Missouri Statute | Act | Code |Laws And Statutes| US Code - US Statute | Chapter 1 Laws In Force And Construction Of Statutes

The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament
made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a
general nature, which are not local to that kingdom and not repugnant to
or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the
constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time
being, are the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or
usage to the contrary notwithstanding, but no act of the general assembly
or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope
or effect by the courts of this state, for the reason that it is in
derogation of, or in conflict with, the common law, or with such statutes
or acts of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, or laws,
shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and
meaning thereof. (RSMo 1939 § 645, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 645; 1919 § 7048; 1909 § 8047

(1953) Fact that statute changed a rule of common law does not require
that it be strictly construed. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258
S.W.2d 577.

(1977) Assuming doctrine of sovereign immunity was part of common law
adopted by state of Missouri, supreme court has authority to alter or
abrogate it and did so. Jones v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 557
S.W.2d 225.

As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise
specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the
legislature or to the context thereof:

(1) "County or circuit attorney" means prosecuting attorney;

(2) "Executor" includes administrator where the subject matter applies to
an administrator;

(3) "General election" means the election required to be held on the
Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November, biennially;

(4) "Guardian", if used in a section in a context relating to property
rights or obligations, means "conservator of the estate" as defined in
chapter 475, RSMo. "Guardianship", if used in a section in a context
relating to rights and obligations other than property rights or
obligations, means "guardian of the person" as defined in chapter 475,
RSMo;

(5) "Handicap" means a mental or physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, whether the impairment is
congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or disease, and where the
impairment is verified by medical findings;

(6) "Heretofore" means any time previous to the day when the statute
containing it takes effect; and "hereafter" means the time after the
statute containing it takes effect;

(7) "In vacation" includes any adjournment of court for more than one day
whenever any act is authorized to be done by or any power given to a
court, or judge thereof in vacation, or whenever any act is authorized to
be done by or any power given to a clerk of any court in vacation;

(8) "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to actual
occupational ability without reference to a court adjudication of
incompetency, means the actual ability of a person to perform in that
occupation. "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to
the property rights and obligations of a person, means a "disabled
person" as defined in chapter 475, RSMo. "Incompetent", if used in a
section in a context relating to the rights and obligations of a person
other than property rights and obligations, means an "incapacitated
person" as defined in chapter 475, RSMo;

(9) "Justice of the county court" means commissioner of the county
commission;

(10) "Month" and "year". "Month" means a calendar month, and "year" means
a calendar year unless otherwise expressed, and is equivalent to the
words "year of our Lord";

(11) The word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate, and to partnerships and other unincorporated associations;

(12) "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in
action and evidences of debt;

(13) "Place of residence" means the place where the family of any person
permanently resides in this state, and the place where any person having
no family generally lodges;

(14) "Preceding" and "following", when used by way of reference to any
section of the statutes, mean the section next preceding or next
following that in which the reference is made, unless some other section
is expressly designated in the reference;

(15) "Property" includes real and personal property;

(16) "Real property" or "premises" or "real estate" or "lands" is
coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments;

(17) "State", when applied to any of the United States, includes the
District of Columbia and the territories, and the words "United States"
includes such district and territories;

(18) "Under legal disability" includes persons within the age of minority
or of unsound mind or imprisoned;

(19) "Ward", if used in a section in a context relating to the property
rights and obligations of a person, means a "protectee" as defined in
chapter 475, RSMo. "Ward", if used in a section in a context relating to
the rights and obligations of a person other than property rights and
obligations, means a "ward" as defined in chapter 475, RSMo;

(20) "Will" includes the words "testament" and "codicil";

(21) "Written" and "in writing" and "writing word for word" includes
printing, lithographing, or other mode of representing words and letters,
but in all cases where the signature of any person is required, the
proper handwriting of the person, or his mark, is intended. (RSMo 1939 §§
649, 650, 653, 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1978 H.B.
971, H.B. 1634, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1988 S.B. 655)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 649, 650, 653, 655; 1919 §§ 7052, 7053, 7056,
7058; 1909 §§ 8051, 8052, 8055, 8057

CROSS REFERENCE: Criminal code definitions, RSMo 556.061

(1965) St. Louis alderman held not "resident" of ward from which he had
been elected and thereby forfeited office, although he had been born and
raised in ward, was registered to vote there, spent his working day
there, had living accommodations in ward above drug store operated by
brothers and sister, and received his business mail and business phone
calls there. He maintained home outside ward where he kept family and
spent evenings and Sundays. Actual place of residence controls. State v.
Mueller (A.), 388 S.W.2d 53.

(1971) Legislative body of which he is a member has exclusive right to
determine elected representative's qualifications to hold or assume
office and courts are without jurisdiction to determine issue of removal
of residence from district. State v. Hickey (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 617.

As used in the statute laws of this state, "registered mail", when
used with reference to the sending of notice or any article having no
intrinsic value, includes certified mail as defined and certified under
regulations of the United States Post Office Department. (L. 1958 2d Ex.
Sess. p. 173 § 1)

The general assembly recognizes that English is the common
language used in Missouri and recognizes that fluency in English is
necessary for full integration into our common American culture for
reading readiness. (L. 1998 S.B. 583 & 645 § 1, A.L. 1999 H.B. 889)

CROSS REFERENCES: Access to English language services, resettling of
refugees and immigrants, grants provided, RSMo 660.025 Adult basic
education program, English language services provided to nonnative
speakers, RSMo 161.227 English translation required for wills and
estates, when, RSMo 474.382 Grants provided for instruction in the
English language, when, RSMo 161.223 Wills and estates, translation to
English, when, RSMo 474.382

1. Whenever, in any statute, words importing the plural number are
used in describing or referring to any matter, parties or persons, any
single matter, party or person is included, although distributive words
are not used.

2. When any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to
by words importing the singular number or the masculine gender, several
matters and persons, and females as well as males, and bodies corporate
as well as individuals, are included. (RSMo 1939 §§ 651, 652, A.L. 1957
p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 651, 652; 1919 §§ 7054, 7055; 1909 §§ 8053, 8054

(1992) Use of word "he" includes both male and female and because section
566.030, RSMo, encompasses the conduct of both males and females, there
is no violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States or
Missouri Constitutions. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. en banc).

Whenever the word "voter" is used in the laws of this state it
shall mean registered voter, or legal voter. (L. 1973 H.B. 20, et al. §
27)

The time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by
excluding the first day and including the last. If the last day is Sunday
it shall be excluded. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p.
587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

CROSS REFERENCE: Civil code of procedure for cases at law, periods of
time prescribed by the code, RSMo 506.060

(1956) Where ninetieth day for filing mechanic's lien occurred on
Decoration Day, May 30, which was Sunday, the time for filing under §
506.060 was extended until Tuesday, June 1, because Monday became the
holiday under § 9.010. Herman v. Dixon (A.), 285 S.W.2d 716.

(1974) Computation of time clarified. Bowling v. Webb Gas Co., Inc. of
Lebanon (Mo.), 505 S.W.2d 39.

(1974) Option given on January 21 and providing for seventy-five days to
act and further providing that notification by mail deposited on or
before expiration date would be sufficient was complied with by notice
mailed April 5. Gottlieb v. LaBrunerie (A.), 514 S.W.2d 27.

(1986) This section is applicable to statutes only, not to city charter
provisions. Friends of City Market v. Old Town Redevelopment, 714 S.W.2d
569 (Mo.App.).

Words importing joint authority to three or more persons shall be
construed as authority to a majority of the persons, unless otherwise
declared in the law giving the authority. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B.
1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

When a statute requires an act to be done, which by law an agent
or deputy as well may do as the principal, the requisition is satisfied
by the performance of the act by an authorized agent or deputy. (RSMo
1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

1. "RSMo" may be used as an abbreviation for the "Revised Statutes
of Missouri" and "RSMo Supp.", when followed by the number of the year,
means the Supplement to the Revised Statutes of Missouri published by the
state after final adjournment of the session of the general assembly held
in that year.

2. Whenever in the statute laws of this state a reference is made to
several sections and the section numbers given in the reference are
connected by the word "to", the reference includes both sections whose
numbers are given and all intervening sections. (1949 S.B. 1001 § 1.07,
A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Whenever the word "county" is used in any law, general in its
character to the whole state, it includes the city of St. Louis, unless
such construction is inconsistent with the evident intent of the law, or
of some law specially applicable to such city. Whenever the county clerk
is authorized or required to perform an act by a law which applies to the
city of St. Louis as well as to the counties of the state, the register
of the city of St. Louis is authorized or required to perform the act
insofar as it is to be performed in the city. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949
S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

CROSS REFERENCE: County officers of St. Louis, duties required by law to
include corresponding city officers, when, RSMo 105.260

Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and
usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their
technical import. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

(1967) When used in statutes the word "shall" is generally regarded as
imperative or mandatory and must be given a compulsory meaning. Stanfield
v. Swenson (A.) 381 F.2d 755.

(1991) If language of statute may be subject to more than one
construction, the law favors the construction which is in harmony with
reason and common sense and tends to avoid unreasonable and absurd
results. Term "resident" means resident at time of commencement of
appointed duties. Shands v. City of Kennett, 756 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Mo.).

The child welfare policy of this state is what is in the best
interests of the child. (L. 1995 H.B. 232 & 485 merged with S.B. 174)

1. The population of any political subdivision of the state for
the purpose of representation or other matters including the
ascertainment of the salary of any county officer for any year or for the
amount of fees he may retain or the amount he is allowed to pay for
deputies and assistants is determined on the basis of the last previous
decennial census of the United States. For the purposes of this section
the effective date of the 1960 decennial census of the United States is
July 1, 1961, and the effective date of each succeeding decennial census
of the United States is July first of each tenth year after 1961; except
that for the purposes of ascertaining the salary of any county officer
for any year or for the amount of fees he may retain or the amount he is
allowed to pay for deputies and assistants the effective date of the 1960
decennial census of the United States is January 1, 1961, and the
effective date of each succeeding decennial census is January first of
each tenth year after 1961.

2. Any law which is limited in its operation to counties, cities or other
political subdivisions having a specified population or a specified
assessed valuation shall be deemed to include all counties, cities or
political subdivisions which thereafter acquire such population or
assessed valuation as well as those in that category at the time the law
passed. Once a city not located in a county has come under the operation
of such a law a subsequent loss of population shall not remove that city
from the operation of that law. No person whose compensation is set by a
statutory formula, which is based in part on a population factor, shall
have his compensation reduced due solely to an increase in the population
factor. (RSMo 1939 §§ 654, 13430, A.L. 1945 p. 1550, A. 1949 S.B. 1001,
A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1959 H.B. 304, A.L. 1971 H.B. 154)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 654, 11808; 1919 §§ 7057, 11016; 1909 §§ 856,
10719

Effective 6-8-71

(1971) Under prior law (§ 481.200, RSMo 1969) separation of probate and
magistrate judges in counties attaining for the first time a population
of over 30,000 inhabitants would be effective on July 1, 1971, rather
than on January 1, 1971, pursuant to § 1.100, RSMo, since probate judges
are not county officers. State ex rel. Stark v. Jeter (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d
882.

(1975) Held that this section clearly prevented St. Louis City from
coming under law applicable to cities of 300,000 to 700,000 population.
State ex rel. McNeal v. Roach (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 69.

(1975) This section is applicable to population for the purpose of
convening grand juries. State ex. rel. Woods v. Connett (Mo.), 525 S.W.2d
326.

(1981) Legislation enacted to address the class of which the City of St.
Louis is the only member is not special legislation within the meaning of
Article III, Section 40, of the Missouri Constitution. Boyd-Richardson
Co. v. Leachman (Mo.), 615 S.W.2d 46.

The provisions of any law or statute which is reenacted, amended
or revised, so far as they are the same as those of a prior law, shall be
construed as a continuation of such law and not as a new enactment. (RSMo
1939 § 683, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 683; 1919 § 7087; 1909 § 8086

A law passed by the general assembly takes effect ninety days
after the adjournment of the session at which it is enacted; but if the
general assembly recesses for thirty days or more, it may prescribe by
joint resolution that laws previously passed and not effective take
effect ninety days from the beginning of the recess, subject to the
following exceptions:

(1) A law necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety, which emergency is expressed in the body or preamble of
the act and which is declared to be thus necessary by the general
assembly, by a vote of two-thirds of its members elected to each house
the vote to be taken by yeas and nays, and entered on the journal, or a
law making an appropriation for the current expenses of the state
government, for the maintenance of the state institutions or for the
support of public schools, takes effect as of the hour and minute of its
approval by the governor; which hour and minute may be endorsed by the
governor on the bill at the time of its approval;

(2) In case the general assembly, as to a law not of the character herein
specified, provides that the law takes effect on a date in the future
subsequent to the expiration of the period of ninety days herein
mentioned the law takes effect on the date thus fixed by the general
assembly;

(3) In case the general assembly provides that any law takes effect as
provided in subdivision (1) of this section, the general assembly may
provide in such law that the operative date of the law or parts of the
law takes effect on a date subsequent to the effective date of the law.
(RSMo 1939 § 659, A.L. 1945 p. 1114, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 659; 1919 § 7067; 1909 § 8061

CROSS REFERENCE: Effective date of constitutional amendments, Const. Art.
XII § 2(b)

(1991) "Later in time" rule of statutory construction does not apply when
sections are passed in the same legislative session and neither has an
emergency clause. Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.banc).

The provisions of every statute are severable. If any provision of
a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid
unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so
essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the
void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have
enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court
finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are
incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.
(1949 S.B. 1001 § 1.14, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

CROSS REFERENCE: Revisor may omit severability clauses from statutes,
RSMo 3.030

(1951) If by striking out a void part of the statute, the remainder by
reason of its generality will have a broader scope as to subject or
territory and its operation would not be in accord with legislative
intent, the whole could be made void by the invalidity of such part.
Preisler v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo. 662, 243 S.W.2d 62.

(1951) Sections 295.090, 295.180 and 295.200 are severable from the
remainder of this law (§§ 295.010 to 295.210) so that the
constitutionality of such sections need not be determined in mandamus
proceedings to compel payment of compensation of members of state board
of mediation. Remainder of law provides a complete, sensible and valid
enactment consistent with the state and federal constitutions and federal
labor legislation, and therefore capable of being carried into execution
as intended by the legislature. State ex rel. State Board of Mediation,
362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75.

(1961) Where severence clause in use tax law stated that the legislature
declared that if any exemption from taxation contained in the act was
invalid under the constitution it intended to and thereby imposed the
same tax on the exempted use as was imposed on the use of other property
subject to the tax, held to prevent the act containing invalid exemptions
from being wholly unconstitutional. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. M.E.
Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 62.

(1966) The absence of a severability clause is of no significance in a
determination of whether an entire statute must fall because of
invalidity of a portion of the statute. St. Louis County v. City of
Florissant (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 281.

(1998) License fee provision of ordinance regulating tobacco product
sales, adopted without voter approval in violation of Hancock Amendment,
was not so essentially and inseparably connected with other substantive
provisions in ordinance that ordinance would not accomplish its purpose
if license fee was eliminated, therefore the fee provision was severable,
and savings clause indicated legislative intent to retain any provisions
not violative of the constitution. Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis
County, 974 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.App. E.D.)

When a law repealing a former law, clause or provision is itself
repealed, it does not revive the former law, clause or provision, unless
it is otherwise expressly provided; nor shall any law repealing any
former law, clause or provision abate, annul or in any wise affect any
proceedings had or commenced under or by virtue of the law so repealed,
but the same is as effectual and shall be proceeded on to final judgment
and termination as if the repealing law had not passed, unless it is
otherwise expressly provided. (RSMo 1939 § 658, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 658; 1919 § 7061; 1909 § 8060

No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred,
or prosecution commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any
statutory provision is repealed or amended, shall be affected by the
repeal or amendment, but the trial and punishment of all such offenses,
and the recovery of the fines, penalties or forfeitures shall be had, in
all respects, as if the provision had not been repealed or amended,
except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing
procedural laws. (RSMo 1939 § 4861, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1993 S.B. 180,
A.L. 2005 H.B. 353)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 4468; 1919 § 3709; 1909 § 4920

(1972) Where defendant was convicted of possession of narcotic drug and
sentenced to three years imprisonment, his appeal argued and submitted on
September 27, 1971, but prior to submission on August 31, 1971, appellant
filed "Alternative Motion for Reduction of Sentence" based upon an
amendment, effective September 28, 1971, of statute which reduced
punishment for his offense to confinement in county jail for not more
than one year or fine of $1,000, or both, supreme court remanded cause
for assessment of punishment and judgment under the law as amended. State
v. Reiley (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 473.

(1972) Where appellant's conviction and sentence for possession of
marijuana occurred at a time when the first conviction for that offense
was a felony regardless of amount of marijuana involved and while appeal
was pending an amendment to the law to make possession of thirty-five
grams or less a misdemeanor became effective, the cause was remanded for
assessment of punishment under the law as amended. State v. Hawkins
(Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 477.

(1974) Held that when license was reinstated prior to effective date of
amendatory act providing for elimination of points on reinstatement the
act could not be applied retroactively. Ritter v. Schaffner (A.), 504
S.W.2d 207.

(1990) Where statute specifying punishment in effect at time of
defendant's arrest was subsequently repealed and new statute, providing
for lesser punishment, became effective few days prior to trial,
defendant was entitled to benefit of reduced punishment. State v. Wright,
797 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. App.).

The repeal of any statutory provision does not affect any act done
or right accrued or established in any proceeding, suit or prosecution
had or commenced in any civil case previous to the time when the repeal
takes effect; but every such act, right and proceeding remains as valid
and effectual as if the provisions so repealed had remained in force.
(RSMo 1939 § 660, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 660; 1919 § 7063; 1909 § 8062

No action or plea pending at the time any statutory provisions are
repealed shall be affected by the repeal; but the same shall proceed, in
all respects, as if the statutory provisions had not been repealed,
except that all proceedings had after the repeal becomes effective are
governed by procedural rules and laws then in effect, insofar as they are
applicable. (RSMo 1939 § 662, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 662; 1919 § 7065; 1909 § 8064

Whenever any of the statutes of this state require or imply that a
notice shall be given to any person concerning or affecting any right,
property, claim, duty, matter or thing of any character or nature, unless
the statutes expressly direct a different method of service, the delivery
of a true copy of the notice to the person intended to be notified, or
the leaving of a copy at his usual place of abode with some member of his
family over the age of fifteen years, constitutes a valid and sufficient
service of the notice. (RSMo 1939 § 1437, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 1273; 1919 § 9156; 1909 § 10185

CROSS REFERENCES: Notice of taking depositions, how served, RSMo 492.180
Service of papers under civil code, RSMo 506.100

In all cases proper for the cognizance of the civil authority of
this state and the courts of judicature in the same, all the citizens of
the United States are equally entitled to the privileges of law and
justice with the citizens of this state. (RSMo 1939 § 647, A.L. 1957 p.
587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 647; 1919 § 7050; 1909 § 8049

1. The general assembly of this state finds that:

(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;

(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being;

(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in
the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.

2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted
and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage
of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to
other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof
by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the
contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.

3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child"
shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human
beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of
biological development.

4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of
action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing
to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular
program of prenatal care. (L. 1986 H.B. 1596)

CROSS REFERENCE: Abortion regulations, Chap. 188, RSMo

(1989) Where section by its terms does not regulate abortions or any
other aspect of appellees' medical practice, it can be read simply to
express a value judgment. The extent to which the statute might be used
to interpret other state statutes or regulations is something that only
the courts of Missouri can definitely decide. U. S. Supreme Court
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the section unless the
meaning of the section is applied to restrict the activities of a
claimant in some concrete way. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
109 S.Ct. 3040.

(1992) Definition of "person" in this section, which includes unborn
children is applicable to other statutes and court concludes that it
applies at least to the involuntary manslaughter statute, section
565.024, RSMo. State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. en banc).

(1995) Statute sets out a canon of interpretation enacted by general
assembly directing that time of conception and not viability is the
determinative point at which legally protectable rights, privileges and
immunities of an unborn child should be deemed to begin. Statute further
sets out the intention of the general assembly that courts should read
all Missouri statutes in pari materia with this section. Connor v. Monkem
Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. en banc).

No person's body shall be imprisoned or restrained unless by
authority of law. (RSMo 1939 § 648, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 648; 1919 § 7051; 1909 § 8050

No state funds shall be used for research with respect to the
cloning of a human person. For purposes of this section, the term
"cloning" means the replication of a human person by taking a cell with
genetic material and cultivating such cell through the egg, embryo, fetal
and newborn stages of development into a new human person. (L. 1998 S.B.
722 § 17)

1. A governmental authority may not restrict a person's free
exercise of religion, unless:

(1) The restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability,
and does not discriminate against religion, or among religions; and

(2) The governmental authority demonstrates that application of the
restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling
governmental interest, and is not unduly restrictive considering the
relevant circumstances.

2. As used in this section, "exercise of religion" shall be defined as an
act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious
belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to
a larger system of religious belief.

3. As used in this section "demonstrates" means meets the burden of going
forward with the evidence and of persuasion. (L. 2003 S.B. 12)

1. Section 1.302 and this section apply to all state and local
laws, resolutions and ordinances and the implementation of such laws,
resolutions, and ordinances, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after August 28, 2003.

2. Nothing in section 1.302 and this section shall be construed to
authorize any government to burden any religious belief, except that
nothing in these sections shall be construed to establish or eliminate a
defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution based on a federal,
state, or local civil rights law.

3. Nothing in section 1.302 and this section shall be construed as
allowing any person to cause physical injury to another person, to
possess a weapon otherwise prohibited by law, to fail to provide monetary
support for a child or to fail to provide health care for a child
suffering from a life-threatening condition.

4. "Relevant circumstances" may include legitimate penological interests
needed to protect the safety and security of incarcerated persons and
correctional facilities, but shall not include reasonable requests by
incarcerated individuals for the opportunity to pray, reasonable access
to clergy, use of religious materials that are not violent or profane,
and reasonable dietary requests. (L. 2003 S.B. 12)

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