Missouri Statute | Act | Code |Criminal Procedure| US Code - US Statute | Chapter 546 Trials, Judgments And Executions In Criminal Cases

The trial and all proceedings upon any information filed in a
court of record shall be governed by the law and practice applicable to
trials upon indictments in said court. (RSMo 1939 § 3899)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3509, 1919 § 3854; 1909 § 5062

When a person shall be arraigned upon any indictment or
information, it shall not be necessary to ask him how he will be tried;
and if he deny the charge in any form, or require a trial, or if he
refuse to plead or answer and in all cases when he does not confess the
charge to be true, a plea of not guilty shall be entered, and the same
proceedings shall be had, in all respects, as if he had formally pleaded
not guilty to such indictment or information; provided, however, that no
judgment rendered in any criminal case shall be reversed, set aside or
for naught held for the reason that the record does not show that the
defendant was arraigned and a plea of not guilty entered, where a trial
was had in all respects as though the defendant had been arraigned and
had formally tendered the general issue under a plea of not guilty. (RSMo
1939 § 4004)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3615; 1919 § 3958; 1909 § 5165

(1951) Where jury was present when information was read and was permitted
to hear defendant's refusal to plead thereto but where court gave
instruction that information "is a mere formal statement * * * and is no
evidence whatever of his guilt" there was no prejudicial error. State v.
Lamb (Mo.), 239 S.W.2d 496.

No person indicted for a felony can be tried unless he be
personally present, during the trial; nor can any person be tried or be
allowed to enter a plea of guilty in any other case unless he be
personally present, or the court and prosecuting attorney shall consent
to such trial or plea in the absence of the defendant; and every person
shall be admitted to make any lawful proof by competent witnesses or
other testimony in his defense; provided, that in all cases the verdict
of the jury may be received by the court and entered upon the records
thereof in the absence of the defendant, when such absence on his part is
willful or voluntary, and when so received and entered shall have the
same force and effect as if received and entered in the presence of such
defendant; and provided further, that when the record in the appellate
court shows that the defendant was present at the commencement or any
other stage of the trial, it shall be presumed, in the absence of all
evidence in the record to the contrary, that he was present during the
whole trial. (RSMo 1939 § 4054)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3665; 1919 § 4008; 1909 § 5214

(1956) Where defendant charged with first degree murder was at liberty on
bond and jury was discharged on its failure to reach verdict during his
voluntary, although inadvertent absence from courtroom, his retrial did
not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McCrary, 365 Mo. 799, 287 S.W.2d
785.

(1959) Absence of defendant's counsel from courtroom at time verdict was
returned violated no constitutional right of defendant. State v. Smith
(Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 707.

(1961) Defendant was not deprived of constitutional right to appear and
defend in person where he was represented by competent counsel throughout
all stages of trial and was personally present at all times except when
voluntarily absent for short time during proceedings in chambers when
record of prior convictions was presented to judge under second offender
law. State v. Colbert (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 115.

(1967) Accused's presence is not necessary during proceedings which are
not part of the trial, such as preliminary or formal proceedings or
motions which do not affect his guilt or innocence. State v. Durham
(MO.), 416 S.W.2d 79.

(1968) Where transcript on appeal did not affirmatively show defendant
who was charged with a misdemeanor present at trial and no request for
trial in his absence appeared in record, conviction could not stand.
State v. Cook (MO.), 432 S.W.2d 345.

(1976) Right to appear and defend in criminal prosecutions is a broader
right than the statutory right to be personally present at the trial. A
defendant may waive these rights and his counsel acting unilaterally may
waive defendant's right to be present at a pretrial motion to suppress an
oral confession. State v. Sanders (A.), 539 S.W.2d 458.

All issues of fact in any criminal cause shall be tried by a
jury, to be selected, summoned and returned in a manner prescribed by
law. (RSMo 1939 § 4051)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3662; 1919 § 4005; 1909 § 5212

CROSS REFERENCE: Defendant may waive trial by jury, when, Const. Art. I §
22(a)

But the defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of
the court, may submit the trial of misdemeanors to the court, whose
finding in all such offenses shall have the force and effect of the
verdict of a jury. (RSMo 1939 § 4052)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3663; 1919 § 4006; 1909 § 5213

(1953) On appeal, in misdemeanor trial where jury was waived, the finding
of the court on the merits must be allowed to stand if supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Sargent, 241 A. 1085, 256 S.W.2d 265.

(1953) In usury prosecution, where jury is waived and requested
declarations of law state correct principles and there is substantial
evidence on which to base them, and they are seasonably offered, it is
error to refuse to give them. State v. Sargent, 241 A. 1085, 256 S.W.2d
265.

(1962) Where defendant in a misdemeanor case is present and represented
by counsel, and there is no request for a jury, his consent to be tried
by the court is presumed. State v. Belleville (A.), 362 S.W.2d 77.

The proceedings prescribed by law in civil cases, in respect to
the impaneling of jurors, the keeping them together, and the manner of
rendering their verdict, shall be had upon trials on indictments and
prosecutions for criminal offenses, except in cases otherwise provided by
statute. (RSMo 1939 § 4068)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3679; 1919 § 4023; 1909 § 5229

The jury being impaneled and sworn, the trial may proceed in the
following order:

(1) The prosecuting attorney must state the case and offer the evidence
in support of the prosecution;

(2) The defendant or his counsel may then state his defense and offer
evidence in support thereof;

(3) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting testimony only,
unless the court, for good reason in furtherance of justice, permit them
to offer evidence upon their original case;

(4) In every trial for a criminal offense the court shall instruct the
jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in the case which are
necessary for their information in giving the verdict, which instructions
shall include a definition of the term reasonable doubt;

(5) Unless the case be submitted without argument, the counsel for the
prosecution shall make the opening argument, the counsel for the
defendant shall follow, and the counsel for the prosecution shall
conclude the argument. (RSMo 1939 § 4070, A.L. 1983 S.B. 276, A.L. 1984
S.B. 448 § A effective 10-1-84)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3681; 1919 § 4025; 1909 § 5231

Effective 10-1-84

(1952) In murder case evidence showed defendant without provocation or
forewarning "bumped into" victim and as he (victim) turned around
defendant shot him. Defendant claimed that because of illness or beating
or intoxication he did not recall incident. Instruction on accidental
shooting not required. State v. Slaten (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 330.

(1953) Court could not review refusal of trial court to give instruction
converse to state's main instruction where new trial witness and, on
cross-examination for purpose of impeachment, case. State v. Dennis
(Mo.), 242 S.W.2d 534.

(1953) Where defendant's evidence indicated that he committed robbery,
not of his own volition, but because of a well-grounded fear of present,
imminent and impending death or serious bodily injury at the hands of
others, court was required to instruct jury on issue of duress. State v.
St. Clair (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 25.

(1954) Instruction reciting "insanity interposed by counsel of the
defendant as an excuse for the charge" held erroneous as tending to
disparage legal defense. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 267 S.W.2d 642.

(1954) Instruction in rape prosecution requiring defendant to prove
insanity "to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury" held erroneous.
State v. Johnson (Mo.), 267 S.W.2d 642.

(1954) Argument on behalf of state that defendant was contending that he
could not be convicted because he had theretofore been adjudicated insane
and confined to mental hospital and statement that if found insane he
would be out in two months held erroneous. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 267
S.W.2d 642.

(1956) Reference to fact in opening statement that defendant, although
being tried separately, had been charged jointly with others held not
error. State v. Deppe (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 776. (1956) Mere nondirection in
misdemeanor case is not error since § 546.070 does not apply. State v.
Griffin (A.), 289 S.W.2d 455.

(1956) Where no objection is made to instructions at time they are given
and read to the jury, court on appeal cannot review alleged errors
therein. State v. Rush (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 767; (1956) State v. Lawson
(Mo.), 290 S.W.2d 84.

(1958) Argument by prosecuting attorney that in the event of acquittal or
light sentence the defendant would commit another crime is improper but,
where general objection was made, the trial court was within its
discretion in not ordering a new trial. State v. Eckenfels (Mo.), 316
S.W.2d 532.

(1960) Where defendant formulates and asks an instruction that correctly
states the law which is the converse of the state's principal instruction
it is duty of the trial court to give the same. State v. McWilliams
(Mo.), 331 S.W.2d 610.

(1960) In prosecution for operating vehicle in excess of speed limit it
was prejudicial error for judge to permit interruption of defendant's
testimony to allow two patrolmen to give testimony beyond their own
testimony in chief, contrary to and in rebuttal of defendant's
interrupted testimony. State v. Hunt (A.), 335 S.W.2d 506.

(1961) Where the defendant in his direct testimony and in
cross-examination gave some evidence as to his prior convictions but did
not offer any evidence to prove his good reputation it was error on the
part of the court to give a good character instruction which stated that
the law presumed that the person whose character is good is less likely
to commit a crime than one whose character is not good. State v. Baldwin
(Mo.), 349 S.W.2d 212.

(1961) Where the defendant offered an incorrect instruction on a
collateral matter (in this case on the effect of impeaching testimony)
the court is required to give a correct instruction. State v. Chaney
(Mo.), 349 S.W.2d 238.

(1962) Trial court need not instruct on alibi unless requested to do so
and stated objections by defendant's counsel immediately prior to giving
of instructions that the court "failed to instruct the jury on all the
law in the case involved, such as alibi instruction" did not constitute a
request for alibi instruction. State v. Harris (Mo.), 356 S.W.2d 889.

(1962) Phrase in reasonable doubt instruction that "but a doubt to
authorize an acquittal on that ground ought to be substantial doubt",
upheld against contention that it lessened the burden of state's proof.
State v. Sanders (Mo.), 358 S.W.2d 45.

(1962) As a general rule this section has no application to misdemeanor
cases. State v. Katz Drug Company (A.), 362 S.W.2d 80.

(1962) Words "if proven to your satisfaction" in instruction to jury on
consideration to be given to previous good character of defendant in
prosecution for murder, though technically erroneous, were not manifestly
prejudicial. State v. Demaree (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 500.

(1962) Instruction on self-defense in prosecution for murder containing
the words that if defendant had "reasonable cause to believe and did
believe that it was necessary for him to shoot and kill" the deceased in
order to protect himself held not reversible error against charges that
it denied defendant the right to act upon appearances and restricted his
right to single hypothesis that it was necessary "to kill" in order to
protect himself. State v. Demaree (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 500.

(1963) In prosecution for robbery in first degree it was proper, assuming
it not to be mandatory, for the court to instruct that voluntary
intoxication is no excuse for commission of crime, although intoxication
was not raised by defendant as an excuse, since the record was replete
with testimony concerning intoxication of defendant. State v. Sawyer
(Mo.), 365 S.W.2d 487.

(1963) Burden of proof instruction using phrase "establishes his guilt to
your satisfaction" in conjunction with phrases "beyond a reasonable
doubt" and "to a moral certainty" held not to minimize defendant's rights
or the presumption of his innocence. State v. Caffey (Mo.), 365 S.W.2d
607.

(1963) In prosecution for second degree murder where facts created issue
of self-defense the court erred in failing to instruct thereon
notwithstanding the state's verdict directing instruction required jury
to find that defendant acted "with malice aforethought". State v. Austin
(Mo.), 367 S.W.2d 485.

(1963) Where defendant adduced substantial evidence as to his good
character he was entitled to the benefit of that evidence if the jury
found from a preponderance of the evidence that he was of good character,
and an instruction that jury was to consider good character of defendant
if proven to its reasonable satisfaction was error. State v. Jackson
(Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 199.

(1963) Where information charged defendant "on or about the 30th day of
March, A.D. 1962", did certain acts in violation of city ordinance, and
all of evidence submitted related to events occurring on March 29, 1962,
verdict directing instruction which, through typographical error,
required jury to find defendant guilty if they found she did the alleged
acts "on or about the 29th day of May" was reversible error. Kansas City
v. Martin (A.), 369 S.W.2d 602.

(1963) In robbery prosecution wherein testimony of accomplice constituted
major part of state's evidence, court did not err in failing to give sua
sponte an accomplice instruction since such instruction would have been
purely cautionary and collateral to principal issue involved. State v.
Garton (Mo.), 371 S.W.2d 283.

(1964) Judge's statement to jury after submission of cause and in answer
to their question about sentence to be imposed, that jury should refer to
instructions and the three forms of verdict given them and that court
would have no objection to jury using form of verdict that did not refer
to the prior conviction if they felt it appropriate was not the giving of
an instruction within rule requiring instruction of jury in writing.
State v. Baugh (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 608.

(1964) Court did not err in refusing to give instruction requested by
defendant to the effect that jury could not consider failure of the
accused to take the stand nor draw any unfavorable inference therefrom.
State v. Perkins (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 701.

(1964) Where the defendant was charged in one information with burglary
and stealing, court was required without request to instruct jury that
they could convict of one offense and acquit of the other and as there
was nothing in the record to show that defendant waived this right,
failure to so instruct was reversible error. State v. Qualls (Mo.), 383
S.W.2d 547.

(1966) If there was substantial evidence to support the submission of the
offense, the trial court is required to give an instruction on the
offense whether requested or not. State v. Adams (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 608.

(1967) Court's failure to instruct jury on issue of excusable homicide
because of accident in homicide prosecution where defendant testified
that gun went off accidentally was plain error affecting substantial
rights, although not set forth as an assignment of error in motion for
new trial. State v. Haygood (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 230.

(1967) An instruction which purports to cover the whole case but which
entirely ignores a defense supported by evidence is erroneous and
constitutes reversible error. State v. Drane (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 105.

(1971) For error to instruct on the subject of good character when such
an instruction was requested by the defendant in prosecution for
misdemeanor of keeping intoxicants on premises licensed for sale of
nonintoxicating beer, the judgment was reversed and case remanded. State
v. Russo (A.), 470 S.W.2d 164.

(1973) Where defendant assigned as error the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury as to the legal effect to be given to the evidence
concerning defendant's breath test for blood alcohol, it was not grounds
for setting aside the verdict in this misdemeanor case, where jury was
not misdirected or the court did not refuse to give proper instructions
offered by the defendant. State v. Kramme (A.), 491 S.W.2d 24.

(1974) The term "whenever necessary" in subdivision (4) means that such
an instruction is necessary only when there is substantial evidence
tending to show the good character of the defendant. State v. Antwine
(Mo.), 506 S.W.2d 397.

(1975) In prosecution for second degree murder, where defendant was
convicted of manslaughter, circumstantial evidence including appellant's
attempt to procure false testimony, his flight from scene, his
destruction and attempted destruction of evidence, and his admission of
having sought to remove suspicion from himself by falsely stating that
victim committed suicide was sufficient to establish submissible case and
instruction on manslaughter was properly given although there was no
evidence of provocation by victim. State v. Stapleton (Mo.), 518 S.W.2d
292.

(1987) It was error to give instruction on reputation of defendant where
defendant did not present any evidence at trial as to his general
reputation for good character. State v. Stone 731 S.W.2d 466
(Mo.App.S.D.).

Whenever on the trial of any felony or misdemeanor, there shall
appear to be any variance between the statement in the indictment or
information and the evidence offered in proof thereof, in the Christian
name or surname, or both the Christian name and surname, or other
description whatsoever, or any person whomsoever therein named or
described, or in the name or description of any matter or thing
whatsoever therein named or described, or in the ownership of any
property named or described therein, such variance shall not be deemed
grounds for an acquittal of the defendant, unless the court before which
the trial shall be had shall find that such variance is material to the
merits of the case and prejudicial to the defense of the defendant. (RSMo
1939 § 3951)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3562; 1919 § 3907; 1909 § 5114

(1964) Court did not err in permitting substitution of information for
indictment at close of evidence and before submission of case to jury
where the only difference was that information stated both the name and
alias of person to whom defendant sold marijuana and indictment stated
only the alias since defendant had known for over a month the true name
of the person named in indictment. State v. Whittington (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d
518.

Upon the trial of any indictment or information the court may at
any stage of the proceeding, in furtherance of justice, amend or supply
any pleading, writ, process, entry, return or other proceedings; and the
court in which the indictment was found, or the information filed, or in
which the trial is had, may at any time before final disposition of the
cause, either in such court or the court to which the same may have been
appealed, and, whether at the same or different term of court, amend or
supply any record in accordance with the fact. If the same be pending on
appeal at the time any such record is amended or supplied, the part
thereof so amended or supplied shall be immediately certified to the
appellate court by the clerk of such trial court. (RSMo 1939 § 3954)

Prior revision: 1929 § 3565

(1953) Reference in argument by state's attorney to defendant as "spook"
and "burglar" held not error where court admonished jury that there was
no justification for the statement and directed that it be stricken and
disregarded entirely. State v. Rousslang (Mo.), 258 S.W.2d 627.

If, in the progress of any trial before an associate circuit
judge, it shall appear that the accused ought to be put upon his trial
for an offense not cognizable before an associate circuit judge, the
judge shall immediately stop all further proceedings before him, and
shall transfer the case to a circuit judge. (L. 1978 H.B. 1634)

Effective 1-2-79

No person shall be rendered incompetent to testify in criminal
causes by reason of his being the person injured or defrauded, or
intended to be injured or defrauded, or that would be entitled to
satisfaction for the injury, or is liable to pay the costs of the
prosecution. (RSMo 1939 § 4078)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3689; 1919 § 4033; 1909 § 5239

CROSS REFERENCE: Civil practice as to witnesses in civil and criminal
trials, RSMo 491.070

1. No person shall be incompetent to testify as a witness in any
criminal cause or prosecution by reason of being the person on trial or
examination, or by reason of being the husband or wife of the accused,
but any such facts may be shown for the purpose of affecting the
credibility of such witness; provided, that no person on trial or
examination, nor wife or husband of such person, shall be required to
testify, but any such person may testify at his or her option either on
behalf of or against the defendant, and shall be liable to
cross-examination, as to any matter referred to in his examination in
chief, and may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the
case; provided, that in no case shall husband or wife, when testifying
under the provisions of this section, be permitted to disclose
confidential communications had or made between them in the relation of
such husband and wife.

2. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section or any other provision of
law to the contrary, in any criminal prosecution under chapter 565, 566
or 568, RSMo, involving an alleged victim under the age of eighteen, a
spouse shall be a competent witness against a defendant spouse, and no
spousal privilege as set forth in subsection 1 of this section or any
other provision of law shall exist. (RSMo 1939 § 4081, A.L. 1985 H.B.
366, et al.)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3692; 1919 § 4036; 1909 § 5242

Effective 7-19-85

(1952) The "matter referred to in his examination in chief" means the
things he testifies about. If defendant in chief in a general way refers
to a subject, he may be examined in detail as to that subject. State v.
Christian (Mo.), 245 S.W.2d 895.

(1952) Where defendant ex-policeman testified as to his work as policeman
and his training, cross-examination as to whether he got in trouble
during training was improper but general objection not sufficient to
preserve objection. Specific objection on ground no conviction shown made
at close of cross-examination also not sufficient to preserve same. State
v. Slaten (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 330.

(1953) Where defendants on direct examination denied stealing corn, they
could be cross-examined as to their signatures to conflicting statements
as to crime made in prosecuting attorney's office, even though statements
were not introduced and particularly is this so where stenographer
testified without objection from her notes as to matters contained in
such statements. State v. Kaufman (Mo.), 254 S.W.2d 640.

(1953) Where defendant in criminal case offered himself as witness and,
on cross-examination for purpose of impeachment, gave false answers as to
his prior convictions of crime, he was guilty of perjury. State v.
Swisher, 364 Mo. 157, 260 S.W.2d 6.

(1956) Where officer was called by defense in robbery prosecution to
impeach state's witnesses, his cross-examination, for the purpose of
showing defendant had been arrested on another charge, held error. State
v. Ingram (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 733.

(1957) Wife, testifying voluntarily, held competent witness against her
husband in prosecution for acts constituting crime of personal violence
against her child. State v. Kollenborn (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 855.

(1958) In prosecution upon charge of performing an abortion where
defendant's testimony on direct examination was in effect a general
denial, cross-examination of defendant in regard to the right of access
to and control of the house in which state's evidence tended to show the
abortion took place was proper. State v. Scown (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 782.

(1958) Under common law court did not err in permitting wife to testify
on behalf of state in prosecution of defendant for statutory rape of his
eight-year-old daughter as to what she found when she returned home and
found defendant and the child. State v. Greer (Mo.), 313 S.W.2d 711.

(1959) Where defendant in criminal case took stand, cross-examination of
him with respect to his former convictions was a proper method of
impeachment. State v. Reece (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 656.

(1959) Where husband on trial for murder testified to an alleged
confidential communication between him and his wife and by such testimony
attempted to blacken her reputation for his own advantage, he was held to
have waived her incompetency and her testimony as to the communication
and as to the commission of the crime was properly admitted in rebuttal.
State v. Bledsoe (Mo.), 325 S.W.2d 762.

(1959) Where defendant took stand as witness, his cross-examination as to
prior convictions, including misdemeanor convictions, held proper. State
v. Ivory (Mo.), 327 S.W.2d 870.

(1960) Where defendant makes sweeping denial of commission of crime in
testimony on his own behalf, he is liable to cross-examination,
contradiction and impeachment as any other witness. State v. Beishir
(Mo.), 332 S.W.2d 898.

(1960) Spouse of individual charged with crime is not precluded from
testifying against coindictee of spouse where such coindictee is
separately tried. State v. Gyngard (Mo.), 333 S.W.2d 73.

(1960) Where defendant in criminal case takes stand as witness in his own
behalf he may be cross-examined as any other witness with respect to
former convictions upon the issue of his credibility as a witness. State
v. Morton (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 858.

(1961) After asking a series of prejudicial and improper questions of
defendant which related to matters beyond scope of direct examination
objections to which were sustained by the court, comment by prosecuting
attorney that "if the court please, we have got the right to put on some
testimony from this witness" prejudiced the rights of defendant and was
not relieved by direction of court to disregard the statement. State v.
Sarten (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 1.

(1962) Where defendant, in prosecution for subornation of perjury,
testified as to his truthfulness it was proper for state to cross-examine
defendant regarding prior jail sentence and fine for contempt of court
for false swearing. State v. Baldwin (Mo.), 358 S.W.2d 18.

(1962) Admission in evidence of photograph of defendant taken after
arrest showing defendant's hair to be long where at time of trial he had
a crew cut and identity of defendant was disputed, upheld against
contention it compelled defendant to testify against himself. State v.
Sanders (Mo.), 358 S.W.2d 45.

(1962) Defendant in robbery prosecution, by taking the stand and
testifying in his own defense, waived the error, if any, in requiring him
to be sworn before exhibiting himself before jury in hat, sweater, gloves
and stocking mask worn by robber. State v. Byrd (Mo.), 360 S.W.2d 614.

(1963) In prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon it was prejudicial
error to admit testimony in rebuttal that defendant had remained silent
when asked by officer at time of arrest why he was carrying the pistol.
State v. Vainikos (Mo.),366 S.W.2d 423.

(1966) Credibility of defendant who elects to take stand in his own
behalf may be attacked like that of any other witness by showing prior
convictions. State v. McClain (Mo.), 404 S.W.2d 186.

(1970) The right of an accused to testify in his own behalf is a
statutory and not a constitutional right. State v. Hutchinson (Mo.), 458
S.W.2d 553.

(1974) Cross-examination as to whether defendant changed coats with a
codefendant before a police lineup was proper since on direct examination
the denial of guilt by the defendant was broad enough to allow evidence
of consciousness of guilt or a disposition to conceal the alleged crime
as indicated by the changing of coats. State v. Kirk (A.), 510 S.W.2d 196.

(1976) When defendant testified that he did not shoot victim but that
third person did, evidence that defendant attempted to suborn perjury in
support of his testimony constitutes direct contradiction of his
examination in chief and is admissible to impeach him. State v. Moore
(A.), 546 S.W.2d 10.

(1977) Held, a person may testify against his spouse, the privilege
belongs to the witness and must be asserted by the witness. State v.
Frazier (A.), 550 S.W.2d 590.

(1977) Where defendant testified on direct examination that he had never
been "in trouble" except for one instance, cross-examination as to prior
arrests was permissible. State v. Payton (A.), 559 S.W.2d 551.

(1986) The husband-wife privilege does not apply to communications
relating to contemplated future crimes. State v. Heistand (Mo.banc), 708
S.W.2d 125.

(1987) Person on trial for selling marijuana who testified in his own
behalf was subject to cross examination on subject of identity of
supplier pursuant to this section in view of defendant's numerous
references to supplier and defendant's implication that defendant was
motivated to sell marijuana to pay a cocaine debt owed to supplier. State
v. McClintic, 731 S.W.2d 853 (Mo.App.S.D.).

If the accused shall not avail himself or herself of his or her
right to testify, or of the testimony of the wife or husband, on the
trial in the case, it shall not be construed to affect the innocence or
guilt of the accused, nor shall the same raise any presumption of guilt,
nor be referred to by any attorney in the case, nor be considered by the
court or jury before whom the trial takes place. (RSMo 1939 § 4082)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3693; 1919 § 4037; 1909 § 5243

(1951) Argument by prosecuting attorney that "defendant has not even
testified" constitutes reversible error and when such statement is not
competent for any purpose a general objection is sufficient. State v.
Dupepe (Mo.), 241 S.W.2d 4.

(1952) Statement in argument on questions as to first and second degree
murder, inquiring "What evidence do you have on the condition of his
mind?" and stating "Even if you believe" witness "who, I tell you, was a
perjurer" * * * and further statement that defendant shot deceased and
inquiry "Did they make any defense of it?" held not improper comments on
evidence. State v. Johnson, 362 Mo. 833, 245 S.W.2d 43.

(1954) Statement by prosecuting attorney that defense "offered no
evidence at all" was not comment on failure of accused to testify in
violation of this section. State v. Hayzlett (Mo.), 265 S.W.2d 321.

(1955) Where defendant's wife failed to testify prosecutor's query in
argument, "Who can identify where he was that morning other than his wife
and two kids?" held error as comment on failure of wife to testify. State
v. Wyatt (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 86.

(1955) Statement that there was no evidence on defendant's side and that
state's evidence was uncontradicted held not comment on failure of
defendant to testify. State v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.

(1955) Prosecutor's statement that there was "no evidence here to refute
what any of these people said" held not comment on failure of accused to
testify. State v. Murray (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 809.

(1955) Where prosecutor in objecting to statement of defense counsel that
state witnesses had testified defendant told them he was just walking by
burglarized premises, stated in effect that defendant had not testified
in case, a mistrial should have been declared. State v. Lindner (Mo.),
282 S.W.2d 547.

(1957) Statement that "on one side is the state's evidence, not
contradicted. And what is on the defense side? It is empty." held not
comment on accused's failure to testify. State v. Hite (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d
411.

(1957) Where defendant takes stand, his failure to testify on specific
facts in the case is a legitimate subject for comment by the state in
argument. State v. Stidham (Mo.), 305 S.W.2d 7.

(1959) Statement in instruction on alibi defense that defendant "says he
was not present at the time and place" etc. held not comment on
defendant's failure to testify. State v. Heissler (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 714.

(1962) Comment by state counsel that ". . . the State's evidence is
unrefuted, it is undisputed, and it is undenied", held not be to comment
on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Powell (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 914.

(1962) Statement by prosecuting attorney in closing argument that "when
the state had concluded its evidence in this case the defense was free to
offer any evidence it chose and none was forthcoming" was permissible
comment where defendant offered no evidence. State v. Michael (Mo.), 361
S.W.2d 664.

(1964) Arguments by prosecuting attorney that the only evidence in the
case was the evidence the state produced and that if jurors were accused
of murder and were innocent and could prove it they would probably do so
were not proper comments of failure of defendant to testify. State v.
Perkins (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 701.

(1964) Court did not err in refusing to give instruction requested by
defendant to the effect that jury could not consider failure of the
accused to take the stand nor draw any unfavorable inference therefrom.
State v. Perkins (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 701.

(1965) Prosecutors and judges may not comment adversely on the failure of
a defendant to testify in a state criminal trial. Griffin v. State of
California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed.2d 106. (1966) Griffin
v. State of California rule prohibiting prosecutors and judges from
commenting adversely on failure of defendant to testify in state criminal
trial does not apply retroactively. Teban v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453.

(1966) Statement by prosecutor that property was found in home of
defendant, and that there has been no explanation as to how it got there
does not constitute reference to defendant's failure to testify. State v.
Kennedy (Mo.), 396 S.W.2d 595.

(1966) It is not error to refuse to give instruction relating to
defendant's failure to testify in case, even when the instruction is
requested by defendant. State v. Barker (Mo.), 399 S.W.2d 1.

(1966) Statement by prosecutor that "malice can be inferred from the
facts; he intentionally shot him, and he has voiced here on different
occasions that he shot him. One: 'I shot him down like a dirty dog.' It
wasn't controverted. The defendant didn't deny it; there was no evidence"
was not a reference to failure of defendant to testify. State v. Gregg
(Mo.), 399 S.W.2d 7.

(1966) Statement by prosecuting attorney that "and at the close of the
State's case the defendant had an opportunity to present any evidence
that they wanted to show, and none was forthcoming" was not reference to
accused's failure to testify. State v. Hodge (Mo.), 399 S.W.2d 65.

(1966) Statement by prosecutor that evidence on behalf of state was
uncontradicted was not comment on defendant's failure to present
evidence. State v. Caffey (Mo.), 404 S.W.2d 171.

(1969) Statement by prosecutor that the state's evidence was
uncontradicted did not constitute a comment on the failure of defendant
to take the witness stand. State v. Robb (Mo.), 439 S.W.2d 510.

(1972) Instruction to jury over defendant's objection, that defendant's
failure to testify should not give rise to a presumption of guilt or
inference of any nature was not error. State v. Smart (Mo.), 485 S.W.2d
90.

(1972) Prohibition against comment on defendant's failure to testify does
not prohibit general comment on failure of accused to offer evidence.
State v. Schrest (Mo.), 485 S.W.2d 96.

(1973) Held that when the trial court judge said to defendant "Will you
be sworn, sir; are you going to testify?" constituted "plain error" and
instructing jury to disregard does not cure the error. State v. Gray
(A.), 503 S.W.2d 457.

(1974) Prosecutor's comment "that is to say, that the defendant himself
elected not to testify" is reversible error. State v. McNeal (A.), 517
S.W.2d 187.

(1987) Argument focusing on the lack of evidence offered to explain the
presence of stolen property in possession of defendant who did not
testify on his own behalf in trial for burglary and theft is not comment
on the defendant's failure to testify in violation of this section. State
v. Masterson, 733 S.W.2d 40 (Mo.App.S.D.)

When two or more persons shall be jointly indicted or
prosecuted, the court may, at any time before the defendants have gone
into their defense, direct any defendant to be discharged, that he may be
a witness for the state. A defendant shall, also, when there is not
sufficient evidence to put him on his defense, at any time before the
evidence is closed, be discharged by the court for the purpose of giving
his testimony for a codefendant. The order of discharge shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense. (RSMo 1939 § 4080)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3691; 1919 § 4035; 1909 § 5241

CROSS REFERENCE: Persons convicted of crime competent witnesses, RSMo
491.050

(1968) This section does not prevent codefendant from testifying for
state after the charge against him has been disposed of by plea of guilty
and before sentencing. Irregularity of asking status of witness' case in
hearing of jury not prejudiced in this case. State v. Blevins (Mo.), 427
S.W.2d 367.

If on the trial or other proceeding in a criminal cause, the
existence, constitution or powers of any banking company or corporation,
shall become material, or be in any way drawn in question, it shall not
be necessary to produce a certified copy of the charter or act of
incorporation, but the same may be proved by general reputation, or by
the printed statute book of the state, government or country by which
such corporation was created. (RSMo 1939 § 4077)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3688; 1919 § 4032; 1909 § 5238

(1954) Existence of banking corporation held shown by evidence of its
general reputation, by testimony of its cashier and by testimony of a
lawyer from his investigation of the records. State v. Weed (Mo.), 271
S.W.2d 557.

In all criminal cases, where the defendant is charged with any
offense against the laws of this state, the fact of the former acquittal
or conviction of such defendant of such offense may be shown under the
general issue or plea of not guilty. (RSMo 1939 § 4053)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3664; 1919 § 4007

(1973) Conviction in Kansas for possession of stolen property not a bar
to prosecution in Missouri for theft of same property. State v. Glover
(A.), 500 S.W.2d 271.

On the trial of any indictment or prosecution for a criminal
offense, exceptions to any decisions of the court may be made in the same
cases and manner provided by law in all civil cases; and bills of
exceptions shall be settled, signed, sealed and filed as now allowed by
law in civil actions, and the same proceedings may be had to compel or
procure the signing and sealing of such bills, and the return thereof, as
in civil cases. (RSMo 1939 § 4084)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3695; 1919 § 4039; 1909 § 5245

CROSS REFERENCES: Appeals in criminal cases, when granted, RSMo 547.070,
547.090 Assignment of error or joinder in crime not necessary in appeal
or writ of error, RSMo 547.270

(1951) Where purported transcript of record did not contain certificate
showing it to have been agreed to and allowed as a bill of exceptions nor
was it shown to have been agreed to as required by § 512.110 and rules
1.31 and 1.34 of supreme court, review on appeal would be limited to
record proper. State v. Bird (Mo.), 242 S.W.2d 576.

The court shall not, on the trial of the issue in any criminal
case, sum up or comment upon the evidence, or charge the jury as to
matter of fact, unless requested to so do by the prosecuting attorney and
the defendant or his counsel; but the court may instruct the jury in
writing on any point of law arising in the cause. (RSMo 1939 § 4083)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3694; 1919 § 4038; 1909 § 5244

(1954) Where judge, after jury began deliberations, pointed out expense
of trial and desirability of reaching verdict and told them they should
respect opinions of others and attempt to arrive at a verdict while
adhering to instructions, there was no error. State v. Roberts (Mo.), 272
S.W.2d 190.

(1956) An inquiry as to how a jury stands numerically after it has
deliberated two hours is not coercive per se but whether it is coercive
must be determined on the record of what was said and done at the time.
State v. Baker (Mo.), 293 S.W.2d 900.

(1956) Statement by court in ruling objection in presence of jury, to the
effect that drunkenness of prosecuting witness constituted no defense in
robbery case held not prejudicial error. State v. Swiney (Mo.), 296
S.W.2d 104.

(1957) Remarks of court held not comment on evidence. State v. Moore
(Mo.), 303 S.W.2d 60.

(1958) In robbery prosecution where defendant was accused of giving
signal to confederates by lighting match and where witnesses testified
they did not see cigarette in defendant's hand, comment by judge that as
matter of law evidence was that defendant did not have cigarette held
unwarranted and erroneous. State v. Fields (Mo.), 314 S.W.2d 723.

(1959) Statement by court on voir dire examination that information
charged two prior convictions, although information charged only one,
held not prejudicial in case where defendant testified on direct
examination that he entered pleas of guilty to other offenses. State v.
Rose (Mo.), 325 S.W.2d 485.

(1960) Instruction not requested by defendant, limiting jury's
consideration of any other offense participated in by defendant to sole
purpose of shedding light upon identification and presence of defendant
at the time of shooting of deceased was cautionary instruction for
benefit of defendant and not improper. Use of word "alibi" in another
instruction was not prejudicial. State v. Griffin (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 364.

(1964) Statement by court to jury after it had retired and in answer to a
question relating to time defendant would serve if given life sentence
and whether or not defendant could be paroled constituted prejudicial
error. State v. Cornett (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 878.

When the jury have agreed upon a verdict, they must be conducted
into court by the officer having them in charge. If they all appear,
their verdict must be rendered in open court. If any shall fail to
appear, the rest must be discharged without giving a verdict, and the
cause must be tried again at the same or next term, as in the case of a
failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict. (RSMo 1939 § 4089)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3700; 1919 § 4044; 1909 § 5250

CROSS REFERENCE: Verdict may be returned on Sunday, RSMo 476.250

Upon the trial of any indictment for any offense where by law
there may be conviction for different degrees of such offense, the jury,
if they convict the defendant of a degree of the offense inferior to the
offense alleged in the indictment, shall specify in their verdict of what
degree of the offense they find the defendant guilty. (RSMo 1939 § 4090)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3701; 1919 § 4045; 1909 § 5251

(1960) In prosecutions for stealing personal property of over fifty
dollars in value defendant contending value was less than fifty dollars,
the court instructed the jury to fix the punishment in accordance with
the way they found the value of the property and the verdict finding the
defendant "guilty of stealing and assess his punishment at two and
one-half years in the Missouri department of corrections" was responsive
and free from ambiguity as the offense of stealing does not have
different degrees but different penalties. State v. McCarthy (Mo.), 336
S.W.2d 411.

The sheriff or other officer having the custody of persons
committed to the director of the department of mental health as provided
in section 552.040, RSMo, shall, if he deems it necessary to their safe
custody, confine them to the county jail until they shall be removed to a
state hospital. If all things needful be not otherwise supplied, he shall
furnish them, and, in such cases, the supplies for the indigent shall be
paid for by the proper county commissions out of the county treasuries;
and supplies for others than the indigent shall be repaid out of their
estates, and may be recovered by suit in the name of such officer. (RSMo
1939 § 9351, A.L. 1965 p. 331)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 8658; 1919 § 12301; 1909 § 1433

For the purpose of judgment, if the conviction be for an offense
punishable by imprisonment, or imprisonment be assessed as punishment by
the jury, the defendant must be personally present; if for a fine only,
he must be personally present, or some responsible person must undertake
for him to pay the judgment and costs; judgment may then be rendered in
his absence. (RSMo 1939 § 4100)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3711; 1919 § 4055; 1909 § 5261

If the defendant is in custody, he must be brought before the
court for judgment; if he is not present when his personal attendance is
necessary, the court may order the clerk to issue a warrant for his
arrest, which may be served in any county in the state, as a warrant of
arrest in other cases. (RSMo 1939 § 4101)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3712; 1919 § 4056; 1909 § 5262

When the defendant appears for judgment, he must be informed by
the court of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he has any legal
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him; and if
no such sufficient cause be shown against it, the court must render the
proper judgment. (RSMo 1939 § 4102)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3713; 1919 § 4057; 1909 § 5263

(1956) Where defendant is heard on motion for new trial, failure of
record to show allocution is not error. State v. Juvenile Defendants
(A.), 291 S.W.2d 628.

(1967) Right of allocution is applicable only after conviction upon trial
by jury. State v. McClanahan (Mo.), 418 S.W.2d 71.

If the defendant has been heard on a motion for a new trial, or
in arrest of judgment, and in all cases of misdemeanor, the requirements
of section 546.570 shall be deemed directory, and the omission to comply
with it shall not invalidate the judgment or sentence of the court. (RSMo
1939 § 4103)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3714; 1919 § 4058; 1909 § 5264

(1952) Where record showed motion for new trial filed and overruled but
failed to show allocution, sentence and judgment, appeal was premature
and cause must be remanded. State v. Bledsoe (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 457;
(1952) State v. Skaggs (Mo.), 248 S.W.2d 635.

(1967) This section is mandatory and court has no power to impose
concurrent sentences. State v. McClanahan (Mo.), 418 S.W.2d 71.

Whenever a judgment upon a conviction shall be rendered in any
court, the clerk of such court shall enter such judgment fully on the
minutes, stating briefly the offense for which such conviction shall have
been had, and the court shall inspect such entries and conform them to
the facts; but the omission of this duty, either by the clerk or judge,
shall in nowise affect or impair the validity of the judgment. (RSMo 1939
§ 4104)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3715; 1919 § 4059; 1909 § 5265

It shall be the duty of the associate circuit judge before whom
any conviction may be had under this chapter, if there be no appeal, to
make out and certify, and within ten days after the date of the judgment,
deliver to the treasurer of the county and clerk of the county commission
each a statement of the case, the amount of the fine and return day of
the execution, and the name of the officer charged with the collection
thereof; and the county treasurer shall charge the officer with the
amount of such fine, and unless the same be paid into the county treasury
on or before the return day of the execution, the county commission
shall, at their next term, ten days' notice being given to the officer in
default and his sureties, render an account stated against them for the
amount due, and twenty percent thereon, making, however, proper
deductions for insolvencies; on which account stated suit may be
maintained and when collected, the proceeds paid in the county treasury.
(L. 1978 H.B. 1634, A.L. 1985 S.B. 5, et al.)

Effective 1-1-87

Whenever a sentence of imprisonment in a county jail shall be
pronounced upon any person convicted of any offense, the clerk of the
court shall, as soon as may be, make out and deliver to the sheriff of
the county a transcript of the entry of such conviction, and of the
sentence thereupon, duly certified by such clerk, which shall be
sufficient authority to such sheriff to execute such sentence, and he
shall execute the same accordingly. (RSMo 1939 § 4105)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3716; 1919 § 4060; 1909 § 5266

CROSS REFERENCE: Appeal or writ of error not to act as stay of execution,
exceptions, RSMo 547.130 to 547.190, 547.330

When any offender shall be committed to the department of
corrections the clerk of the court in which the sentence was passed shall
forthwith deliver a certified copy thereof to the sheriff of the county,
who shall, without delay, either in person or by a general and usual
deputy, cause such offender to be transported to a place designated by
the director of the department of corrections and delivered to the chief
administrative officer thereof. (RSMo 1939 § 4106, A.L. 1971 S.B. 293,
A.L. 1990 H.B. 974)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3717; 1919 § 4061; 1909 § 5267

CROSS REFERENCE: Commitments to state penal institutions, how made, RSMo
217.305

Such sheriff or deputy, while conveying a convict to the
penitentiary, shall have the same power and like authority to require the
assistance of any citizen of this state in securing such convict, and
retaking him if he shall escape, as if such sheriff or deputy were in the
county in which he is such officer; and all persons who shall neglect or
refuse to assist such sheriff or deputy, when required, shall be liable
to the same penalties as if such officer were in his own county. (RSMo
1939 § 4107)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3718; 1919 § 4062; 1909 § 5268

The court before which any person shall be convicted of any
criminal offense shall have power, in addition to the sentence prescribed
or authorized by law, to require such person to give security to keep the
peace or be of good behavior, or both, for a term not exceeding two
years, or to stand committed until such security be given. (RSMo 1939 §
4097)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3708; 1919 § 4052; 1909 § 5258

Section 546.650 shall not extend to convictions for writing or
publishing any libel; nor shall any such security be hereafter required
by any court upon any complaint, prosecution or conviction for any such
writing or publishing. (RSMo 1939 § 4098)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3709; 1919 § 4053; 1909 § 5259

No recognizance given under the provisions of section 546.650
shall be deemed to be broken, unless the principal therein be convicted
of some offense amounting, in judgment of law, to a breach of such
recognizance. (RSMo 1939 § 4099)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3710; 1919 § 4054; 1909 § 5260

When judgment of death is rendered by any court of competent
jurisdiction, a warrant signed by the judge and attested by the clerk
under the seal of the court must be drawn and delivered to the sheriff.
It must state the conviction and judgment and appoint a day on which the
judgment must be executed, which must not be less than thirty nor more
than sixty days from the date of judgment, and must direct the sheriff to
deliver the defendant, at a time specified in said order, not more than
ten days from the date of judgment, to the chief administrative officer
of a correctional facility of the department of corrections, for
execution. (RSMo 1939 § 4108, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1340 & 1348)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3719; 1919 § 4063; 1909 § 5269

The judge of a court at which a conviction is had must,
immediately after the conviction, transmit to the governor of the state,
by mail or otherwise, a statement of the conviction and judgment. (RSMo
1939 § 4109)

CROSS REFERENCE: Pardons, governor's powers, conditions and restrictions,
RSMo 217.800

Whenever, for any reason, any convict sentenced to the
punishment of death shall not have been executed pursuant to such
sentence, and the cause shall stand in full force, the supreme court, or
the court of the county in which the conviction was had, on the
application of the prosecuting attorney, shall issue a writ of habeas
corpus to bring such convict before the court; or if he be at large, a
warrant for his apprehension may be issued by such court, or any judge
thereof. (RSMo 1939 § 4110)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3720; 1919 § 4064; 1909 § 5270

CROSS REFERENCE: Habeas corpus, generally, Chap. 532, RSMo

Upon such convicted offender being brought before the court,
they shall proceed to inquire into the facts, and if no legal reasons
exist against the execution of sentence, such court shall issue a warrant
to the director of the department of corrections, for the execution of
the prisoner at the time therein specified, which execution shall be
obeyed by the director accordingly. (RSMo 1939 § 4111, A.L. 1988 H.B.
1340 & 1348, A.L. 1990 H.B. 974, A.L. 1995 H.B. 424)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3721; 1919 § 4065; 1909 § 5271

The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by the
administration of lethal gas or by means of the administration of lethal
injection. And for such purpose the director of the department of
corrections is hereby authorized and directed to provide a suitable and
efficient room or place, enclosed from public view, within the walls of a
correctional facility of the department of corrections, and the necessary
appliances for carrying into execution the death penalty by means of the
administration of lethal gas or by means of the administration of lethal
injection. (RSMo 1939 § 4112, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1340 & 1348, A.L. 1990 H.B.
974)

A judgment of death must be executed within a correctional
center of the department of corrections; and such execution shall be
under the supervision and direction of the director of the department of
corrections. (RSMo 1939 § 4113, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1340 & 1348, A.L. 1990
H.B. 974, A.L. 1995 H.B. 424)

The chief administrative officer of the correctional center, or
his duly appointed representative shall be present at the execution and
the director of the department of corrections shall invite the presence
of the attorney general of the state, and at least eight reputable
citizens, to be selected by him; and he shall at the request of the
defendant, permit such clergy or religious leaders, not exceeding two, as
the defendant may name, and any person, other than another incarcerated
offender, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the
execution, together with such peace officers as he may think expedient,
to witness the execution; but no person under twenty-one years of age
shall be allowed to witness the execution. (RSMo 1939 § 4114, A.L. 1988
H.B. 1340 & 1348, A.L. 1990 H.B. 974, A.L. 1995 H.B. 424)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3724; 1919 § 4068; 1909 § 5274

After the execution the chief administrative officer of the
correctional facility shall make a return upon the death warrant to the
court by which the judgment was rendered, showing the time, mode and
manner in which it was executed. (RSMo 1939 § 4115, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1340 &
1348, A.L. 1990 H.B. 974)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3725; 1919 § 4069; 1909 § 5275

If, after any female convict shall be sentenced to the
punishment of death, the officer having charge of her person shall have
reason to suspect that she is pregnant, he shall in like manner summon a
jury of six persons, not less than three of whom shall be physicians, and
shall give notice thereof to the prosecuting attorney of the county where
such criminal proceedings originated, or to the circuit attorney of the
city of St. Louis, if such criminal proceedings originated in that city,
who shall attend, and the proceedings shall be had as provided. (RSMo
1939 § 4196, A.L. 1969 p. 77)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3806; 1919 § 4152; 1909 § 5360

The inquisition shall be signed by the jury and the officer in
charge of such convict, and if it appear that such female convict is
pregnant with child, her execution shall be suspended and the inquisition
shall be transmitted to the governor. (RSMo 1939 § 4197)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3807; 1919 § 4153; 1909 § 5361

Whenever the governor shall be satisfied that the cause of such
suspension no longer exists, he shall issue his warrant, appointing a day
for the execution of such convict, pursuant to her sentence; or he may,
at his discretion, commute her punishment to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for life. (RSMo 1939 § 4198)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3808; 1919 § 4154; 1909 § 5362

The property, real and personal, of any person charged with a
criminal offense, shall be bound from the time of his final conviction of
such offense, for the payment of all fines and costs which he may be
adjudged to pay. (RSMo 1939 § 4119)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3729; 1919 § 4073; 1909 § 5279

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court having criminal
jurisdiction for the county at the end of each term, to issue executions
for all fines imposed, and the costs of conviction in criminal cases,
during the term and remaining unpaid, which shall be executed in the same
manner as executions in civil cases; and the property of the defendant
may be seized and sold thereon, notwithstanding he may be in custody for
the same demand. (RSMo 1939 § 4120)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3730; 1919 § 4074; 1909 § 5280

Whenever any person shall, because of a conviction for any
misdemeanor or felony, be subject to imprisonment in a county jail, such
person may, at the discretion of the court, be confined in any workhouse
or other place of imprisonment belonging to any town or city in such
county, or in any incorporated city from which said county has been
separated by law; provided, the county commission of such county shall
have contracted or agreed with the town or city owning such workhouse or
other place of confinement for the custody and keeping of such convicts;
and cities or towns having no workhouse or houses shall have authority to
work convicted persons on the streets, bridges or other public works in
such city or town. (RSMo 1939 § 4121)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3731; 1919 § 4075; 1909 § 5281

1. Every person committed to the workhouse of the city of St.
Louis, or other place of punishment provided by that city, by the circuit
court of the city of St. Louis, shall be put to hard labor at such work
as his or her strength and health will permit, whether within or without
such place of imprisonment, and shall be under the control and management
of those having charge of such prison, subject to such rules and
regulations as the municipal assembly of St. Louis City may establish for
such prisons.

2. If the party committed is unwilling although able to pay the fine and
costs, if such be the punishment for the offense, in whole or in part, in
payment of such fines and costs, the party committed shall be allowed for
his or her work at the rate of ten dollars per day. No imprisonment for
nonpayment of fine and costs shall exceed six months.

3. When a fine is assessed by the circuit court of the city of St. Louis
the court may provide for the payment of the fine and costs on an
installment basis under such terms and conditions as the court deems
appropriate.

4. Any person, after being committed to the workhouse or other place of
imprisonment provided by the city of St. Louis, for nonpayment of his or
her fine and costs, desiring to pay same, shall make application to the
judge of said court, who shall in open court order the fine and all costs
of such person to be paid to the clerk of said court, whose duty it shall
be to receive same, enter satisfaction on the execution in his execution
book, and give notice in writing, under the seal of said court, to the
superintendent or person having charge and control of said workhouse,
that the execution against such person has been fully satisfied,
whereupon such person shall immediately be discharged from said workhouse
or place of punishment. (L. 1978 H.B. 1634)

Effective 1-2-79

All persons committed to any workhouse or other places of
confinement under the provisions of section 546.880 shall be imprisoned
for the full term of their sentence, unless sooner discharged by due
course of law. (RSMo 1939 § 4122)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3732; 1919 § 4076; 1909 § 5282

In case of a conviction for any offense where the punishment has
been fixed at a fine or imprisonment in the county jail, or workhouse, or
by both such fine and imprisonment, the court in which any such
conviction was had, or the judge thereof in vacation, or any associate
circuit judge before whom such conviction was had, may, for good cause
shown, by order entered of record, or in writing signed by such judge or
associate circuit judge, grant a stay of execution on any such judgment
of conviction and sentence thereon for a definite period of time to be
fixed by the court, judge or associate circuit judge granting the same,
not to exceed six months, upon the defendant or some person for him
entering a recognizance conditioned for his surrendering himself in
execution at the time and place fixed by the judgment of such conviction
or sentence on a day to be named in such order. (RSMo 1939 § 4129)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3739; 1919 § 4085; 1909 § 5291

Any municipality located within any county of the first
classification with a population in excess of nine hundred thousand, for
any purpose or purposes mentioned in this chapter, may enact and make all
necessary ordinances, rules and regulations; and they may enact and make
all such ordinances and rules, not inconsistent with the laws of the
state, as may be expedient for maintaining the peace and good government
and welfare of the city and its trade and commerce; and all ordinances
may be enforced by prescribing and inflicting upon its inhabitants, or
other persons violating the same, such fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, and such imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both such
fine and imprisonment, as may be just for any offense, recoverable with
costs of suit, together with judgment of imprisonment, until the fine and
costs are paid or satisfied; and any person committed for the nonpayment
of fine and costs, or either, may be compelled to work out the same as
herein provided; but, in any case wherein the penalty for an offense is
fixed by any statute, the council shall affix the same penalty by
ordinance for the punishment of such offense, except that imprisonments,
when made under city ordinances, may be in the city prison or workhouse
instead of the county jail. (L. 1995 H.B. 424 § 8)

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