money but was based on contract and
therefore was governed by five-year statute of limitations, section
516.120, and not by section 516.110. Bangert v. Boise Cascade Corp.
(C.A.Mo.), 527 F.2d 902.
(1985) Party had ten years, not five, to initiate an action for specific
performance of a real estate contract since the action was for the
enforcement of a contract and not for breach of contract. Oberle v. Monia
(Mo.App.), 690 S.W.2d 840.
Within five years:
(1) All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or
implied, except those mentioned in section 516.110, and except upon
judgments or decrees of a court of record, and except where a different
time is herein limited;
(2) An action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty
or forfeiture;
(3) An action for trespass on real estate;
(4) An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels,
including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for
any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on
contract and not herein otherwise enumerated;
(5) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in
such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting
the fraud. (RSMo 1939 § 1014)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 862; 1919 § 1317; 1909 § 1889
(1967) Five year statute of limitations applies to action by city to
collect delinquent city earnings tax and the statute begins running at
the time the grace period for the payment of the taxes due expires
whether or not a return was filed as the tax became delinquent at that
time. State v. Robertson (A.), 417 S.W.2d 699.
(1967) In action for broker's commission the statute of limitation begins
to run when payment on which commission is based is paid, not when last
service is rendered by broker. Boyd v. Margolin (Mo.), 421 S.W.2d 761.
(1968) The filing of a petition and the issuance of summons halt the
running of a statute of limitations even if the summons is not served
until after the statute would have run out if the plaintiff makes a good
faith attempt to obtain service before the limitation period has run its
course. Emanuel v. Richards (A.), 426 S.W.2d 716.
(1969) An application by a surviving spouse for a year's allowance from
the estate of decedent is not an "action" within the meaning of this
section but is a special proceeding, and limitation period of section did
not apply. In re Estate of Guthland (A.), 438 S.W.2d 12.
(1970) The concealment of a cause of action founded upon fraud does not
toll the period established by subdivision (5) of this section. Anderson
v. Dyer (A.), 456 S.W.2d 808.
(1970) The period of limitation under subdivision (5) of this section
accrues the moment the right to commence the action comes into existence,
but is deferred until the actual discovery of the fraud at any time
within ten years of its perpetration. If the fraud was not discovered or
discoverable during the ten-year hiatus, the cause of action will be
deemed to have accrued at the termination of such period and the statute
of limitations will commence to run at that time, thereby permitting a
maximum of fifteen years for commencement of the suit. Anderson v. Dyer
(A.), 456 S.W.2d 808.
(1974) Failure to request an instruction on the statute of limitations
constitutes an abandonment of that defense. Yeager v. Wittels (A.), 517
S.W.2d 457.
(1975) An action to collect sum allegedly due for holiday pay for firemen
where such claim was based on a city ordinance is a claim on an
"obligation" and must be brought within five years. Barberi v. University
City (A.), 518 S.W.2d 457.
(1976) Action to recover liquidated damages for breach of a covenant in a
lease not to assign or transfer interest in the lease was not based upon
a writing for the payment of money but was based on contract and
therefore was governed by five-year statute of limitations, section
516.120, and not by section 516.110. Bangert v. Boise Cascade Corp. (C.A.
Mo.), 527 F.2d 902.
(1977) Held, in a continuing trespass to real estate recovery is limited
to the five-year period immediately preceding institution of the action.
Cacioppo v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., (A.), 550 S.W.2d 919.
(1985) Five-year limitation period held applicable to civil actions under
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §
1961, commenced when plaintiff had reasonable ground to suspect fraud.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Current Components, Inc., 616 F.Supp. 862
(D.C.Mo.).
(1993) Five year statute of limitations applies to claims for breach of
fiduciary duty. Claims for relief based on fraud accrue, not when
resulting damage is capable of being ascertained, but when facts
constituting fraud are discovered. Koester v. American Republic
Investments, Inc., 11 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.).
(1993) Statute of limitations for actions for alienation of affections is
governed by this section for any other injury to person or rights of
another; therefore, statute of limitations is five years. Miller v.
Neill, 867 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. App. E.D.).
(2001) Subdivision (4) of section applies to inverse condemnation actions
seeking compensation for damage to personal property. Shade v. Missouri
Highway and Transportation Commission, 69 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.App. W.D.).
(2005) Replevin action with five-year limitations period applies for
return of seized weapons legally possessed by owner and not used in
commission of crime. Elam v. Dawson, 156 S.W.3d 807 (Mo.App. W.D.).
Within three years:
(1) An action against a sheriff, coroner or other officer, upon a
liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and in
virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including
the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution or otherwise;
(2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the
action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the state;
(3) An action under section 290.300, RSMo. (RSMo 1939 § 1015, A.L. 2005
S.B. 420 & 344)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 863; 1919 § 1318; 1909 § 1890
(1964) Section 516.110, the ten year statute, and not section 516.130,
the three year statute, is applicable to proceeding on motion for default
judgment on bail bond. State v. Virgilito (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 361.
(1975) This statute of limitation applies to bar action against officers
of federal government brought under the civil rights acts. Peterson v.
Fink (C.A. Mo.), 515 F.2d 815.
(1984) Inmate's federal action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against a prison
official is governed by state's three year statute of limitations
contained in this section for actions against an official acting in his
official capacity. Foster v. Armontrout, 729 F.2d 583.
(1984) The three year period specified in subdivision (1) of this section
was the proper statute of limitations in a civil rights action brought
against Supreme Court justices and state officials. Buford v. Tremayne
(8th Cir.) 747 F.2d 445.
(1998) Director of department of revenue qualifies as "other officer" for
purposes of this section. City of Ellisville v. Lohman, 972 S.W.2d 527
(E.D.Mo.).
Within two years: An action for libel, slander, assault,
battery, false imprisonment, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution
or actions brought under section 290.140, RSMo. An action by an employee
for the payment of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation or
liquidated damages by reason of the nonpayment of minimum wages or
overtime compensation, and for the recovery of any amount under and by
virtue of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
amendments thereto, such act being an act of Congress, shall be brought
within two years after the cause accrued. (RSMo 1939 § 1016, A.L. 1945 p.
644, A.L. 1976 S.B. 470, A.L. 1985 H.B. 225)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 864; 1919 § 1319; 1909 § 1891
CROSS REFERENCE: Action for accounting on pro rata pay back from
nonprobate transfer to personal representation to cover statutory
allowances and claims due estate, RSMo 461.300
(1994) Where defamatory statement was made during FBI investigation,
statute of limitations began to run after indictment, when business began
to decline. Only then did plaintiff learn of false statement and begin to
suffer loss of business. Statute of limitations for slander begins to
run, not when defamatory statement was made, but when damages are
ascertained. Thurston v. Ballinger, 884 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. W.D.).
Within one year: all actions brought by an offender, as defined
in section 217.010, RSMo, against the department of corrections or any
entity or division thereof, or any employee or former employee for an act
in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty. (L. 1990
H.B. 974)
(2000) Section is constitutional and does not violate equal protection,
due process, or the prohibition against special legislation. Cooper v.
Minor, 16 S.W.3d 578 (Mo.banc).
No suit, action or proceeding under power of sale to foreclose
any mortgage or deed of trust, to secure any obligation to pay money or
property, shall be had or maintained after such obligation has been
barred by the statutes of limitation of this state; nor in any event
after the lapse of twenty years from the date at which the last maturing
obligation secured by the instrument sought to be foreclosed is due on
the face of such instrument, unless such termination of said period falls
within two years after the passage of this section, or has heretofore
happened, in which event such suit, action or proceeding may be begun
within two years after the passage of this section without regard to the
date of the instrument or the maturity of the obligation, unless
otherwise barred under the provisions of the general statutes of
limitation, unless before the lapse of said twenty years the owner of the
debt thereby secured or some person for him shall file an affidavit duly
verified, or file an instrument in writing acknowledged as deeds are
required to be acknowledged in order to entitle them to record in this
state, showing the amount due and owing thereon. (RSMo 1939 § 1017)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 865; 1919 § 1320; 1909 § 1892
1. Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, whenever
under the provisions of section 516.150 "the date at which the last
maturing obligation secured by the instrument sought to be foreclosed is
due on the face of such instrument" cannot be determined from the face of
such instrument, the twenty-year period referred to in section 516.150
shall begin to run on the recited date of execution of such instrument,
or if there is no recited date, the date of acknowledgment of such
instrument, or if there is neither a recited date of execution nor a date
of acknowledgment, the date of recording of such instrument, or if there
is none of the above, the original date of the secured obligation, except
that the provisions of this subsection shall apply only to deeds of trust
and mortgages recorded after January 1, 1979.
2. In the case of a security instrument described in section 443.055,
RSMo, the twenty-year period referred to in section 516.150 shall begin
to run on the twentieth anniversary of the recited date of execution of
such security instrument, or if there is no recited date, the date of
acknowledgment of such security instrument, or if there is neither a
recited date of execution nor a date of acknowledgment, the date of
recording of such instrument, except that the provisions of this
subsection shall apply only to such security instruments recorded after
September 1, 1992. (L. 1978 S.B. 665, A.L. 1992 S.B. 688)
In an action brought to recover a balance due on a mutual, open
and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the
parties, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from time of
the last item in the account on the adverse side. (RSMo 1939 § 1019)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 867; 1919 § 1322; 1909 § 1893
Except as provided in section 516.105, if any person entitled to
bring an action in sections 516.100 to 516.370 specified, at the time the
cause of action accrued be either within the age of twenty-one years, or
mentally incapacitated, such person shall be at liberty to bring such
actions within the respective times in sections 516.100 to 516.370
limited after such disability is removed. (RSMo 1939 § 1020, A.L. 1976
S.B. 470, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1990 H.B. 974)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 868; 1919 § 1323; 1909 § 1894
(1977) Statute of limitations is tolled while plaintiff is actually
imprisoned by any proper authority and statute starts to run when
plaintiff is released on parole. Jepson v. Stubbs (Mo.), 555 S.W.2d 307.
(1984) This section was held to toll the five year statute of limitations
in section 516.120 during the course of a ward's incompetence, despite
the appointment of a guardian. Mason v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Cir.) 755
F.2d 120.
(1985) Held, that even though plaintiff could have, by reason of section
507.115, RSMo, filed his action when he became eighteen years of age
without the necessity of a guardian, curator, or next friend, the
two-year limitation was nonetheless tolled, by reason of this statute,
until plaintiff reached age twenty-one. Crawford v. Fenton (A.), 701
S.W.2d 772.
(1987) The provisions of section 516.170, RSMo, protecting the rights of
persons under disability, apply to any statute of limitations borrowed
under the provisions of section 516.190, RSMo. Dorris v. McClanahan, 725
S.W.2d 870 (Mo.banc).
If any person so entitled to sue, die before the expiration of
the time herein limited for the commencement of such suit, if such cause
of action shall survive to his representatives, his executor or
administrator may, after the expiration of such time and within one year
after such death, commence such action, but not after that period. (RSMo
1939 § 1022)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 870; 1919 § 1325; 1909 § 1896
Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of
the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be
a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of
this state. (RSMo 1939 § 1021)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 869; 1919 § 1324; 1909 § 1895
(1974) Any defense against foreign statute by waiver or estoppel should
be recognized in applying this section. Wilburn v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of St. Louis (C.A. Mo.), 492 F.2d 1288.
(1974) Held it is not necessary to raise "borrowing statute" as an
affirmative defense since courts are bound to take judicial notice of the
laws of all states. (C.A. Mo.) McIndoo v. Burnett, 494 F.2d 1311.
(1975) Word "originated" as used in this section means "accrued".
Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Company Inc. (A.), 525 S.W.2d 819.
(1976) Where plaintiff was injured in accident in Illinois while on a
trip that was to begin and end in Missouri and all parties were Missouri
residents and plaintiff had not charged defendants with willful and
wanton misconduct, necessary under the Illinois guest statute,
nevertheless, the Missouri borrowing statute made the Illinois statute of
limitations applicable to plaintiff's action for damages and the action
was barred. Trzecki v. Gruenewald (Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 209.
(1987) The provisions of section 516.170, RSMo, protecting the rights of
persons under disability, apply to any statute of limitations borrowed
under the provisions of section 516.190, RSMo. Dorris v. McClanahan, 725
S.W.2d 870 (Mo.banc).
If at any time when any cause of action herein specified accrues
against any person who is a resident of this state, and he is absent
therefrom, such action may be commenced within the times herein
respectively limited, after the return of such person into the state; and
if, after such cause of action shall have accrued, such person depart
from and reside out of this state, the time of his absence shall not be
deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of
such action. (RSMo 1939 § 1023)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 871; 1919 § 1326; 1909 § 1897
(1980) General statute of limitations was not tolled because of
defendant's absence from the state where defendant was subject to
personal service in another state under long-arm statute. Williams v.
Malone (A.), 592 S.W.2d 879.
(2001) Section denying statute of limitations defense to defendants who
have moved from the state burdens interstate commerce and is
unconstitutional; statute cannot be justified due to applicability of
long-arm jurisdiction over such defendants. Rademeyer v. Farris, 145
F.Supp.2d 1096 (E.D.Mo.), aff'd, 284 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2002).
Whenever any person shall be disabled to prosecute in the courts
of this state by reason of his being an alien, subject or citizen of any
country at war with the United States, the time of the continuance of
such war shall not be deemed any part of the respective periods limited
in sections 516.010 to 516.200 for the making of an entry or the
commencement of any action. (RSMo 1939 § 1024)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 872; 1919 § 1327; 1909 § 1898
Section 516.210 shall not apply to actions for any penalty or
forfeiture given by any statute of this state. (RSMo 1939 § 1025)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 873; 1919 § 1328; 1909 § 1899
If any action shall have been commenced within the times
respectively prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370, and the plaintiff
therein suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him, the judgment be
arrested, or, after a judgment for him, the same be reversed on appeal or
error, such plaintiff may commence a new action from time to time, within
one year after such nonsuit suffered or such judgment arrested or
reversed; and if the cause of action survive or descend to his heirs, or
survive to his executors or administrators, they may, in like manner,
commence a new action within the time herein allowed to such plaintiff,
or, if no executor or administrator be qualified, then within one year
after letters testamentary or of administration shall have been granted
to him. (RSMo 1939 § 1026)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 874; 1919 § 1329; 1909 § 1900
(1977) Dismissal without prejudice is a species of nonsuit and action
could be commenced within one year from such dismissal. State ex rel.
Buchanan County v. Roach (A.), 548 S.W.2d 206.
(1978) So-called "savings statute" concerning right to reinstate suit
within one year after original suit is voluntarily nonsuited is not a
general procedural statute and its action is limited to causes of action
prescribed by statute. Stine v. Kansas City Terminal Railway Company
(A.), 564 S.W.2d 619.
(1985) Savings provision was held not to apply where first action was
filed outside Missouri. King v. Nashua Corp. (8th Cir.), 763 F.2d 332.
(1985) Reversal and remand for a new trial does not constitute reversal
for purposes of invoking the one-year savings provision. Sanders v.
Daniel Intern Corp. 616 F.Supp. 127 (D.C. Mo.).
(1986) One-year refiling period provided by this section applies only to
actions commenced in Missouri. Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Mobay
Chemical Corp. 798 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir.).
If any action is commenced within the time prescribed in
sections 516.010 to 516.230, and the defendant in the suit dies before
judgment, and if the right of action is such as survives against the
representatives of the defendant, the plaintiff may commence a new action
against the heirs, devisees or assigns of the defendant, as the case
requires, within one year after his death; but if an executor or
administrator is appointed then the new action may be commenced against
the executor or administrator within nine months after the first
published notice of letters testamentary or of administration whether
more or less than one year after such death. (RSMo 1939 § 1027, A.L. 1957
p. 292, A.L. 1959 H.B. 95)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 875; 1919 § 1330; 1909 § 1901
When an action commenced within the time prescribed by law shall
abate by reason of the death of the plaintiff, if the right of action
survived to his representatives, his executor or administrator may,
within one year after such death, commence a new action, if the cause of
such action would otherwise survive; and if any action so commenced by an
executor or administrator abate by the death of the plaintiff, a new
action may be commenced by the administrator of the same estate, at any
time within one year after such abatement; or, if no executor or
administrator be appointed within that time, then within one year after
letters testamentary or of administration shall have been granted to him.
(RSMo 1939 § 1028)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 876; 1919 § 1331; 1909 § 1902
Whenever the commencement of any suit shall be stayed by an
injunction of any court or officers authorized to grant the same, the
time during which such injunction shall be in force shall not be deemed
any portion of the time in sections 516.010 to 516.370 limited for the
commencement of such suit. (RSMo 1939 § 1029)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 877; 1919 § 1332; 1909 § 1903
No person shall avail himself of any disability herein
enumerated, unless such disability existed at the time his right of
action or of entry accrued. (RSMo 1939 § 1030)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 878; 1919 § 1333; 1909 § 1904
If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any
other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action
may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement
of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented. (RSMo 1939 § 1031)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 879; 1919 § 1334; 1909 § 1905
(1968) This section is statutory authority for the proposition that
fraudulent concealment of a cause of action is an improper act which, if
established, will toll the running of limitations under section 516.140,
RSMo. Smile v. Lawson (Mo.), 435 S.W.2d 325; Kauchick v. Williams (Mo.),
435 S.W.2d 342.
When there are two or more disabilities existing at the time the
right of action of entry accrued, the limitation herein prescribed shall
not attach until all such disabilities be removed. (RSMo 1939 § 1032)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 880; 1919 § 1335; 1909 § 1906
The provisions of sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend
to any action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute; but
such action shall be brought within the time limited by such statute.
(RSMo 1939 § 1033)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 881; 1919 § 1336; 1909 § 1907
Nor shall any of said provisions apply to suits brought to
enforce payment of bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued by
moneyed corporations. (RSMo 1939 § 1034)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 882; 1919 § 1337; 1909 § 1908
In actions founded on any contract, no acknowledgment or promise
hereafter made shall be evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby
to take any case out of the operation of the provisions of sections
516.100 to 516.370, or deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless
such acknowledgment or promise be made or contained by or in some writing
subscribed by the party chargeable thereby. (RSMo 1939 § 1035)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 883; 1919 § 1338; 1909 § 1909
(2003) Statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claim is
not subject to Kansas tolling statute during pendency of review of claim
by Kansas professional malpractice screening panel. Eichenwald v. Small,
321 F.3d 733 (8th Cir.).
If there be two or more joint contractors or joint executors or
administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor or executor or
administrator shall lose the benefit of the provisions of sections
516.100 to 516.370, so as to be chargeable by reason only of any
acknowledgment or promise made or subscribed by any other or others of
them. (RSMo 1939 § 1036)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 884; 1919 § 1339; 1909 § 1910
Nothing contained in sections 516.320 and 516.330 shall alter,
take away or lessen the effect of a payment of any principal or interest
made by any person. (RSMo 1939 § 1037)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 885; 1919 § 1340; 1909 § 1911
1. Every judgment, order or decree of any court of record of the
United States, or of this or any other state, territory or country,
except for any judgment, order, or decree awarding child support or
maintenance or dividing pension, retirement, life insurance, or other
employee benefits in connection with a dissolution of marriage, legal
separation or annulment which mandates the making of payments over a
period of time or payments in the future, shall be presumed to be paid
and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date of the
original rendition thereof, or if the same has been revived upon personal
service duly had upon the defendant or defendants therein, then after ten
years from and after such revival, or in case a payment has been made on
such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon the record thereof,
after the expiration of ten years from the last payment so made, and
after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition
or revival upon personal service, or from the date of the last payment,
such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no
execution, order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be
brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever. An action to
emancipate a child, and any personal service or order rendered thereon,
shall not act to revive the support order.
2. In any judgment, order, or decree awarding child support or
maintenance, each periodic payment shall be presumed paid and satisfied
after the expiration of ten years from the date that periodic payment is
due, unless the judgment has been otherwise revived as set out in
subsection 1 of this section. This subsection shall take effect as to all
such judgments, orders, or decrees which have not been presumed paid
pursuant to subsection 1 of this section as of August 31, 1982.
3. In any judgment, order, or decree dividing pension, retirement, life
insurance, or other employee benefits in connection with a dissolution of
marriage, legal separation or annulment, each periodic payment shall be
presumed paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the
date that periodic payment is due, unless the judgment has been otherwise
revived as set out in subsection 1 of this section. This subsection shall
take effect as to all such judgments, orders, or decrees which have not
been presumed paid pursuant to subsection 1 of this section as of August
28, 2001.
4. In any judgment, order or decree awarding child support or
maintenance, payment duly entered on the record as provided in subsection
1 of this section shall include recording of payments or credits in the
automated child support system created pursuant to chapter 454, RSMo, by
the division of child support enforcement or payment center pursuant to
chapter 454, RSMo. (RSMo 1939 § 1038, A.L. 1982 S.B. 468, A.L. 1999 S.B.
291, A.L. 2001 S.B. 10)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 886; 1919 § 1341; 1909 § 1912
(1982) Periodic child support judgments that have not been adjudicated to
have lapsed are not "presumed paid" within the meaning of this section.
In re Marriage of Holt (Mo. banc), 635 S.W.2d 335.
(1984) Change in statutory period of limitation excludes from the ten
year bar any judgment awarding maintenance payments over a period of
time, renewed former wife's maintenance judgment for all sums falling due
after the effective date of the statute. Walls v. Walls (Mo.App.), 673
S.W.2d 450.
The limitations prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall
apply to actions brought in the name of this state, or for its benefit,
in the same manner as to actions by private parties. (RSMo 1939 § 1040)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 888; 1919 § 1343; 1909 § 1914
When a defendant in action has interposed an answer, as a
defense, setoff or counterclaim, upon which he would be entitled to reply
in such action, the remedy upon which, at the time of the commencement of
such action, was not barred by law, and such complaint is dismissed, or
the action is discontinued, the time which intervened between the
commencement and the termination of such action shall not be deemed a
part of the time limited for the commencement of an action by the
defendant, to recover for the cause of action so interposed as a defense,
setoff or counterclaim. (RSMo 1939 § 1041)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 889; 1919 § 1344; 1909 § 1915
(1987) With the exception of what might be considered to be purely
defensive pleading such as a setoff or recoupment, a counterclaim which
seeks affirmative relief by asserting a new cause of action like a
medical malpractice, although arising out of the same occurrence and
although not barred at the commencement of the plaintiff's action, is
barred if the counterclaim is filed at a time when it would have been
barred as an original action. Northwest Radiation Oncology v. Goodstal,
735 S.W.2d 762 (Mo.App.E.D.).
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, there
shall be a ten-year statute of limitation on any action for damages for
personal injury caused to an individual by a person within the third
degree of affinity or consanguinity who subjects such individual to
sexual contact, as defined in section 566.010, RSMo. (L. 1989 S.B. 420 §
1)
CROSS REFERENCES: Childhood sexual abuse damage action, time limitation
on bringing action after August 28, 1990, RSMo 537.046 Prosecution for
sexual offenses involving person seventeen or under to be commenced
within ten years of offense, RSMo 556.037
All actions and suits, upon any statute, for any penalty or
forfeiture given in whole or in part to any person who will prosecute for
the same, shall be commenced within one year after the commission of the
offense, and not after. (RSMo 1939 § 3786)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3396; 1919 § 3741; 1909 § 4949
If the penalty is given in whole or in part to the state, or to
any county or city, or to the treasury thereof, a suit therefor may be
commenced, by or in behalf of the state, county or city, at any time
within two years after the commission of the offense, and not after.
(RSMo 1939 § 3787)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3397; 1919 § 3742; 1909 § 4950
All actions upon any statute for any penalty or forfeiture,
given in whole or in part to the party aggrieved, shall be commenced
within three years after the commission of the offense, and not after.
(RSMo 1939 § 3788)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3398; 1919 § 3743; 1909 § 4951
Sections 516.380 to 516.400 shall not apply to any bill,
complaint, information, indictment or action, which is or shall be
limited by any statute to be brought, had, commenced or prosecuted within
a shorter or longer time than is prescribed in said sections; but such
bill, complaint, information, indictment or other suit shall be brought
and prosecuted within the time limited by such statute. (RSMo 1939 § 3789)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3399; 1919 § 3744; 1909 § 4952
None of the provisions of sections 516.380 to 516.420 shall
apply to suits against moneyed corporations or against the directors or
stockholders thereof, to recover any penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to
enforce any liability created by the act of incorporation or any other
law; but all such suits shall be brought within six years after the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which such penalty or
forfeiture attached, or by which such liability was created. (RSMo 1939 §
3790)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3400; 1919 § 3745; 1909 § 4953
No action alleging a procedural defect in the enactment of a
bill into law shall be commenced, had or maintained by any party later
than the adjournment of the next full regular legislative session
following the effective date of the bill as law, unless it can be shown
that there was no party aggrieved who could have raised the claim within
that time. In the latter circumstance, the complaining party must
establish that he or she was the first person aggrieved or in the class
of first persons aggrieved, and that the claim was raised not later than
the adjournment of the next full regular legislative session following
any person being aggrieved. In no event shall an action alleging a
procedural defect in the enactment of a bill into law be allowed later
than five years after the bill or the pertinent section of the bill which
is challenged becomes effective. (L. 1994 S.B. 558)
Effective 6-3-94
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