Missouri Statute | Act | Code |Statutory Actions And Torts| US Code - US Statute | Chapter 537 Torts And Actions For Damages

Actions for wrongs done to property or interests therein may be
brought against the wrongdoer by the person whose property or interest
therein is injured. If the person whose property or interest therein is
injured is dead, the action survives and may be brought against the
wrongdoer by the person appointed as fiduciary for the estate of the
deceased person. If the wrongdoer is dead, the action also survives and
may be brought and maintained in the manner set forth in section 537.021.
Such actions shall be brought and maintained in the same manner and with
like effect in all respects as actions founded upon contracts. (RSMo 1939
§ 98, A.L. 1977 S.B. 147)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 98; 1919 § 97; 1909 § 105

(1969) The charitable immunity doctrine is abolished and nongovernmental
charitable institutions are liable for their own negligence and the
negligence of their agents and employees acting within the scope of their
employment. Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's (Mo.), 446 S.W.2d 599.

(1969) Churches are liable for their own negligence and the negligence of
their agents and employees acting within the scope of their employment.
Garnier v. St. Andrew Presbyterian Church of St. Louis, Mo. (Mo.), 446
S.W.2d 607.

(1971) The doctrine of governmental immunity does not violate the
constitutional rights of an injured party by depriving him of rights or
property without due process. Wood v. County of Jackson (Mo.), 463 S.W.2d
834.

1. Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those
resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the
person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death, nor
by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause of action
shall have accrued; but in case of the death of either or both such
parties, such cause of action shall survive to the personal
representative of such injured party, and against the person, receiver or
corporation liable for such injuries and his legal representatives, and
the liability and the measure of damages shall be the same as if such
death or deaths had not occurred. Causes of action for death shall not
abate by reason of the death of any party to any such cause of action,
but shall survive to the personal representative of such party bringing
such cause of action and against the person, receiver or corporation
liable for such death and his or its legal representatives.

2. The right of action for death or the right of action for personal
injury that does not result in the death shall be sufficient to authorize
and to require the appointment of a personal representative by the
probate division of the circuit court upon the written application
therefor by one or more of the beneficiaries of the deceased. The
existence of the right of action for death or personal injury that does
not result in death shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the
appointment of a personal representative for the person liable for such
death or injury by the court having probate jurisdiction upon his death
upon the written application of any person interested in such right of
action for death or injury. (RSMo 1939 § 3670, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 225,
A.L. 1949 p. 633, A.L. 1955 p. 780, A.L. 1977 S.B. 147, A.L. 1978 H.B.
1634)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3280; 1919 § 4231; 1909 § 5438

Effective 1-2-79

(1971) Where parents of deceased child were not made defendants in
plaintiff's suit against child's administrator, they could not bring
themselves into that action as counter-claimants for wrongful death.
State ex rel. Saupe v. Swink (A.), 475 S.W.2d 466.

(1975) Wrongful death action of husband for wife's death abated on his
death sixteen days later and did not pass to his personal representative.
Pedroli v. Missouri Pacific Railroad (A.), 524 S.W.2d 882.

1. The existence of a cause of action for an injury to property,
for a personal injury not resulting in death, or for wrongful death,
which action survives the death of the wrongdoer or the person injured,
or both, shall authorize and require the appointment by a probate
division of the circuit court of:

(1) A personal representative of the estate of a person whose property is
injured, or a person injured or a person entitled to maintain a wrongful
death action upon the death of any such person and such appointment in
only those cases involving loss chance of recovery or survival shall be
made notwithstanding the time specified in section 473.050, RSMo, for the
exclusive purpose of pursuing a cause of action related to such injury or
wrongful death; provided that, in such cases, the court in which any such
case is brought shall appoint a plaintiff ad litem at the request of the
plaintiff or other interested person delineated in section 537.080 and
such person shall be entitled to the proceeds of such action. Such
plaintiff ad litem may maintain such action instead of the personal
representative of the deceased and may maintain the action as an
alternative theory in any action under section 537.080; and

(2) A personal representative of the estate of a wrongdoer upon the death
of such wrongdoer; provided that, if a deceased wrongdoer was insured
against liability for damages for wrongdoing and damages may be recovered
from the wrongdoer's liability insurer, then the court in which any such
cause of action is brought shall appoint at the request of the plaintiff
or other interested party a qualified person to be known as a defendant
ad litem. The defendant ad litem when so appointed shall serve and act as
the named party defendant in such actions in the capacity of legal
representative of the deceased wrongdoer and such appointment and any
proceedings had or judgment rendered in such cause after such appointment
shall be binding on the insurer of such deceased wrongdoer to the same
extent as if a personal representative had acted as the legal
representative of such deceased wrongdoer in such cause of action. Should
the plaintiff in such cause of action desire to satisfy any portion of a
judgment rendered thereon out of the assets of the estate of such
deceased wrongdoer, such action shall be maintained against a personal
representative appointed by the probate division of the circuit court and
the plaintiff shall comply with the provisions of the probate code with
respect to claims against decedents' estates. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to permit a plaintiff in such cause of action to
pursue other assets of a decedent's estate after the expiration of the
time provided in section 473.444, RSMo.

2. Nothing herein shall be construed to require that the deceased
wrongdoer leave no assets subject to probate administration before the
appointment of a defendant ad litem as herein provided, nor shall the
appointment of a defendant ad litem as herein provided prevent the
probate division of the circuit court from appointing a personal
representative of the estate of the deceased wrongdoer for purposes of
administration of the assets thereof.

3. The defendant ad litem may be allowed a reasonable fee by the court
appointing him which shall be taxed as court costs. The defendant ad
litem shall not be liable for court costs unless specially charged by the
court for personal misconduct in the action.

4. Actions properly pending against personal representatives and
defendants ad litem prior to September 28, 1981, shall not be affected by
the provisions of this section. (L. 1977 S.B. 147, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1634,
A.L. 1981 S.B. 22 & 119 & 23, A.L. 1993 S.B. 88, A.L. 1996 S.B. 494)

Effective 5-23-96

Sections 537.010 and 537.020 shall not extend to actions for
slander, libel, assault and battery or false imprisonment. (RSMo 1939 §
99, A. 1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 99; 1919 § 98; 1909 § 106

1. As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise, the following words and terms shall have the meanings
indicated:

(1) "Health care professional", a physician or surgeon licensed under the
provisions of chapter 334, RSMo, or a dentist licensed under the
provisions of chapter 332, RSMo, or a podiatrist licensed under the
provisions of chapter 330, RSMo, or an optometrist licensed under the
provisions of chapter 336, RSMo, or a pharmacist licensed under the
provisions of chapter 338, RSMo, or a chiropractor licensed under the
provisions of chapter 331, RSMo, or a psychologist licensed under the
provisions of chapter 337, RSMo, or a nurse licensed under the provisions
of chapter 335, RSMo, or a social worker licensed under the provisions of
chapter 337, RSMo, or a professional counselor licensed under the
provisions of chapter 337, RSMo, or a mental health professional as
defined in section 632.005, RSMo, while acting within their scope of
practice;

(2) "Peer review committee", a committee of health care professionals
with the responsibility to evaluate, maintain, or monitor the quality and
utilization of health care services or to exercise any combination of
such responsibilities.

2. A peer review committee may be constituted as follows:

(1) Comprised of, and appointed by, a state, county or local society of
health care professionals;

(2) Comprised of, and appointed by, the partners, shareholders, or
employed health care professionals of a partnership or professional
corporation of health care professionals, or employed health care
professionals of a university or an entity affiliated with a university
operating under chapter 172, 174, 352, or 355, RSMo;

(3) Appointed by the board of trustees, chief executive officer, or the
organized medical staff of a licensed hospital, or other health facility
operating under constitutional or statutory authority, including
long-term care facilities licensed under chapter 198, RSMo, or an
administrative entity of the department of mental health recognized
pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of section
630.407, RSMo;

(4) Any other organization formed pursuant to state or federal law
authorized to exercise the responsibilities of a peer review committee
and acting within the scope of such authorization;

(5) Appointed by the board of directors, chief executive officer or the
medical director of the licensed health maintenance organization.

3. Each member of a peer review committee and each person, hospital
governing board, health maintenance organization board of directors, and
chief executive officer of a licensed hospital or other hospital
operating under constitutional or statutory authority, chief executive
officer or medical director of a licensed health maintenance organization
who testifies before, or provides information to, acts upon the
recommendation of, or otherwise participates in the operation of, such a
committee shall be immune from civil liability for such acts so long as
the acts are performed in good faith, without malice and are reasonably
related to the scope of inquiry of the peer review committee.

4. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the interviews,
memoranda, proceedings, findings, deliberations, reports, and minutes of
peer review committees, or the existence of the same, concerning the
health care provided any patient are privileged and shall not be subject
to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for their
release to any person or entity or be admissible into evidence in any
judicial or administrative action for failure to provide appropriate
care. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person who was in
attendance at any peer review committee proceeding shall be permitted or
required to disclose any information acquired in connection with or in
the course of such proceeding, or to disclose any opinion,
recommendation, or evaluation of the committee or board, or any member
thereof; provided, however, that information otherwise discoverable or
admissible from original sources is not to be construed as immune from
discovery or use in any proceeding merely because it was presented during
proceedings before a peer review committee nor is a member, employee, or
agent of such committee, or other person appearing before it, to be
prevented from testifying as to matters within his personal knowledge and
in accordance with the other provisions of this section, but such witness
cannot be questioned about testimony or other proceedings before any
health care review committee or board or about opinions formed as a
result of such committee hearings. The disclosure of any interview,
memoranda, proceedings, findings, deliberations, reports, or minutes to
any person or entity, including but not limited to governmental agencies,
professional accrediting agencies, or other health care providers,
whether proper or improper, shall not waive or have any effect upon its
confidentiality, nondiscoverability, or nonadmissibility.

5. The provisions of subsection 4 of this section limiting discovery and
admissibility of testimony as well as the proceedings, findings, records,
and minutes of peer review committees do not apply in any judicial or
administrative action brought by a peer review committee or the legal
entity which formed or within which such committee operates to deny,
restrict, or revoke the hospital staff privileges or license to practice
of a physician or other health care providers; or when a member,
employee, or agent of the peer review committee or the legal entity which
formed such committee or within which such committee operates is sued for
actions taken by such committee which operate to deny, restrict or revoke
the hospital staff privileges or license to practice of a physician or
other health care provider.

6. Nothing in this section shall limit authority otherwise provided by
law of a health care licensing board of the state of Missouri to obtain
information by subpoena or other authorized process from peer review
committees or to require disclosure of otherwise confidential information
relating to matters and investigations within the jurisdiction of such
health care licensing boards. (L. 1973 S.B. 62 § 1, A.L. 1977 H.B. 562,
A.L. 1985 H.B. 357, A.L. 1993 S.B. 388, A.L. 1997 H.B. 335, A.L. 2005
H.B. 393)

CROSS REFERENCE: Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after
August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305

(1984) No peer review privilege of confidentiality exists for statements
or documents since such privilege is separate and distinct from the
statutory immunity from civil liability granted to medical personnel
participating in peer review. State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle (Mo.
banc), 678 S.W.2d 804.

(1986) The proceedings, findings, deliberations, reports and minutes of
peer review committees are not discoverable. State ex rel. Faith Hospital
v. Enright (Mo. banc), 706 S.W.2d 852.

1. Any physician or surgeon, registered professional nurse or
licensed practical nurse licensed to practice in this state under the
provisions of chapter 334 or 335, RSMo, or licensed to practice under the
equivalent laws of any other state and any person licensed as a mobile
emergency medical technician under the provisions of chapter 190, RSMo,
may:

(1) In good faith render emergency care or assistance, without
compensation, at the scene of an emergency or accident, and shall not be
liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions other than damages
occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions
by such person in rendering such emergency care;

(2) In good faith render emergency care or assistance, without
compensation, to any minor involved in an accident, or in competitive
sports, or other emergency at the scene of an accident, without first
obtaining the consent of the parent or guardian of the minor, and shall
not be liable for any civil damages other than damages occasioned by
gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person
in rendering the emergency care.

2. Any other person who has been trained to provide first aid in a
standard recognized training program may, without compensation, render
emergency care or assistance to the level for which he or she has been
trained, at the scene of an emergency or accident, and shall not be
liable for civil damages for acts or omissions other than damages
occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions
by such person in rendering such emergency care.

3. Any mental health professional, as defined in section 632.005, RSMo,
or substance abuse counselor, as defined in section 631.005, RSMo, or any
practicing medical, osteopathic, or chiropractic physician, or certified
nurse practitioner, or physicians' assistant may in good faith render
suicide prevention interventions at the scene of a threatened suicide and
shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions other
than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts
or omissions by such person in rendering such suicide prevention
interventions.

4. Any other person who has been trained to provide suicide prevention
interventions in a standard recognized training program may, without
compensation, render suicide prevention interventions to the level for
which such person has been trained at the scene of a threatened suicide
and shall not be liable for civil damages for acts or omissions other
than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts
or omissions by such person in rendering such suicide prevention
interventions. (L. 1979 H.B. 445 § 1, A.L. 1983 1st Ex. Sess. H.B. 8,
A.L. 1986 H.B. 860, A.L. 2005 H.B. 462 & 463)

For all civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may
be recovered against her alone, and her husband shall not be responsible
therefor, except in cases where, under the law, he would be jointly
responsible with her, if the marriage did not exist. (RSMo 1939 § 3680)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3290; 1919 § 4241

(1986) The court abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity as a bar
to claims for intentional torts. Townsend v. Townsend (Mo. banc), 708
S.W.2d 646.

(1986) The doctrine of spousal immunity is no longer available as a bar
to negligence actions. S.A.V. v. K.G.V. (Mo. banc), 708 S.W.2d 651.

1. The parent or guardian, excluding foster parents, of any
unemancipated minor, under eighteen years of age, in their care and
custody, against whom judgment has been rendered for purposely marking
upon, defacing or in any way damaging any property, shall be liable for
the payment of that judgment up to an amount not to exceed two thousand
dollars, provided that the parent or guardian has been joined as a party
defendant in the original action. The judgment provided in this
subsection to be paid shall be paid to the owner of the property damaged,
but such payment shall not be a bar to any criminal action or any
proceeding against the unemancipated minor for such damage for the
balance of the judgment not paid by the parent or guardian.

2. The parent or guardian, excluding foster parents, of any unemancipated
minor, under eighteen years of age, in their care and custody, against
whom judgment has been rendered for purposely causing personal injury to
any individual, shall be liable for the payment for that judgment up to
an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars, provided that the parent or
guardian has been joined as a party defendant in the original action. The
judgment provided in this subsection to be paid shall be paid to the
person injured, but such payment shall not be a bar to any criminal
action or any proceeding against the unemancipated minor for such damage
for the balance of the judgment not paid by the parent or guardian.

3. Upon rendering a judgment in any proceeding under this section, the
judge may order the parent or guardian, and the minor who damaged the
property or caused the personal injury, to work for the owner of the
property damaged or the person injured in lieu of payment, if the parent,
minor and the owner of the property damaged or the person injured are
agreeable. (L. 1965 p. 661 § 1, A.L. 1979 H.B. 207, A.L. 1990 H.B. 1734)

CROSS REFERENCES: Damages by minor, restitution, RSMo 211.185 Defacing
state buildings, liability, RSMo 8.150 Parents liable for minors defacing
state capitol, RSMo 8.150

1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Childhood sexual abuse", any act committed by the defendant against
the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of
eighteen years and which act would have been a violation of section
566.030, 566.040, 566.050*, 566.060, 566.070, 566.080*, 566.090, 566.100,
566.110*, or 566.120*, RSMo, or section 568.020, RSMo;

(2) "Injury" or "illness", either a physical injury or illness or a
psychological injury or illness. A psychological injury or illness need
not be accompanied by physical injury or illness.

2. Any action to recover damages from injury or illness caused by
childhood sexual abuse in an action brought pursuant to this section
shall be commenced within ten years of the plaintiff attaining the age of
twenty- one or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers, or
reasonably should have discovered, that the injury or illness was caused
by childhood sexual abuse, whichever later occurs.

3. This section shall apply to any action commenced on or after August
28, 2004, including any action which would have been barred by the
application of the statute of limitation applicable prior to that date.
(L. 1990 H.B. 1370, et al. § 3, A.L. 2004 H.B. 1055 merged with H.B. 1453
merged with S.B. 1211)

*Sections 566.050, 566.080, 566.110, and 566.120 were repealed by S.B.
693 in 1994.

CROSS REFERENCES: Prosecution for sexual offense involving person
seventeen or under to be commenced within ten years of offense, RSMo
556.037 Statute of limitation in action for damages for sexual contact
with person within third degree of consanguinity or affinity, RSMo 516.371

(1993) Expiration of statutes of limitation for tort actions created
vested right in favor of defendants to be free from suit; therefore, to
extent that section authorizes causes of action that would have been
barred under statutes of limitation in effect prior to effective date of
statute, statute contravenes, Art. I, Sec. 13, Mo. Const., constitutional
prohibition against retrospective laws. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese,
862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo.banc).

In no case shall the right of action of any party injured by the
commission of any felony or misdemeanor be deemed or adjudged to be
merged in such felony or misdemeanor; but he may recover the amount of
damages sustained thereby in an action to be brought before any court or
tribunal of competent jurisdiction. (RSMo 1939 § 3679)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3289; 1919 § 4240; 1909 § 5447

1. Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop Act in 1934 (Laws
of 1933-34, extra session, page 77), it has been and continues to be the
policy of this state to follow the common law of England, as declared in
section 1.010, RSMo, to prohibit dram shop liability and to follow the
common law rule that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not the proximate
cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons.

2. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section, a cause of action may be
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personal injury or
death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the
drink for consumption on the premises when it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the seller knew or should have known that
intoxicating liquor was served to a person under the age of twenty-one
years or knowingly served intoxicating liquor to a visibly intoxicated
person.

3. For purposes of this section, a person is "visibly intoxicated" when
inebriated to such an extent that the impairment is shown by
significantly uncoordinated physical action or significant physical
dysfunction. A person's blood alcohol content does not constitute prima
facie evidence to establish that a person is visibly intoxicated within
the meaning of this section, but may be admissible as relevant evidence
of the person's intoxication.

4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to provide a right of
recovery to a person who suffers injury or death proximately caused by
the person's voluntary intoxication unless the person is under the age of
twenty-one years. No person over the age of twenty-one years or their
dependents, personal representative, and heirs may assert a claim for
damages for personal injury or death against a seller of intoxicating
liquor by the drink for consumption on the premises arising out of the
person's voluntary intoxication.

5. In an action brought pursuant to subsection 2 of this section alleging
the sale of intoxicating liquor by the drink for consumption on the
premises to a person under the age of twenty-one years, proof that the
seller or the seller's agent or employee demanded and was shown a
driver's license or official state or federal personal identification
card, appearing to be genuine and showing that the minor was at least
twenty-one years of age, shall be relevant in determining the relative
fault of the seller or seller's agent or employee in the action.

6. No employer may discharge his or her employee for refusing service to
a visibly intoxicated person. (L. 1985 S.B. 345 § 1, A.L. 2002 H.B. 1532)

(1985) There is no common-law "dramshop" liability on the part of a
social host who serves alcohol in his home to an intoxicated guest who
later injures a third party. Harriman v. Smith (A.), 697 S.W.2d 219.

(1987) Licensed vendors of liquor not to be consumed on the premises are
"dram shop keepers" and are protected from liability according to the
terms of this section. Ernst v. Dowdy, 739 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.App.).

(1987) Three men who planned a party at the home of one of the men's
parents were not liable for the injuries of a woman who was involved in a
motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle driven by a man who
was intoxicated and had become so at the party given by the three men.
Childress v. Sams, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.banc).

(2000) Provisions of Missouri's dram shop law that impose liability only
upon conviction of sale of liquor to a person under age or to an
obviously intoxicated person are an unconstitutional violation of the
state's open courts provision, Missouri Constitution Article I, Section
14, because access to the courts is conditioned upon a prosecutor's
decision to bring the case. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo.banc).

(2002) Kilmer v. Mun decision applies retrospectively. Piskorski v.
Larice, 70 S.W.3d 573 (Mo.App. E.D.).

Defendants in a judgment founded on an action for the redress of
a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other
consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent
as defendants in a judgment in an action founded on contract. When an
agreement by release, covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or wrongful death, such agreement shall not discharge any of
the other tort-feasors for the damage unless the terms of the agreement
so provide; however such agreement shall reduce the claim by the
stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the amount of consideration
paid, whichever is greater. The agreement shall discharge the tort-feasor
to whom it is given from all liability for contribution or noncontractual
indemnity to any other tort-feasor. The term "noncontractual indemnity"
as used in this section refers to indemnity between joint tort-feasors
culpably negligent, having no legal relationship to each other and does
not include indemnity which comes about by reason of contract, or by
reason of vicarious liability. (RSMo 1939 § 3658, A.L. 1983 H.B. 135 &
194)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3268; 1919 § 4223; 1909 § 5431

(1974) When joint tort-feasors are each chargeable with active or
affirmative negligence, neither is entitled to indemnity from the other;
however, one may be entitled to contribution from the other. Lewis v.
Amchem Products, Inc. (A.), 510 S.W.2d 46.

(1994) Statute does not require court to ignore plain, clear divestiture
of all claims in general release, however, a specific and clear
reservation is no longer required. Plaintiff's failure to clearly reserve
a specific claim in release does not necessarily render the claim barred.
Court must consider the whole instrument where language limits scope of
release to claims in first cause of action. Allison V. Flexway Trucking,
Inc. 28 F.3d 64 (8th Cir.).

(1996) Statute does not prohibit a general release. Meyer v. General
Motors Corp., 937 F.Supp. 861 (E.D. Mo.)

(2001) Claim for noncontractual indemnity includes, in the absence of
contractual provision allowing indemnification, seller's claim against
manufacturer for indemnification in products liability case. Tiny
Totland, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Companies, Inc., 242 F.3d 830 (8th
Cir.).

Any person having an unliquidated claim for damages against a
tort-feasor, on account of bodily injuries or death, may enter into a
contract with such tort-feasor or any insurer in his behalf or both,
whereby, in consideration of the payment of a specified amount, the
person asserting the claim agrees that in the event of a judgment against
the tort-feasor, neither he nor any person, firm or corporation claiming
by or through him will levy execution, by garnishment or as otherwise
provided by law, except against the specific assets listed in the
contract and except against any insurer which insures the legal liability
of the tort-feasor for such damage and which insurer is not excepted from
execution, garnishment or other legal procedure by such contract.
Execution or garnishment proceedings in aid thereof shall lie only as to
assets of the tort-feasor specifically mentioned in the contract or the
insurer or insurers not excluded in such contract. Such contract, when
properly acknowledged by the parties thereto, may be recorded in the
office of the recorder of deeds in any county where a judgment may be
rendered, or in the county of the residence of the tort-feasor, or in
both such counties, and if the same is so recorded then such
tort-feasor's property, except as to the assets specifically listed in
the contract, shall not be subject to any judgment lien as the result of
any judgment rendered against the tort-feasor, arising out of the
transaction for which the contract is entered into. (L. 1959 S.B. 259 § 1)

(1974) This section does not deprive insuror of right to be heard on
question of coverage or collusion and does not discriminate against
insurors. Butters v. City of Independence (Mo.), 513 S.W.2d 418.

(1975) Guardian ad litem who sat silent during alleged improper argument
and who made an admission of liability held not to have violated his duty
to ward and to have owed no duty to insuror after having proceeded under
this section. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 809.

1. In all tort actions for damages, if a defendant is found to
bear fifty-one percent or more of fault, then such defendant shall be
jointly and severally liable for the amount of the judgment rendered
against the defendants. If a defendant is found to bear less than fifty-
one percent of fault, then the defendant shall only be responsible for
the percentage of the judgment for which the defendant is determined to
be responsible by the trier of fact; except that, a party is responsible
for the fault of another defendant or for payment of the proportionate
share of another defendant if any of the following applies:

(1) The other defendant was acting as an employee of the party;

(2) The party's liability for the fault of another person arises out of a
duty created by the federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Section
51.

2. The defendants shall only be severally liable for the percentage of
punitive damages for which fault is attributed to such defendant by the
trier of fact.

3. In all tort actions, no party may disclose to the trier of fact the
impact of this section. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 41, A.L. 2005 H.B. 393)

CROSS REFERENCE: Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after
August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305

(2001) Joint and several liability applies to Missouri Highway and
Transportation Commission; application of statute would not require the
public payment of a private debt or the unconstitutional diversion of
appropriated highway funds. Smith v. Coffey, 37 S.W.3d 797 (Mo.banc.).

A court may enter a remittitur order if, after reviewing the
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, the court finds that the
jury's verdict is excessive because the amount of the verdict exceeds
fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiff's injuries and damages. A
court may increase the size of a jury's award if the court finds that the
jury's verdict is inadequate because the amount of the verdict is less
than fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiff's injuries and
damages. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 42)

Effective 7-1-87

(1996) Additur is an "authorized after-trial" motion. Massman
Construction Company v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 914
S.W.2d 801 (Mo.banc).

The provisions of sections 260.552, RSMo, 408.040, RSMo,
490.715, RSMo, 509.050, RSMo, 510.263, RSMo, 537.067, 537.068, 537.117,
537.675, and 537.760 to 537.765 and 538.300, RSMo, shall apply to all
causes of actions accruing after July 1, 1987. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 45)

Effective 7-1-87

CROSS REFERENCE: Medical and health care providers, malpractice sections,
538.205 to 538.230; certain sections not applicable, RSMo 538.300

1. Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct,
occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued,
would have entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof,
the person or party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable
if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, which damages may be
sued for:

(1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any
deceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by
the father or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive;

(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action,
then by the brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants, who
can establish his or her right to those damages set out in section
537.090 because of the death;

(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the
action, then by a plaintiff ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be
appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the action for damages
provided in this section upon application of some person entitled to
share in the proceeds of such action. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be
some suitable person competent to prosecute such action and whose
appointment is requested on behalf of those persons entitled to share in
the proceeds of such action. Such court may, in its discretion, require
that such plaintiff ad litem give bond for the faithful performance of
his duties.

2. Only one action may be brought under this section against any one
defendant for the death of any one person.

(RSMo 1939 §§ 3652, 3653, A.L. 1955 p. 778 § 537.070, A.L. 1967 p. 663,
A.L. 1979 S.B. 368, A.L. 1991 H.B. 236)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 3262, 3263; 1919 §§ 4217, 4218; 1909 §§ 5425,
5426

(1971) Where parents of deceased child were not made defendants in
plaintiff's suit against child's administrator, they could not bring
themselves into that action as counter-claimants for wrongful death.
State ex rel. Saupe v. Swink (A.), 475 S.W.2d 466.

(1973) A husband or wife, when there is no living father or mother of the
deceased, may sue at any time within two years. Montemayor v. Harvey
(Mo.), 490 S.W.2d 61.

(1974) Held that father has an absolute right to intervene in an action
brought by mother for wrongful death of their son. State ex rel.
Slibowski v. Kimberlin (A.), 504 S.W.2d 237.

(1974) Held that stepdaughter cannot maintain an action for wrongful
death of her mother against her stepfather since doctrine of interspousal
immunity would operate to bar such action by the mother and would extend
to the daughter. Klein v. Abramson (A.), 513 S.W.2d 714.

(1975) Even though alleged daughter of deceased was born seven months
after putative father's death she would have had to have filed within the
year to have prevented deceased's mother from appropriating the action.
Wessels v. Gupfel (A.), 522 S.W.2d 653.

(1976) Held, it is essential to plead and prove that any heir who would
receive damages collected, when distributed under laws of descent and
distribution, suffered a pecuniary loss by reason of the death. Pittock
v. Gardner (Mo.), 530 S.W.2d 217.

(1976) If the deceased left a surviving father or mother, the spouse and
minor children must exercise their preferred right by filing suit within
one year from the date of death. State ex rel. Kansas City Stock Yards v.
Clark (Mo.), 536 S.W.2d 142.

(1976) Held, since an unborn fetus is incapable of maintaining an action
there is no cause of action to pass to another and no claim for wrongful
death can be asserted. State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders (Mo.), 538 S.W.2d
336.

(1978) Parents could recover for wrongful death of an unmarried adult
child who left no surviving minor children. State ex rel. Zigler v. Adolf
(A.), 561 S.W.2d 691.

(1978) Held, that divorced father not entitled to equal interest in
judgment for wrongful death where mother paid vast majority of expenses
arising from accident. Taylor v. Aspey (A.), 567 S.W.2d 670.

(1978) Held, infant child of deceased unmarried minor deserves no
preference over any other child and must bring action within one year for
wrongful death. Kausch v. Bishop (Mo.), 568 S.W.2d 532.

(1984) Child decreed equitably adopted by his aunt six months after her
death was a proper plaintiff in a wrongful death action based upon her
death. Holt v. Burlington Northern R. Co. (Mo.App.W.D.), 685 S.W.2d 851.

(1990) Non-viable fetus is not a person within the meaning of wrongful
death statute. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.banc).

(1991) Statute limits wrongful death action to a single or sole cause of
action. When a person entitled to bring a wrongful death action has
settled case, other persons claiming to be within class entitled to
recover are barred from bringing an action and have the exclusive remedy
of attacking validity of prior judgment under Rule 74.06. Davis v.
Wilson, 804 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.App.).

(1992) Under wrongful death statute, survivorship damages incurred by the
decedent before death, such as medical expenses and pain and suffering,
are recoverable as part of wrongful death claim, but no recovery, either
in terms of economic loss or in terms of premature termination of
pleasures of life, is allowed for damages to the decedent caused by the
death itself. Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184 (Mo.banc.).

On the trial of such action to recover damages for causing
death, the defendant may plead and prove as a defense any defense which
the defendant would have had against the deceased in an action based upon
the same act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which
caused the death of the deceased, and which action for damages the
deceased would have been entitled to bring had death not ensued. (L. 1955
p. 778 § 537.090, A.L. 1979 S.B. 368)

In every action brought under section 537.080, the trier of the
facts may give to the party or parties entitled thereto such damages as
the trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus
occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of
the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services,
consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel,
training, and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought
have been deprived by reason of such death and without limiting such
damages to those which would be sustained prior to attaining the age of
majority by the deceased or by the person suffering any such loss. In
addition, the trier of the facts may award such damages as the deceased
may have suffered between the time of injury and the time of death and
for the recovery of which the deceased might have maintained an action
had death not ensued. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the death may be considered by the trier of the facts, but
damages for grief and bereavement by reason of the death shall not be
recoverable. If the deceased was not employed full time and was at least
fifty percent responsible for the care of one or more minors or disabled
persons, or persons over sixty-five years of age, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that the value of the care provided, regardless of
the number of persons cared for, is equal to one hundred and ten percent
of the state average weekly wage, as computed under section 287.250,
RSMo. If the deceased is under the age of eighteen, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that the annual pecuniary losses suffered by
reason of the death shall be calculated based on the annual income of the
deceased's parents, provided that if the deceased has only one parent
earning income, then the calculation shall be based on such income, but
if the deceased had two parents earning income, then the calculation
shall be based on the average of the two incomes. (RSMo 1939 § 3654, A.L.
1945 p. 846, A.L. 1955 p. 778 § 537.080, A.L. 1967 p. 663, A.L. 1973 H.B.
173, A.L. 1979 S.B. 368, A.L. 2005 H.B. 393)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3264; 1919 § 4219; 1909 § 5427

CROSS REFERENCE: Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after
August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305

(1987) Award of $6.5 million dollars in action for wrongful death of
plaintiff's 22-year-old daughter was not so large to be deemed excessive
and not permitted pursuant to this section. Morrissey v. Welsh Co., 821
F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.).

(1989) Because a wrongful death settlement is for the use and benefit of
those who sue or are entitled to sue, and because wrongful death is not a
claim or cause of action brought on the part of the injured person, a
hospital lien does not attach to the settlement of a wrongful death
claim. American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Ward, 774 S.W.2d 135
(Mo.banc).

1. Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, if two or
more persons are entitled to sue for and recover damages as herein
allowed, then any one or more of them may compromise or settle the claim
for damages with approval of any circuit court, or may maintain such suit
and recover such damages without joinder therein by any other person,
provided that the claimant or petitioner shall satisfy the court that he
has diligently attempted to notify all parties having a cause of action
under section 537.080. Any settlement or recovery by suit shall be for
the use and benefit of those who sue or join, or who are entitled to sue
or join, and of whom the court has actual written notice.

2. When any settlement is made, or recovery had, by any plaintiff ad
litem, the persons entitled to share in the proceeds thereof shall be
determined according to the laws of descent, and any settlement or
recovery by such plaintiff ad litem shall likewise be distributed
according to the laws of descent unless special circumstances indicate
that such a distribution would be inequitable, in which case the court
shall apportion the settlement or recovery in proportion to the losses
suffered by each person or party entitled to share in the proceeds and,
provided, that any person entitled to share in the proceeds shall have
the right to intervene at any time before any judgment is entered or
settlement approved under this section.

3. In any action for damages under section 537.080, the trier of the
facts shall state the total damages found, or upon the approval of any
settlement for which a petition or application for such approval has been
filed, the court shall state the total settlement approved. The court
shall then enter a judgment as to such damages, apportioning them among
those persons entitled thereto in proportion to the losses suffered by
each as determined by the court.

4. The court shall order the claimant:

(1) To collect and receipt for the payment of the judgment;

(2) To deduct and pay the expenses of recovery and collection of the
judgment and the attorneys' fees as contracted, or if there is no
contract, or if the party sharing in the proceeds has no attorney
representing him before the rendition of any judgment or settlement, then
the court may award the attorney who represents the original plaintiff
such fee for his services, from such persons sharing in the proceeds, as
the court deems fair and equitable under the circumstances;

(3) To acknowledge satisfaction in whole or in part for the judgment and
costs;

(4) To distribute the net proceeds as ordered by the court; and

(5) To report and account therefor to the court. In its discretion the
court may require the claimant to give bond for the collection and
distribution. (L. 1967 p. 663, A.L. 1979 S.B. 368)

Every action instituted under section 537.080 shall be commenced
within three years after the cause of action shall accrue; provided, that
if any defendant, whether a resident or nonresident of the state at the
time any such cause of action accrues, shall then or thereafter be absent
or depart from the state, so that personal service cannot be had upon
such defendant in the state in any such action heretofore or hereafter
accruing, the time during which such defendant is so absent from the
state shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for
the commencement of such action against him; and provided, that if any
such action shall have been commenced within the time prescribed in this
section, and the plaintiff therein take or suffer a nonsuit, or after a
verdict for him the judgment be arrested, or after a judgment for him the
same be reversed on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a new
action from time to time within one year after such nonsuit suffered or
such judgment arrested or reversed; and in determining whether such new
action has been begun within the period so limited, the time during which
such nonresident or absent defendant is so absent from the state shall
not be deemed or taken as any part of such period of limitation. (RSMo
1939 § 3656, A.L. 1955 p. 778, A.L. 1967 p. 663, A.L. 1979 S.B. 368)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3266; 1919 § 4221; 1909 § 5429

The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio
broadcasting station or network of stations, or the agents or employees
of such owner, licensee or operator of such a station or network of
stations, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory
statement uttered over the facilities of such station or network by or on
behalf of any candidate for public office where such statement is not
subject to censorship or control by reason of any federal statute or any
ruling or order of the Federal Communications Commission made pursuant
thereto. (L. 1951 p. 804 § 1)

It is actionable to publish falsely and maliciously, in any
manner whatsoever, that any person has been guilty of fornication or
adultery. (RSMo 1939 § 3651)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3261; 1919 § 4216; 1909 § 5424

CROSS REFERENCE: Pleadings in libel or slander actions, RSMo 509.210

1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Canned food", any food commercially processed and prepared for human
consumption;

(2) "Perishable food", any food which may spoil or otherwise become unfit
for human consumption because of its nature, type or physical condition.
This term includes, but is not limited to, fresh and processed meats,
poultry, seafood, dairy products, bakery products, eggs in the shell,
fresh fruits and vegetables, and foods which have been packaged,
refrigerated, or frozen.

2. All other provisions of law notwithstanding, a good faith donor of
canned or perishable food, which complies with chapter 196, RSMo, at the
time it was donated and which is fit for human consumption at the time it
is donated, to a bona fide charitable or not-for-profit organization for
free distribution, shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability
arising from an injury or death due to the condition of such food unless
such injury or death is a direct result of the negligence, recklessness
or intentional misconduct of such donor.

3. All other provisions of law notwithstanding, a bona fide charitable or
not-for-profit organization which in good faith receives and distributes
food, which complies with chapter 196, RSMo, at the time it was donated
and which is fit for human consumption at the time it is distributed,
without charge, shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability
arising from an injury or death due to the condition of such food unless
such injury or death is a direct result of the negligence, recklessness,
or intentional misconduct of such organization.

4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a good
faith donor or a charitable or not-for-profit organization, who in good
faith receives or distributes frozen and packaged venison without charge,
shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability arising from an
injury or death due to the condition of such food, except as provided in
this subsection. The venison must:

(1) Come from a whitetail deer harvested in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the department of conservation;

(2) Be field dressed and handled in a sanitary manner and the carcass of
which remains in sound condition;

(3) Be processed in a licensed facility that is subject to the United
States Department of Agriculture's mandated inspections during
domesticated animal operations or is approved by the Missouri department
of agriculture meat inspection program.

Except that, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply if the
injury or death is a direct result of the negligence, recklessness or
intentional misconduct of such donor or the deer was harvested during a
season that the deer in Missouri were found to have diseases communicable
to humans. Venison handled and processed in accordance with the
provisions of this section and protected by all reasonable means from
foreign or injurious contamination is exempt from the provisions of
chapter 196, RSMo.

5. The provisions of this section shall govern all good faith donations
of canned or perishable food which is not readily marketable due to
appearance, freshness, grade, surplus or other conditions, but nothing in
this section shall restrict the authority of any appropriate agency to
regulate or ban the use of such food for human consumption. (L. 1981 H.B.
113 § 1, A.L. 1993 H.B. 306, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1610, A.L. 2004 H.B. 1192
merged with S.B. 740, et al.)

Any officer or member of the governing body of an entity which
operates under the standards of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, who is not compensated for his services on a salary or
prorated equivalent basis, shall be immune from personal liability for
any civil damages arising from acts performed in his official capacity.
The immunity shall extend only to such actions for which the person would
not otherwise be liable, but for his affiliation with such an entity.
This immunity shall not apply to intentional conduct, wanton or willful
conduct, or gross negligence. Nothing herein shall be construed to create
or abolish an immunity in favor of the entity itself. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 §
43)

Effective 7-1-87

1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Nonprofit organization", an entity which operates under the
standards of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as
amended;

(2) "Prorated equivalent basis", any other basis for compensation except
that used to compensate for expenses actually incurred; and

(3) "Volunteer", an individual performing services for a nonprofit
organization or a governmental entity who is not compensated for his
services on a salary or prorated equivalent basis. The term shall not
include those covered by section 537.117.

2. Any volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity shall
be immune from personal liability for any act or omission resulting in
damage or injury to any person intended to receive benefit from such
volunteer's service if:

(1) The volunteer acted in good faith and within the scope of his
official functions and duties with the organization or entity; and

(2) The damage or injury was not caused by the intentional or malicious
conduct or by the negligence of such volunteer.

3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or abolish an
immunity in favor of a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity.

4. The provisions of this section shall apply to all causes of action
accruing after August 28, 1989. (L. 1989 S.B. 208 § 1)

No regular practicing or licensed physician or surgeon or the
owner or operator of any private sanatorium or hospital shall be liable
in damages for restraint of any mentally incapacitated person by reason
of having in good faith furnished care, treatment or attention to such
person, and while such person is under the care of such physician or
surgeon or confined in such sanatorium or hospital. (RSMo 1939 § 508,
A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45)

1. As used in this section:

(1) "Mercantile establishment" means any mercantile place of business in,
at or from which goods, wares and merchandise are sold, offered for sale
or delivered from and sold at retail or wholesale;

(2) "Merchandise" means all goods, wares and merchandise offered for sale
or displayed by a merchant;

(3) "Merchant" means any corporation, partnership, association or person
who is engaged in the business of selling goods, wares and merchandise in
a mercantile establishment;

(4) "Wrongful taking" includes stealing of merchandise or money and any
other wrongful appropriation of merchandise or money.

2. Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a
wrongful taking of merchandise or money from a mercantile establishment,
may detain such person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length
of time for the purpose of investigating whether there has been a
wrongful taking of such merchandise or money. Any such reasonable
detention shall not constitute an unlawful arrest or detention, nor shall
it render the merchant, his agent or employee, criminally or civilly
liable to the person so detained.

3. Any person willfully concealing unpurchased merchandise of any
mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises
of such establishment, shall be presumed to have so concealed such
merchandise with the intention of committing a wrongful taking of such
merchandise within the meaning of subsection 1, and the finding of such
unpurchased merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings
of such person shall be evidence of reasonable grounds and probable cause
for the detention in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of
time, of such person by a merchant, his agent or employee, in order that
recovery of such merchandise may be effected, and any such reasonable
detention shall not be deemed to be unlawful, nor render such merchant,
his agent or employee criminally or civilly liable.

4. Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or
probable cause to believe that a person has committed a wrongful taking
of property, as defined in this section, and who has detained such person
and investigated such wrongful taking, may contact law enforcement
officers and instigate criminal proceedings against such person. Any such
contact of law enforcement authorities or instigation of a judicial
proceeding shall not constitute malicious prosecution, nor shall it
render the merchant, his agent or employee criminally or civilly liable
to the person so detained or against whom proceedings are instigated. (L.
1961 p. 571 §§ 1, 2, 3, A.L. 1985 H.B. 225)

(1972) This section adds to previously existing law a presumption that
the willful concealment of property supplies the intent to steal. It is
still, however, a jury issue as to whether there existed a willful
concealment. The presumption is rebuttable by evidence such as that
accused placed the tape recorder batteries in his pocket to aid in
inspecting a magazine on a rack, and that he had no intent to steal.
Schwane v. Broger Company (A.), 480 S.W.2d 113.

(1978) It was error for trial court to read a portion of statute, but
counsel failed to state the proper objection at time evidence was
admitted. Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (A.), 562 S.W.2d 723.

Any person or persons forming a part of an unlawful or riotous
assemblage shall be liable for any damage to person or property caused by
the acts of such assemblage, or of any person or persons unlawfully
connected therewith. (RSMo 1939 § 3661)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3271; 1919 § 8672; 1909 § 9549

Every county, city, town, village, fire district or other
political subdivision of the state having a full time salaried fire
department shall defend, in the name and on behalf of the members of its
fire department in any action brought against a member involving claims
for death or injury to persons or property arising out of their operation
of motor vehicles of the fire department in the performance of their
duties. Such defense shall be conducted by the regular legal staff of the
county, city, town, village, fire district or other political subdivision
involved. No judgment, or liability for court costs, obtained against any
such member in any such action shall be a liability of the county, city,
town, village, fire district or other political subdivision defending
such action. (L. 1957 p. 756 § 1)

It shall hereafter be lawful for any blind person over the age
of eighteen years to agree to and with his or her employer to waive his
or her right to damages or compensation for any personal injury arising
out of or in the course of his or her employment for which injury such
blindness was the direct or contributory cause and any such agreement
shall be valid and binding upon the parties thereto. (RSMo 1939 § 3669)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3279; 1919 § 4230

Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in
this state and every person, company or corporation operating a mine or
mines in this state producing lead, zinc, coal or other valuable minerals
shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof
while engaged in the work of operating such railroad or while engaged in
operating such mine or mines by reason of the negligence of any other
agent or servant thereof; provided, that it may be shown in defense that
the person injured was guilty of negligence contributing as a proximate
cause to produce the injury. (RSMo 1939 §§ 3665, 3672, A. 1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 3275, 3282; 1919 §§ 4226, 4233; 1909 §§ 5434,
5440

CROSS REFERENCES: Contributory negligence of employee no defense in
action for injuries against railroad, when, RSMo 389.790 to 389.870
Damages for injuries to employees resulting from failure of railroad to
maintain switch lights, RSMo 389.710 to 389.730

All persons who are engaged in the common service of such
railroad corporation, or of any person, company or corporation operating
a mine or mines, and who while so engaged, are working together at the
same time and place, to a common purpose of same grade, neither of such
persons being entrusted by such railroad corporation, person, company, or
corporation with any superintendence or control over their fellow
employees, are fellow servants with each other; except that nothing
herein contained shall be so construed as to make any agent or servant of
any railroad corporation in the service of such railroad corporation a
fellow servant with any other agent or servant of such railroad
corporation engaged in any other department or service of such
corporation. (RSMo 1939 §§ 3667, 3674, A. 1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 3277, 3284; 1919 §§ 4228, 4235; 1909 §§ 5436,
5442

All persons engaged in the service of any railroad corporation
doing business in this state or of any person, company or corporation
operating a mine or mines in this state, who are entrusted by such
railroad corporation, person, company or corporation, with the authority
of superintendence, control or command of other persons in the employ or
service of such railroad corporation, person, company or corporation, or
with authority to direct any other servant in the performance of any duty
of such servant, or with the duty of inspection or other duty owing by
the master to the servant, are "vice-principals" of such corporation, and
are not fellow servants with such employees. (RSMo 1939 §§ 3666, 3673, A.
1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 3276, 3283; 1919 §§ 4227, 4234; 1909 §§ 5435,
5441

No contracts made between any railroad corporation, or between
any person, company or corporation operating a mine or mines and their
agents or servants, based upon the contingency of the injury or death to
any such agent or servant, limiting the liability of the employer for any
damages under the provisions of this and sections 537.180 to 537.200
shall be valid or binding, but all such contracts or agreements shall be
null and void. (RSMo 1939 §§ 3668, 3675, A. 1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 3278, 3285; 1919 §§ 4229, 4236; 1909 §§ 5437,
5443

Nothing in sections 537.180 to 537.210 shall be so construed as
applying to or including the operation, construction or repairing of
concentrating mills, flumes or tramways wholly above ground. (RSMo 1939 §
3676)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3286; 1919 § 4237; 1909 § 5444

Whenever any cause of action shall accrue to any agent or
servant of any person, company or corporation operating a mine or mines
in this state under sections 537.180 to 537.210, and death shall ensue to
such agent or servant by reason of the negligence provided for in said
sections, the cause of action shall survive in favor of the widow and
minor children of the deceased; provided, that action therefor shall be
brought by the widow within six months after such death, and if she shall
fail to bring such action then within twelve months after such death by
such minor children; and provided further, that recovery in case of such
death shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars. (RSMo 1939 §
3677, A. 1949 H.B. 2135)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3287; 1919 § 4238; 1909 § 5445

Whenever the words "railroad companies" or "railroad
corporation" shall be found in sections 537.040 to 537.110, 537.130 to
537.260, it shall be taken and construed to include all companies,
corporations, person or persons operating any railroad in this state, and
wherever the word "railroad" occurs in any of said sections it shall be
taken and construed to include all railroads operated in this state by
whatever motive or power propelled, and shall include all railroads or
railways, commonly known as street railways, and all railroads operated
by terminal companies or associations, known as "terminal railroads" or
"railways", as well as all railways or railroads operated anywhere in the
state, commonly known as electric railroads, whether they be wholly or in
part in the city or country districts; also all railroads within the
country or city operated by what is commonly known as cable or motor
power, or by horsepower. (RSMo 1939 § 3671)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3281; 1919 § 4232; 1909 § 5439

Whenever any property is received by a common carrier to be
transferred from one place to another, within or without the state, or
when a railroad or other transportation company issues receipts or bills
of lading in this state, the common carrier, railroad or transportation
company issuing such bill of lading shall be liable for any loss, damage
or injury to such property, caused by its negligence or the negligence of
any other common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which
such property may be delivered, or over whose line such property may
pass; and the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing
any such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover, in a
proper action, the amount of any loss, damage or injury it may be
required to pay to the owner of such property, from the common carrier,
railroad or transportation company, through whose negligence the loss,
damage or injury may be sustained; provided, that in any suit to recover
for any loss, damage or injury to property transported by a common
carrier and one or more connecting carriers, the plaintiff may join as
defendants the original carrier and all connecting carriers, and shall be
entitled to recover in such action from the common carrier, railroad or
transportation company, through whose negligence any loss, damage or
injury to such property was sustained, the amount of such loss, damage or
injury, with all costs of suit, and may prosecute such action in any
county in this state in which, as is provided by law, a suit may be
maintained against either of such common carriers. (RSMo 1939 § 3678)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3288; 1919 § 4239; 1909 § 5446

CROSS REFERENCES: Common carriers, liable for damage to property in
transit, RSMo 387.180 Failure of railroad to receive and deliver bulk
grain, RSMo 389.540

When any animal or animals shall be killed or injured by the
cars, locomotive or other carriages used on any railroad in this state,
the owner of such animal or animals may recover the value thereof, in an
action against the company or corporation running such railroad, without
any proof of negligence, unskillfulness or misconduct, on the part of the
officers, servants or agents of such company; but this section shall not
apply to any accident occurring on any portion of such road that may be
enclosed by a lawful fence, or in the crossing of any public highway.
(RSMo 1939 § 3655)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3265; 1919 § 4220; 1909 § 5428

Whenever any livestock shall go in upon any railroad or its
right-of-way, in this state, and the said railroad is not at such place
or places enclosed by a good fence, on both sides of said railroad, such
as is by law required, or where said railroad has failed to construct and
maintain a good and sufficient cattle guard, or opening gate, such as is
by law required, and such stock by being frightened or run by any passing
locomotive, motor car, or other vehicle, or train on said railroad, shall
be injured or killed by or because of having run against the fence on
either side, or into any culvert, bridge, slough or mire, or other object
along the line of said road, the railroad company shall pay the owner of
any such stock so injured or killed the amount of the damages sustained.
(RSMo 1939 § 5219)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 4762; 1919 § 9949; 1909 § 3146

CROSS REFERENCE: Railroad liable for double damages for killing stock
until fences are built, RSMo 389.650

Whenever any livestock shall be injured or killed by any
railroad, so as to render the railroad liable under section 537.270, or
otherwise, and the owner of said livestock so injured or killed, or his
authorized agent, and the agent or adjuster of the railroad, shall agree
upon the amount of damage or damages sustained by the owner, the railroad
shall, within forty days after said agreement, pay to the owner thereof,
or his authorized agent, the amount of damage or damages so agreed upon.
(RSMo 1939 § 5220)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 4763; 1919 § 9951; 1909 § 3148

If any railroad neglect, fail or refuse to pay the owner or his
authorized agent the damage or damages agreed upon, as provided in
section 537.280, then the railroad shall be liable to the owner in double
the amount of damage or damages agreed upon, to be recovered in any court
of competent jurisdiction. (RSMo 1939 § 5221)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 4764; 1919 § 9952; 1909 § 3149

1. As used in this section, the term "firearm range" means any
rifle, pistol, silhouette, skeet, trap, blackpowder or other similar
range in this state used for discharging firearms in a sporting event or
for practice or instruction in the use of a firearm, or for the testing
of a firearm.

2. All owners of firearm ranges in existence on August 13, 1988, shall be
immune from any criminal liability arising out of or as a consequence of
noise or sound emission resulting from the normal use of any such firearm
range. Owners of such firearm ranges shall not be subject to any action
for public or private nuisance or trespass and no court in this state
shall enjoin the use or operation of such firearm ranges on the basis of
noise or sound emission resulting from the normal use of any such firearm
range. The term "normal use" of a firearm range, as used in this
subsection, means the average level of use of the firearm range during
the twelve months preceding August 13, 1988.

3. All owners of firearms ranges placed in operation after August 13,
1988, shall be immune from any criminal liability and shall not be
subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass arising
out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emission resulting from the
normal use of any such firearm range, if such firearm range conforms to
any one of the following requirements:

(1) Any area from which any firearm may be properly discharged is at
least one thousand yards from any occupied permanent dwelling on adjacent
property;

(2) Any area from which any rifle or pistol may be properly discharged is
enclosed by a permanent building or structure that absorbs or contains
the sound energy escaping from the muzzle of* firearms in use; or

(3) If the firearm range is situated on land otherwise subject to land
use zoning, the firearm range is in compliance with the requirements of
the zoning authority regarding the sound deflection or absorbent baffles,
barriers, or other sound emission control requirements. (L. 1988 S.B. 434
& 435 § 5)

*Word "or" appears in original rolls.

1. No agricultural operation or any of its appurtenances shall
be deemed to be a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions
in the locality thereof after the facility has been in operation for more
than one year, when the facility was not a nuisance at the time the
operation began. An agricultural operation protected pursuant to the
provisions of this section may reasonably expand its operation in terms
of acres or animal units without losing its protected status so long as
all county, state, and federal environmental codes, laws, or regulations
are met by the agricultural operation. Reasonable expansion shall not be
deemed a public or private nuisance, provided the expansion does not
create a substantially adverse effect upon the environment or creates a
hazard to public health and safety, or creates a measurably significant
difference in environmental pressures upon existing and surrounding
neighbors because of increased pollution. Reasonable expansion shall not
include complete relocation of a farming operation by the owner within or
without the present boundaries of the farming operation; however,
reasonable expansion of like kind that presently exists, may occur. If a
poultry or livestock operation is to maintain its protected status
following a reasonable expansion, the operation must ensure that its
waste handling capabilities and facilities meet or exceed minimum
recommendations of the University of Missouri extension service for
storage, processing, or removal of animal waste. The protected status of
an agricultural operation, once acquired, shall be assignable, alienable,
and inheritable. The protected status of an agricultural operation, once
acquired, shall not be waived by the temporary cessation of farming or by
diminishing the size of the operation. The provisions of this section
shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or
improper operation of any such agricultural operation or its
appurtenances.

2. As used in this section the term "agricultural operation and its
appurtenances" includes, but is not limited to, any facility used in the
production or processing for commercial purposes of crops, livestock,
swine, poultry, livestock products, swine products or poultry products.

3. The provisions of this section shall not affect or defeat the right of
any person, firm or corporation to recover damages for any injuries
sustained by it as a result of the pollution or other change in the
quantity or quality of water used by that person, firm or corporation for
private or commercial purposes, or as a result of any overflow of land
owned by or in the possession of any such person, firm or corporation.

4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any nuisance
resulting from an agricultural operation located within the limits of any
city, town or village on August 13, 1982.

5. In any nuisance action brought in which an agricultural operation is
alleged to be a nuisance, and which is found to be frivolous by the
court, the defendant shall recover the aggregate amount of costs and
expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred in his
behalf in connection with the defense of such action, together with a
reasonable amount for attorneys fees. (L. 1982 S.B. 537 § 1, A.L. 1990
S.B. 686)

1. The following words as used in this section shall have the
following meanings:

(1) "Owner", all of the following persons:

(a) Any person who lawfully owns anhydrous ammonia;

(b) Any person who lawfully owns a container, equipment or storage
facility containing anhydrous ammonia;

(c) Any person responsible for the installation or operation of such
containers, equipment or storage facilities;

(d) Any person lawfully selling anhydrous ammonia;

(e) Any person lawfully purchasing anhydrous ammonia for agricultural
purposes;

(f) Any person who operates or uses anhydrous ammonia containers,
equipment or storage facilities when lawfully applying anhydrous ammonia
for agricultural purposes;

(2) "Tamperer", a person who commits or assists in the commission of
tampering;

(3) "Tampering", transferring or attempting to transfer anhydrous ammonia
from its present container, equipment or storage facility to another
container, equipment or storage facility, without prior authorization
from the owners.

2. A tamperer assumes the risk of any personal injury, death and other
economic and noneconomic loss arising from his or her participation in
the act of tampering. A tamperer or any person related to a tamperer
shall not commence a direct or derivative action against any owner as it
relates to the act of tampering. Owners are immune from suit by a
tamperer or any person related to a tamperer and shall not be held liable
for any negligent act or omission which may cause personal injury, death
or other economic or noneconomic loss to a tamperer as it relates to the
act of tampering.

3. The immunity from liability and suit authorized by this section is
expressly waived for owners whose acts or omissions constitute willful or
wanton negligence. (L. 2001 H.B. 471 merged with S.B. 89 & 37)

Whenever any drover, or other person or persons engaged in
driving horses, mules, cattle, hogs or sheep through any part of the
state of Missouri, shall drive off or shall knowingly and willingly
suffer or permit to be driven off from the premises of any citizen of
said state, or from the range in which stock of any citizen usually run,
to any distance exceeding three miles from such premises or range, any
horses, mules, neat cattle, hogs or sheep belonging to such citizen, it
shall be lawful for the owner of any such stock so driven off to follow
and reclaim the same wherever it may be found; and for the taking and
driving away, or suffering or permitting to be driven away, of such
stock, the said owner shall be entitled to recover from any said drover,
or other person or persons guilty thereof, for each head of horses,
mules, neat cattle, hogs or sheep so driven away, twice the value
thereof, to be recovered in civil action in the circuit court of the
proper county before either a circuit or associate circuit judge and such
case may be heard and determined by an associate circuit judge under
chapter 517, RSMo, procedures without special assignment or transfer
regardless of the amount of the claim; provided, however, that if the
drover shall not pass any habitation where there is a sufficient
enclosure for the safekeeping of such animal or animals within said three
miles, and shall separate said cattle or other stock from the drove at
the next habitation, in such case said action shall not accrue to the
owner of said property. (RSMo 1939 § 14495, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1634)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 12821; 1919 § 4311; 1909 § 812

Effective 1-2-79

In any action commenced under section 537.300, a summons may
issue against the defendants upon the plaintiff stating, on oath, that he
believes some one or more of his cattle or other stock has been driven
off by a drover, and that he believes the same to be of a certain value,
to be endorsed on the writ; and the proceedings thereon shall be the same
as in other actions commenced by summons; provided, however, that no
exception shall be taken to the form of the oath aforesaid, and that upon
such affidavit, and the execution of a bond by plaintiff, as now required
under proceedings by attachment for the amount stated in said affidavit,
he shall also be entitled to an attachment against the horses, cattle,
mules, hogs, sheep or other animals which defendant or defendants are
then so driving, and also against their goods and chattels, and may
proceed, under said attachment, to recover all damages given to plaintiff
under section 537.300. (RSMo 1939 § 14496)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 12822; 1919 § 4312; 1909 § 813

Whenever judgment shall be rendered against any person or
persons, under the provisions of sections 537.300 to 537.320, by any
associate circuit judge or circuit judge, an execution shall issue
thereon against the goods and chattels of any such defendant or
defendants. (RSMo 1939 § 14497, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1634)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 12823; 1919 § 4313; 1909 § 814

Effective 1-2-79

1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise
requires, the following words and phrases shall mean:

(1) "Engages in an equine activity", * riding, training, assisting in
medical treatment of, driving or being a passenger upon an equine,
whether mounted or unmounted, or any person assisting a participant or
any person involved in show management. The term "engages in an equine
activity" does not include being a spectator at an equine activity,
except in cases where the spectator places himself in an unauthorized
area;

(2) "Equine", * a horse, pony, mule, donkey or hinny;

(3) "Equine activity" *:

(a) Equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances or parades that
involve any or all breeds of equines and any of the equine disciplines,
including, but not limited to, dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows,
grand prix jumping, three-day events, combined training, rodeos, driving,
pulling, cutting, polo, steeplechasing, English and western performance
riding, endurance trail riding and western games and hunting;

(b) Equine training or teaching activities or both;

(c) Boarding equines;

(d) Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine belonging to another,
whether or not the owner has received some monetary consideration or
other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a
prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect or evaluate the
equine;

(e) Rides, trips, hunts or other equine activities of any type however
informal or impromptu that are sponsored by an equine activity sponsor;
and

(f) Placing or replacing horseshoes on an equine;

(4) "Equine activity sponsor", * an individual, group, club, partnership
or corporation, whether or not operating for profit or nonprofit, or any
employee thereof, which sponsors, organizes or provides the facilities
for, an equine activity, including but not limited to pony clubs, 4-H
clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, school- and college-sponsored classes,
programs and activities, therapeutic riding programs and operators,
instructors and promoters of equine facilities, including but not limited
to stables, clubhouses, pony ride strings, fairs and arenas at which the
activity is held;

(5) "Equine professional", * a person engaged for compensation, or an
employee of such a person engaged:

(a) In instructing a participant or renting to a participant an equine
for the purpose of riding, driving or being a passenger upon the equine;
or

(b) In renting equipment or tack to a participant;

(6) "Inherent risks of equine activities", * those dangers or conditions
which are an integral part of equine activities, including but not
limited to:

(a) The propensity of any equine to behave in ways that may result in
injury, harm or death to persons on or around it**;

(b) The unpredictability of any equine's reaction to such things as
sounds, sudden movement and unfamiliar objects, persons or other animals;

(c) Certain hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions;

(d) Collisions with other equines or objects;

(e) The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may
contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to
maintain control over the animal or not acting within his ability;

(7) "Participant", * any person, whether amateur or professional, who
engages in an equine activity, whether or not a fee is paid to
participate in the equine activity.

2. Except as provided in subsection 4 of this section, an equine activity
sponsor, an equine professional or any other person or corporation shall
not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting
from the inherent risks of equine activities and, except as provided in
subsection 4 of this section, no participant or a participant's
representative shall make any claim against, maintain an action against,
or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or
any other person from injury, loss, damage or death of the participant
resulting from any of the inherent risks of equine activities.

3. This section shall not apply to the horse racing industry as regulated
in sections 313.050 to 313.720, RSMo. This section shall not apply to any
employer-employee relationship governed by the provisions of, and for
which liability is established pursuant to, chapter 287, RSMo.

4. The provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall not prevent or
limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional
or any other person if the equine activity sponsor, equine professional
or person:

(1) Provided the equipment or tack and knew or should have known that the
equipment or tack was faulty and such equipment or tack was faulty to the
extent that it did cause the injury; or

(2) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts
to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the
equine activity and determine the ability of the participant to safely
manage the particular equine based on the participant's age, obvious
physical condition or the participant's representations of his ability;

(3) Owns, leases, rents or otherwise is in lawful possession and control
of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries
because of a dangerous latent condition which was known to the equine
activity sponsor, equine professional or person and for which warning
signs have not been conspicuously posted;

(4) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of the participant and that act or omission
caused the injury;

(5) Intentionally injures the participant;

(6) Fails to use that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and
prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances.

5. The provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall not prevent or
limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor or an equine
professional under liability provisions as set forth in any other section
of law.

6. Every equine activity sponsor shall post and maintain signs which
contain the warning notice specified in this subsection. Such signs shall
be placed in a clearly visible location on or near stables, corrals or
arenas where the equine professional conducts equine activities if such
stables, corrals or arenas are owned, managed or controlled by the equine
professional. The warning notice specified in this subsection shall
appear on the sign in black letters on a white background with each
letter to be a minimum of one inch in height. Every written contract
entered into by an equine professional and equine activity sponsor for
the providing of professional services, instruction or the rental of
equipment or tack or an equine to a participant, whether or not the
contract involves equine activities on or off the location or site of the
equine professional's or equine activity sponsor's business, shall
contain in clearly readable print the warning notice specified in this
subsection. The signs and contracts described in this subsection shall
contain the following warning notice:

WARNING

Under Missouri law, an equine professional is not liable

for an injury to or the death of a participant in equine

activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities

pursuant to the Revised Statutes of Missouri. (L. 1994 S.B. 457)

*Word "means" appears here in original rolls.

**Word "them" appears in original rolls.

(2004) Exculpatory clause must show clear and unmistakable waiver and
shifting of risk to be enforceable, and section does not relieve riding
instructors or stable owners of duty to exercise reasonable care. Frank
v. Mathews, 136 S.W.3d 196 (Mo.App. W.D.).

1. As used in this section, unless the context provides
otherwise, the following terms shall mean:

(1) "Canoe", a watercraft which has an open top and is designed to hold
one or more participants;

(2) "Canoeing, rafting, kayaking, or tubing", riding in or on, training
in or on, using, paddling, or being a passenger in or on a canoe, kayak,
raft, or tube, including a person assisting a participant;

(3) "Equipment", any accessory to a watercraft which is used for
propulsion, safety, comfort, or convenience including, but not limited
to, paddles, oars, and personal floatation devices;

(4) "Inherent risks of paddlesport activities", those dangers, hazards,
or conditions which are an integral part of paddlesport activities in
Missouri's free-flowing streams or rivers, including, but not limited to:

(a) Risks typically associated with watercraft, including change in water
flow or current, submerged, semi-submerged, and overhanging objects,
capsizing, swamping, or sinking of watercraft and resultant injury,
hypothermia, or drowning;

(b) Cold weather or heat-related injuries and illnesses, including
hypothermia, frostbite, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, and dehydration;

(c) An "act of nature" which may include rock fall, inclement weather,
thunder and lightning, severe or varied temperature, weather conditions,
and winds including tornadoes;

(d) Equipment failure or operator error;

(e) Attack or bite by animals;

(f) The aggravation of injuries or illnesses because they occurred in
remote places where there are no available medical facilities;

(5) "Kayak", a watercraft similar to a canoe with a covered top which may
have more than one circular opening to hold participants, or designed to
permit a participant to sit on top of an enclosed formed seat;

(6) "Outfitter", any individual, group, club, partnership, corporation,
or business entity, whether or not operating for profit or not for
profit, or any employee or agent, which sponsors, organizes, rents, or
provides to the general public the opportunity to use any watercraft by a
participant on Missouri's free-flowing streams or rivers;

(7) "Paddlesport activity", canoeing, rafting, or kayaking in or on a
watercraft as follows:

(a) A competition, exercise, or undertaking that involves a watercraft;

(b) Training or teaching activities;

(c) A ride, trip, tour, or other activity, however informal or impromptu,
whether or not a fee is paid, that is sponsored by an outfitter;

(d) A guided trip, tour, or other activity, whether or not a fee is paid,
that is sponsored by an outfitter;

(8) "Participant", any person, whether amateur or professional, whether
or not a fee is paid, which rents, leases, or uses watercraft or is a
passenger on a rented, leased, or used watercraft participating in a
paddlesport activity;

(9) "Personal floatation device", a life jacket, floatable cushion, or
other device approved by the United States Coast Guard;

(10) "Raft", an inflatable watercraft which has an open top and is
designed to hold one or more participants;

(11) "Tube", an inflatable tire inner tube or similar inflatable
watercraft which has an open top capable of holding one or more
participants;

(12) "Watercraft", any canoe, kayak, raft, or tube propelled by the use
of paddles, oars, hands, poles, or other nonmechanical, nonmotorized
means of propulsion.

2. Except as provided in subsection 4 of this section, an outfitter shall
not be liable for any injury to or the death of a participant resulting
from the inherent risks of paddlesport activities and, except as provided
in subsection 4 of this section, no participant or a participant's
representative shall make any claim against, maintain any action against,
or recover from an outfitter for injury, loss, damage, or death of the
participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of paddlesport
activities.

3. This section shall not apply to any employer-employee relationship
governed by the provisions of chapter 287, RSMo.

4. The provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall not prevent or
limit the liability of an outfitter that:

(1) Intentionally injures the participant;

(2) Commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence for the safety
of a participant in a paddlesport activity and that negligence is the
proximate cause of the injury or death of a participant;

(3) Provides unsafe equipment or watercraft to a participant and knew or
should have known that the equipment or watercraft was unsafe to the
extent that it did cause the injury;

(4) Fails to provide a participant a United States Coast Guard- approved
personal floatation device; or

(5) Fails to use that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and
prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances.

5. Every outfitter shall post and maintain signs which contain the
warning notice specified in this subsection. Such signs shall be placed
in a clearly visible location on or near areas where the outfitter
conducts paddlesport activities. The warning notice specified in this
subsection shall appear on the sign in black letters on a white
background with each letter to be a minimum of one inch in height. Every
written contract entered into by an outfitter for the providing of
watercraft to a participant shall contain the warning notice specified in
this subsection. The signs and contracts described in this subsection
shall contain the following warning notice:

"WARNING Under Missouri law, an outfitter is not liable for an injury to
or the death of a participant in paddlesport activities resulting from
the inherent risks of paddlesport activities pursuant to the Revised
Statutes of Missouri.".

6. This section shall not be construed to limit or modify any defense or
immunity already existing in statute or common law or to affect any claim
occurring prior to August 28, 2005. (L. 2005 S.B. 346)

If any person shall maliciously or wantonly damage or destroy
any personal property, goods, chattels, furniture or livestock, the
person so offending shall pay to the party injured double the value of
the things so damaged or destroyed; and upon an affidavit that said
damage or destruction was wantonly or maliciously done, it shall be a
good ground for an attachment to issue, as in other cases by attachment.
(RSMo 1939 § 3688)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3298; 1919 § 4249; 1909 § 5455

(1973) Section 537.330 did not abrogate the common law right of punitive
damages. State ex rel. Smith v. Greene (Mo.), 494 S.W.2d 55.

(2000) Section applies to both tangible and intangible personal property,
and includes delivery and distribution routes held by independent
contract carriers for newspaper chain. Weicht v. Suburban Newspapers of
Greater St. Louis, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 592 (Mo.App.E.D.).

If any person shall cut down, injure or destroy or carry away
any tree placed or growing for use, shade or ornament, or any timber,
rails or wood standing, being or growing on the land of any other person,
including any governmental entity, or shall dig up, quarry or carry away
any stones, ore or mineral, gravel, clay or mold, or any ice or other
substance or material being a part of the realty, or any roots, fruits or
plants, or cut down or carry away grass, grain, corn, flax or hemp in
which such person has no interest or right, standing, lying or being on
land not such person's own, or shall knowingly break the glass or any
part of it in any building not such person's own, the person so offending
shall pay to the party injured treble the value of the things so injured,
broken, destroyed or carried away, with costs. Any person filing a claim
for damages pursuant to this section need not prove negligence or intent.
(RSMo 1939 § 3681, A.L. 2000 H.B. 1097)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3291; 1919 § 4242; 1909 § 5448

(1971) Measure of damages under this section is not the difference
between value of land before and value of land after cutting of trees and
court erred in instructing that it was and defendant therefore was not
prejudiced by court's failure to instruct on definition of fair market
value. Keener v. Black River Electric Cooperative (A.), 469 S.W.2d 657.

(2000) Section can be violated by either entering land wrongfully and
felling trees or entering land with the landowner's consent and then
exceeding the scope of that consent by felling trees without permission.
Ridgway v. TTnT Development Corp., 26 S.W.3d 428 (Mo.App.S.D.).

As used in sections 537.345 to 537.347, the following terms mean:

(1) "Charge", the admission price or fee asked by an owner of land or an
invitation or permission without price or fee to use land for
recreational purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the
purpose of sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering
business purposes;

(2) "Land", all real property, land and water, and all structures,
fixtures, equipment and machinery thereon;

(3) "Owner", any individual, legal entity or governmental agency that has
any ownership or security interest whatever or lease or right of
possession in land;

(4) "Recreational use", hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, biking,
nature study, winter sports, viewing or enjoying archaeological or scenic
sites, or other similar activities undertaken for recreation, exercise,
education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another. (L. 1983
S.B. 162 § 1)

Except as provided in sections 537.345 to 537.348, an owner of
land owes no duty of care to any person who enters on the land without
charge to keep his land safe for recreational use or to give any general
or specific warning with respect to any natural or artificial condition,
structure, or personal property thereon. (L. 1983 S.B. 162 § 2)

Except as provided in sections 537.345 to 537.348, an owner of
land who directly or indirectly invites or permits any person to enter
his land for recreational use, without charge, whether or not the land is
posted, does not thereby:

(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;

(2) Confer upon such person the status of an invitee, or any other status
requiring of the owner a duty of special or reasonable care;

(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to such
person or property caused by any natural or artificial condition,
structure or personal property on the premises; or

(4) Assume responsibility for any damage or injury to any other person or
property caused by an act or omission of such person. (L. 1983 S.B. 612 §
3)

Nothing in this act shall be construed to create liability, but
it does not limit liability that otherwise would be incurred by those who
use the land of others, or by owners of land for:

(1) Malicious or grossly negligent failure to guard or warn against a
dangerous condition, structure, personal property which the owner knew or
should have known to be dangerous, or negligent failure to guard or warn
against an ultrahazardous condition which the owner knew or should have
known to be dangerous;

(2) Injury suffered by a person who has paid a charge for entry to the
land; or

(3) Injuries occurring on or in:

(a) Any land within the corporate boundaries of any city, municipality,
town, or village in this state;

(b) Any swimming pool. "Swimming pool" means a pool or tank, especially
an artificial pool or tank, intended and adapted for swimming and held
out as a swimming pool;

(c) Any residential area. "Residential area" as used herein means a tract
of land of one acre or less predominately used for residential purposes,
or a tract of land of any size used for multifamily residential services;
or

(d) Any noncovered land. "Noncovered land" as used herein means any
portion of any land, the surface of which portion is actually used
primarily for commercial, industrial, mining or manufacturing purposes;
provided, however, that use of any portion of any land primarily for
agricultural, grazing, forestry, conservation, natural area, owner's
recreation or similar or related uses or purposes shall not under any
circumstances be deemed to be use of such portion for commercial,
industrial, mining or manufacturing purposes. (L. 1983 S.B. 162 § 4, A.L.
1984 S.B. 580)

CROSS REFERENCE: Swimming pools, certain pools, refusal to allow disabled
persons to wear life jackets, penalty, RSMo 577.161

A person or legal entity owning or controlling an interest in
real property, or an agent of such person or entity, shall not incur any
liability for the death of or injury to a trespasser upon the property
resulting from or arising by reason of the trespasser's commission of the
offense of trespass if the normal faculties of such trespasser are
substantially impaired by alcohol or the illegal influence of a
controlled substance as defined in section 195.010, RSMo. The person or
entity owning or controlling an interest in such real property shall not
be immune from liability if negligence or willful and wanton misconduct
on the part of such person or entity or agent thereof is the proximate
cause of the death of or injury to the trespasser. (L. 1991 S.B. 125 &
341 § 3)

Effective 7-1-92

If any person shall voluntarily throw down or open any doors,
bars, gates or fences, and leave the same open or down, other than those
that lead into his own enclosure, or shall voluntarily throw down, open
or remove any partition fence, without giving six months' written notice
to the person owning the adjoining fields, if they are cultivated lands,
he shall pay to the party injured the sum of five dollars, and double the
amount of damages he shall sustain by reason of such doors, bars, gates
and fences having been thrown down or opened, with costs; provided, that
this section shall not be construed to apply to fences erected across any
watercourse in this state which carries sufficient water to move logs for
lumbering purposes, of ten inches or more in diameter, and railroad
crossties and piling; provided further, that any corporation, company or
individual driving such logs, crossties or piling, or having placed the
same in any such stream with the intent to drive or float the same, shall
be liable for the actual damages which may result therefrom to any owner
of land bordering on any such stream; but this section shall not be
construed to include a fence erected across any such stream and not
enclosing a farm or plantation, nor where, in any case, it is apparent
that such fence was erected across such stream for the mere purpose of
hindering the free passage of such logs, crossties or piling, or for the
purpose of extorting money from the corporation, company or individual
engaged in driving such logs, crossties or piling. (RSMo 1939 § 3682)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3292; 1919 § 4243; 1909 § 5449

1. Any person or entity who knowingly damages or destroys any
field crop product that is grown for personal or commercial purposes, or
for testing or research purposes in the context of a product development
program in conjunction or coordination with a private research facility,
a university, or any federal, state or local government agency, shall be
liable for double damages pursuant to this section.

2. In awarding damages pursuant to this section, the courts shall
consider the following:

(1) The market value of the crop prior to damage or destruction; and

(2) The actual damages involving production, research, testing
replacement and crop development costs directly related to the crop that
has been damaged or destroyed.

3. In addition, the court may award court costs, including reasonable
attorneys fees. (L. 2001 S.B. 462)

On the trial of any action or prosecution brought upon sections
537.340, 537.350 and 537.370 if it shall appear that the defendant had
probable cause to believe that the land on which the trespass is alleged
to have been committed, or that the thing so taken, carried away, injured
or destroyed, was his own, the plaintiff in the action or prosecution
shall receive single damages only, with costs. (RSMo 1939 § 3684)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3294; 1919 § 4245; 1909 § 5451

The penalties mentioned in sections 537.340 and 537.350 may be
recovered by civil action founded on said sections, or by indictment, or
information, at the option of the party injured, in any court having
jurisdiction of the same; and when the proceeding is by indictment, such
penalties shall be paid into county treasury. (RSMo 1939 § 3683)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3293; 1919 § 4244; 1909 § 5450

Each railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this
state shall be responsible in damages to every person and corporation
whose property may be injured or destroyed by fire communicated directly
or indirectly by locomotive engines in use upon the railroad owned or
operated by such railroad corporation, and each such railroad corporation
shall have an insurable interest in the property upon the route of the
railroad owned or operated by it, and may procure insurance thereon in
its own behalf for its protection against such damages. (RSMo 1939 § 5223)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 4766; 1919 § 9954; 1909 § 3151

If any person shall willfully set on fire any woods, marshes or
prairies whether his own or not, so as thereby to occasion any damage to
any other person, such person shall make satisfaction in double damages
to the party injured, to be recovered by civil action. (RSMo 1939 § 3660)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3270; 1919 § 4225; 1909 § 5433

Every corporation, person or association of persons who shall
construct a boom across or in any of the streams or waters of this state
shall be liable for all damages arising from backwater or overflow caused
by the construction of such boom or the accumulation of logs, lumber or
other floatables therein, and in all cases where judgment is rendered in
any court for any damages occasioned as herein provided, the court shall
allow the plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed as costs in
the case. (RSMo 1939 § 5486)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 5044; 1919 § 10317; 1909 § 3473

If any tenant, for life or years, shall commit waste during his
estate or term, of anything belonging to the tenement so held, without
special license in writing so to do, he shall be subject to a civil
action for such waste, and shall lose the thing wasted and pay treble the
amount at which the waste shall be assessed. (RSMo 1939 § 1939 § 3003)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2616; 1919 § 6910; 1909 § 7913

(1992) Where the parties have entered into a special landlord-tenant
relationship, a tenancy for life or years, statute mandates the trebling
of damages for waste without regard to whether the waste was committed
wantonly. Greeson v. Ace Pipe Cleaning, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App.
W.D.).

(2002) Presence of liquidated damages clause in lease was not a waiver of
right to sue under section and did not constitute implied license for
tenant to commit waste. Brizendine v. Conrad, 71 S.W.3d 587 (Mo.banc).

The action may be maintained by one who has the remainder or
reversion in fee simple, after an intervening estate for life or years,
and also by one who has a remainder or reversion for life or years only;
and each of them shall recover such damages as it shall appear that he
has suffered by the waste complained of. (RSMo 1939 § 3004)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2617; 1919 § 6911; 1909 § 7914

An heir may bring and maintain an action for waste done in the
time of his ancestor, as well as in his own time. (RSMo 1939 § 3005)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2618; 1919 § 6912; 1909 § 7915

If a tenant of land commit any waste thereon after he has
aliened it while he remains in possession, he shall be liable to the
party injured for damages. (RSMo 1939 § 3006)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2619; 1919 § 6913; 1909 § 7916

If a tenant in common, joint tenant or parcener commit waste, he
shall be liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages.
(RSMo 1939 § 3007)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2620; 1919 § 6914; 1909 § 7917

If a conservator commit waste of the estate of his protectee, he
shall be liable to the protectee for damages, at the expiration of his
conservatorship. (RSMo 1939 § 3008, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2621; 1919 § 6915; 1909 § 7918

Any person who is entitled to such civil action shall recover
such damages as it shall appear that he has suffered by the waste
complained of. (RSMo 1939 § 3009)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2622; 1919 § 6916; 1909 § 7919

If in any action for waste, the jury find that the waste was
wantonly committed, judgment shall be entered for three times the amount
of the damages assessed. (RSMo 1939 § 3010)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2623; 1919 § 6917; 1909 § 7920

If the tenant in possession of any land shall, pending a suit to
recover or charge said land, commit any waste thereon, the court in which
the suit may be pending may order a receiver to take possession of the
land. (RSMo 1939 § 3013)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2626; 1919 § 6920; 1909 § 7923

An action for waste may be brought against the representatives
of a tenant, or, if instituted in the lifetime of the tenant, it may be
revived against his representatives after his death. (RSMo 1939 § 3011)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2624; 1919 § 6918; 1909 § 7921

The jury on the trial of any issue, or on any inquisition of
damages, may, if they shall think fit, give damages, in the nature of
interest, over and above the value of the goods at the time of the
conversion or seizure. (RSMo 1939 § 3657)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3267; 1919 § 4222; 1909 § 5430

1. Irrespective of any criminal prosecution or the result
thereof, any person incurring bodily injury or damage or loss to his
property as a result of conduct in violation of section 574.085, 574.090*
or 574.093* shall have a civil action to secure an injunction, damages or
other appropriate relief in law or in equity against any and all persons
who have violated section 574.085, 574.090* or 574.093*.

2. In any such action, whether a violation of section 574.085, 574.090*
or 574.093* has occurred shall be determined according to the burden of
proof used in other civil actions for similar relief.

3. Upon prevailing in such civil action, the plaintiff may recover:

(1) Both special and general damages; and

(2) Reasonable attorney fees and costs. (L. 1988 S.B. 678 § 4)

*Formerly included ethnic intimidation as a result of conduct in
violation of sections 574.090 and 574.093 which were repealed by S.B.
328, 1999.

1. A court may enjoin conduct which would be in violation of
section 578.151 or 578.152, RSMo, upon petition by a person affected or
who reasonably may be affected by such conduct, upon a showing that such
conduct is threatened or that it has occurred on particular premises in
the past and that it is not unreasonable to expect that under similar
circumstances it will be repeated.

2. A court may award damages to any person adversely affected by a
violation of section 578.151 or 578.152, RSMo, which may include an award
for punitive damages. In addition to other items of special damage, the
measure of damages may include expenditures of the affected person for
license and permit fees, travel, guides, special equipment and supplies,
to the extent that such expenditures were rendered futile by interference
with the lawful hunting or trapping of a wild animal. (L. 1988 S.B. 434 &
435 § 4)

1. In addition to any other civil remedy available, the owner or
lessee of the computer system, computer network, computer program,
computer service or data may bring a civil action against any person who
violates sections 569.095 to 569.099, RSMo, for compensatory damages,
including any expenditures reasonably and necessarily incurred by the
owner or lessee to verify that a computer system, computer network,
computer program, computer service, or data was not altered, damaged, or
deleted by the access.

2. In any action brought pursuant to this section, the court may award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. (L. 1987 H.B. 208 §
1)

1. Any action seeking money damages against a person for conduct
or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or
public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or
decision-making body of the state or any political subdivision of the
state is subject to a special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on
the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be considered by
the court on a priority or expedited basis to ensure the early
consideration of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent the
unnecessary expense of litigation. Upon the filing of any special motion
described in this subsection, all discovery shall be suspended pending a
decision on the motion by the court and the exhaustion of all appeals
regarding the special motion.

2. If the rights afforded by this section are raised as an affirmative
defense and if a court grants a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment filed within ninety
days of the filing of the moving party's answer, the court shall award
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the moving party in
defending the action. If the court finds that a special motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment is frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney
fees to the party prevailing on the motion.

3. Any party shall have the right to an expedited appeal from a trial
court order on the special motions described in subsection 2 of this
section or from a trial court's failure to rule on the motion on an
expedited basis.

4. As used in this section, a "public meeting in a quasi-judicial
proceeding" means and includes any meeting established and held by a
state or local governmental entity, including without limitations
meetings or presentations before state, county, city, town or village
councils, planning commissions, review boards or commissions.

5. Nothing in this section limits or prohibits the exercise of a right or
remedy of a party granted pursuant to another constitutional, statutory,
common law or administrative provision, including civil actions for
defamation.

6. If any provision of this section or the application of any provision
of this section to a person or circumstance is held invalid, the
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this
section that can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.

7. The provisions of this section shall apply to all causes of actions.
(L. 2004 S.B. 807 § 537.800)

1. No county, city or village with ten thousand or fewer
inhabitants that organizes, sponsors, or conducts any fair, festival, or
similar gathering shall be liable, except as provided in sections 537.600
to 537.650, for an injury or death of any person attending the event, and
no person attending the event shall make any claim against, or recover
from, any such county, city or village for injury, loss, damage, or death
of the person attending the event.

2. Each county, city or village governed by this section shall post and
maintain signs which contain the warning notice specified in this
section. The signs shall be placed in a clearly visible location at major
entrances to the event and throughout the event location as determined by
the governing authority of the county, city or village. The signs
described in this section shall be in black letters on a white background
with each letter to be a minimum of one inch in height and contain
substantially the following warning notice:

WARNING

Under Missouri law, (enter county, city or village name) is not liable
for an injury to or the death of any person resulting from the inherent
risks of participating in or observing any activities at this event
pursuant to the Revised Statutes of Missouri. (L. 2004 H.B. 795, et al).

1. This section may be known as the "Commonsense Consumption
Act".

2. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Claim", any claim by or on behalf of a natural person, as well as
any derivative or other claim arising therefrom asserted by or on behalf
of any other person;

(2) "Generally known condition allegedly caused by or allegedly likely to
result from long-term consumption", a condition generally known to result
or to likely result from the cumulative effect of consumption and not
from a single instance of consumption;

(3) "Knowing or willful violation of federal or state law", that:

(a) The conduct constituting the violation was committed with the intent
to deceive or injure consumers or with actual knowledge that such conduct
was injurious to consumers; and

(b) The conduct constituting the violation was not required by
regulations, orders, rules, or other pronouncements of, or statutes
administered by, a federal, state, or local government agency;

(4) "Other person", any individual, corporation, company, association,
firm, partnership, society, joint-stock company, or any other entity,
including any governmental entity or private attorney general.

3. Except as exempted in subsection 4 of this section, a manufacturer,
packer, distributor, carrier, holder, seller, marketer, retailer, or
advertiser of a food, as defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 321(f)), as amended, but shall not include alcoholic
beverages, or an association of one or more such entities shall not be
subject to civil liability under any state law, including all statutes,
regulations, rules, common law, public policies, court or administrative
decisions or decrees, or other state actions having the effect of law,
for any claim arising out of weight gain, obesity, or a health condition
associated with weight gain or obesity.

4. The provisions of subsection 3 of this section shall not preclude
civil liability where the claim of weight gain, obesity, health condition
associated with weight gain or obesity, or other generally known
condition allegedly caused by or allegedly likely to result from
long-term consumption of food is based on:

(1) A material violation of an adulteration or misbranding requirement
prescribed by statute or regulation of the state of Missouri or the
United States and the claimed injury was proximately caused by such
violation; or

(2) Any other material violation of federal or state law applicable to
the manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertising, labeling, or
sale of food, provided that such violation is knowing and willful, and
the claimed injury was proximately caused by such violation. The
provisions of subsection 3 of this section shall not preclude civil
liability for breach of express contract or express warranty in
connection with the purchase of food.

5. In any action exempted under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection 4 of
this section, the petition initiating such action shall state with
particularity the following: the statute, regulation, or other state or
federal law that was allegedly violated, the facts that are alleged to
constitute a material violation of such statute or regulation, and the
facts alleged to demonstrate that such violation proximately caused
actual injury to the plaintiff. In any action exempted under subdivision
(2) of subsection 4 of this section, the petition initiating such action
shall also state with particularity facts sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that the violation occurred with the intent to
deceive or injure consumers or with the actual knowledge that such
violation was injurious to consumers. For purposes of applying this
section the pleading requirements under this section are deemed part of
state substantive law and not merely procedural provisions.

6. In any action exempted under subsection 4 of this section, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of
any motion to dismiss unless the court finds upon the motion of any party
that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence, resolve
the motion to dismiss, or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.
During the pendency of any stay of discovery under this subsection and
unless otherwise ordered by the court, any party to the action with
actual notice of the allegations contained in the petition shall treat
all documents, data compilations, including electronically recorded or
stored data, and tangible objects that are in the custody or control of
such party that are relevant to the allegations as if they were the
subject of a continuing request for production of documents from an
opposing party under the Missouri rules of civil procedure.

7. The provisions of this section shall apply to all covered claims
pending on or filed after January 1, 2005, regardless of when the claim
arose. (L. 2004 H.B. 1115 § 537.900)

Effective 1-1-05

1. Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at
common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the
extent waived, abrogated or modified by statutes in effect prior to that
date, shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of
the public entity from liability and suit for compensatory damages for
negligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived in the following
instances:

(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by
public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles or
motorized vehicles within the course of their employment;

(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the
plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures
to protect against the dangerous condition. In any action under this
subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was damaged by the
negligent, defective or dangerous design of a highway or road, which was
designed and constructed prior to September 12, 1977, the public entity
shall be entitled to a defense which shall be a complete bar to recovery
whenever the public entity can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the alleged negligent, defective, or dangerous design reasonably
complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the
time the road or highway was designed and constructed.

2. The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in
subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute
waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether
or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary
capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability
insurance for tort.

3. The term "public entity" as used in this section shall include any
multistate compact agency created by a compact formed between this state
and any other state which has been approved by the Congress of the United
States. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 1, A.L. 1985 S.B. 323, A.L. 1989 H.B. 161,
A.L. 2005 H.B. 58)

(1988) Law abrogating sovereign immunity is procedural as it creates no
new cause of action but only provides remedy for cause of action whose
remedy was previously barred and therefore applies retrospectively.
Wilkes v. Mo. Highway and Transportation Commission, 762 S.W.2d 27
(Mo.banc).

(1988) Broken down stop sign constituted dangerous condition of
government property and sovereign immunity is waived. Donahue v. City of
St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.banc).

(1988) Placement of a folding partition against a ladder created a
dangerous condition of property within meaning of section 537.600, RSMo.
Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.banc).

(1989) Public housing authorities are statutory municipal corporations
and exercise only governmental functions which are subject to
governmental immunity. Privately owned rental property enrolled in rental
assistance program is not "public property" and was not within statutory
exception to governmental immunity. (Mo.App.W.D.) Tyler v. Housing Auth.
of Kansas City, 781 S.W.2d 110.

(1992) The sovereign immunity doctrine is uniquely applicable to
governmental entities and is not transferable to an agent of that entity.
The public duty doctrine holds that public officers are not liable in
tort for injuries or damages sustained by particular individuals that
result from a breach of the duty that officers owe to the general public.
Automobile accident victim's attempt to intermingle the two doctrines
fails. The abrogation of sovereign immunity in no way implicitly
abrogated the public duty doctrine. Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.
App.W.D.)

(1992) A medical center, a not-for-profit corporation, which is not
controlled by or answerable to public officials, public entities, or
public itself, is not a public entity protected by sovereign immunity.
Stacy v. Truman Medical Center, 836 S.W.2d 911 (Mo.banc).

(1993) Court finds a direct conflict between the state doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act to extent public hospital claimed to be immune from "patient
dumping" claim. Federal act preempted state sovereign immunity doctrine.
Helton v. Phelps County Regional Medical Center, 817 F.Supp. 789 (E.D.
Mo.).

(1993) Doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to regional planning
commission. Where slander is not among the circumstances obligating
insurer to pay on behalf of the regional planning under insurance policy,
regional planning commission did not waive its sovereign immunity against
plaintiff's claim. Balderre v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. App. S.D.).

(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one
civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to
others, statute that waives sovereign immunity for negligent acts or
omissions of public employees in operation of motor vehicles in course of
employment does not create duty running from individual defendants to
either general public or to plaintiffs individually. Boyle v. City of
Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D. Mo.).

(1993) Plaintiff may have action against city because official immunity
doctrine, which provides that public officers are not personally liable
for negligent acts related to discretionary duties and performed within
scope of their authority, is different legal concept than sovereign
immunity doctrine which waives sovereign immunity for injuries resulting
from negligent acts of public employees arising out of operation of
motorized vehicles. Bachmann v. Welby, 860 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App. E.D.).

(1993) Statute waives sovereign immunity in certain cases, however,
statute does not authorize awarding of costs against state agency. In
instances where general assembly waives immunity regarding costs, it
explicitly specifies such waivers as it provides in sections 550.020,
RSMo, and 536.087, RSMo. Richardson v. State Highway and Transportation
Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo.banc).

(1999) Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be used to establish the
dangerous-condition exception of this section. Hale ex rel. Hale v. City
of Jefferson, 6 S.W.3d 187 (Mo.App.W.D.).

(2001) Section does not bar claims for contribution when compensatory
damage claims for injuries result from dangerous conditions on public
property and a joint obligation on the liability is shared by
tort-feasors. McNeill Trucking Company, Inc. v. Missouri State Highway
and Transportation Commission, 35 S.W.3d 846 (Mo.banc).

1. The commissioner of administration, through the purchasing
division, and the governing body of each political subdivision of this
state, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may purchase liability
insurance for tort claims, made against the state or the political
subdivision, but the maximum amount of such coverage shall not exceed two
million dollars for all claims arising out of a single occurrence and
shall not exceed three hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a
single accident or occurrence, except for those claims governed by the
provisions of the Missouri workers' compensation law, chapter 287, RSMo,
and no amount in excess of the above limits shall be awarded or settled
upon. Sovereign immunity for the state of Missouri and its political
subdivisions is waived only to the maximum amount of and only for the
purposes covered by such policy of insurance purchased pursuant to the
provisions of this section and in such amount and for such purposes
provided in any self-insurance plan duly adopted by the governing body of
any political subdivision of the state.

2. The liability of the state and its public entities on claims within
the scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650, shall not exceed two million
dollars for all claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence and
shall not exceed three hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a
single accident or occurrence, except for those claims governed by the
provisions of the Missouri workers' compensation law, chapter 287, RSMo.

3. No award for damages on any claim against a public entity within the
scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650, shall include punitive or exemplary
damages.

4. If the amount awarded to or settled upon multiple claimants exceeds
two million dollars, any party may apply to any circuit court to
apportion to each claimant his proper share of the total amount limited
by subsection 1 of this section. The share apportioned each claimant
shall be in the proportion that the ratio of the award or settlement made
to him bears to the aggregate awards and settlements for all claims
arising out of the accident or occurrence, but the share shall not exceed
three hundred thousand dollars.

5. The limitation on awards for liability provided for in this section
shall be increased or decreased on an annual basis effective January
first of each year in accordance with the Implicit Price Deflator for
Personal Consumption Expenditures as published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce. The current value
of the limitation shall be calculated by the director of the department
of insurance, who shall furnish that value to the secretary of state, who
shall publish such value in the Missouri Register as soon after each
January first as practicable, but it shall otherwise be exempt from the
provisions of section 536.021, RSMo.

6. Any claim filed against any public entity under this section shall be
subject to the penalties provided by supreme court rule 55.03. (L. 1978
H.B. 1650 § 2, A.L. 1989 H.B. 161, A.L. 1999 S.B. 295 & 46)

CROSS REFERENCE: Liability of state and public entities, increases to be
effective on certain causes of actions, when, RSMo 537.615

(2000) Statutory cap does not apply to postjudgment interest on damage
awards against the State. Benoit v. Missouri Highway and Transportation
Commission, 33 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.App.S.D.).

The provisions of this act* increasing the liability of the
state and its public entities shall only be applied to those causes of
action that accrue on or after January 1, 2000. (L. 1999 S.B. 295 & 46 §
1)

*"This act" (S.B. 295 & 46, 1999) contains numerous sections. Consult
Disposition of Sections table for definitive listing.

Notwithstanding any direct or implied prohibitions in chapter
375, RSMo, 377, RSMo, or 379, RSMo, any three or more political
subdivisions of this state may form a business entity for the purpose of
providing liability and all other insurance, including insurance for
elderly or low-income housing in which the political subdivision has an
insurable interest, for any of the subdivisions upon the assessment plan
as provided in sections 537.600 to 537.650. Any political subdivision may
join this entity and use public funds to pay any necessary assessments.
(L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 3, A.L. 1988 S.B. 532, A.L. 1999 S.B. 28)

1. Any group of subdivisions desiring to provide liability and
all other insurance for its members shall pay a license fee of one
hundred dollars and file articles of association with the director of
insurance. The articles shall be filed in accordance with the provisions
of sections 375.201 to 375.236, RSMo. The articles shall include the
names of the political subdivisions initially associated, the method by
which other subdivisions may be admitted to the association as members,
the purposes for which organized, the amount of the initial assessment
which is to be paid into the association, the method of assessment
thereafter and the maximum amount of any assessment which the association
may make against any member. The articles of association shall provide
for bylaws and for the amendment of the bylaws and the articles of
association.

2. Each association shall designate and maintain a registered agent
within this state. Service upon the agent is service upon the association
and each of its members.

3. The articles of association shall be accompanied by a copy of the
initial bylaws of the association. The bylaws shall provide for a
governing body for the association, a manner of election thereof, the
manner in which assessments will be made, the specific kinds of insurance
or indemnification which will be offered, the classes of membership which
will be offered, and may provide that assessments of various amounts for
particular classes of membership may be made. All assessments shall be
uniform within classes. The bylaws may provide for the transfer of risks
to other insurance companies or for reinsurance. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 4,
A.L. 1988 S.B. 532)

Effective 6-2-88

The director of insurance shall, within thirty days after the
articles of association are filed with him, determine if the proposed
association meets the requirements of sections 537.600 to 537.650. If it
does, he shall issue a license to the association authorizing it to do
business for a one-year period. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 5)

The association may, on the seventh day thereafter, commence to
do business. The association shall be a body corporate, and shall do
business as a corporation. No member of the association shall be liable
for any amounts because of his or her membership in the association other
than his or her assessments as provided in the articles of association
and the bylaws of the association. The business of the association shall
be conducted so as to preclude any distribution of income, profit or
property of the association to the individual members thereof except in
payment of claims or indemnities or upon the final dissolution of the
association, but the association may pay dividends to its members as long
as the association has a positive surplus both before and after any such
dividend is declared. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 6, A.L. 1999 S.B. 28)

1. The director of insurance shall be authorized in accordance
with sections 375.171 and 375.173, RSMo, to examine into the affairs of
any association organized under the provisions of sections 537.620 to
537.650 and may, in accordance with section 375.426, RSMo, make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in him. Annually thereafter, within thirty days before
the expiration of its license, each association shall pay a renewal
license fee of one hundred dollars and shall file a statement with the
director of insurance giving a report of its activities for the preceding
year.

2. Any existing association shall also, at the time it files for renewal
of its license, file any amendments to its articles of association or
bylaws which have been adopted in the preceding year. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650
§ 7)

If at any time any association fails or refuses to pay any claim
finally adjudged to be due pursuant to the provisions of its articles of
association and bylaws, or if the director of insurance determines that
the association is unable to satisfy its contractual obligations, he
shall immediately take charge of the association, its assets and affairs,
and wind up same as now provided by law in the case of life insurance
companies. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 8)

No association organized pursuant to the provisions of sections
537.620 to 537.650 shall be required to pay any premium tax in connection
with the conduct of its business. (L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 9)

1. As used in sections 537.675 through 537.693, the following
terms mean:

(1) "Annual claims", that period of time commencing on the first day of
January of every year after December 31, 2002, and ending on the last day
of that calendar year;

(2) "Commission", the labor and industrial relations commission;

(3) "Division", the division of workers' compensation;

(4) "Initial claims period", that period commencing on August 28, 2001,
and ending on December 31, 2002;

(5) "Punitive damage final judgment", an award for punitive damages
excluding interest that is no longer subject to review by courts of this
state or of the United States;

(6) "Uncompensated tort victim", a person who:

(a) Is a party in a personal injury or wrongful death lawsuit; or is a
tort victim whose claim against the tort-feasor has been settled for the
policy limits of insurance covering the liability of such tort-feasor and
such policy limits are inadequate in light of the nature and extent of
damages due to the personal injury or wrongful death;

(b) Unless described in paragraph (a) of this subdivision:

a. Has obtained a final monetary judgment in that lawsuit described in
paragraph (a) of this subdivision against a tort-feasor for personal
injuries, or wrongful death in a case in which all appeals are final;

b. Has exercised due diligence in enforcing the judgment; and

c. Has not collected the full amount of the judgment;

(c) Is not a corporation, company, partnership or other incorporated or
unincorporated commercial entity;

(d) Is not any entity claiming a right of subrogation;

(e) Was not on house arrest and was not confined in any federal, state,
regional, county or municipal jail, prison or other correctional facility
at the time he or she sustained injury from the tort-feasor;

(f) Has not pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of two or more
felonies, where such two or more felonies occurred within ten years of
the occurrence of the tort in question, and where either of such felonies
involved a controlled substance or an act of violence; and

(g) Is a resident of the state of Missouri or sustained personal injury
or death by a tort which occurred in the state of Missouri.

2. There is created the "Tort Victims' Compensation Fund". Unexpended
moneys in the fund shall not lapse at the end of the biennium as provided
in section 33.080, RSMo.

3. Any party receiving a judgment final for purposes of appeal for
punitive damages in any case filed in any division of any circuit court
of the state of Missouri shall notify the attorney general of the state
of Missouri of such award, except for actions claiming improper health
care pursuant to chapter 538, RSMo. The state of Missouri shall have a
lien for deposit into the tort victims' compensation fund to the extent
of fifty percent of the punitive damage final judgment which shall attach
in any such case after deducting attorney's fees and expenses. In each
case, the attorney general shall serve a lien notice by certified mail or
registered mail upon the party or parties against whom the state has a
claim for collection of its share of a punitive damage final judgment. On
a petition filed by the state, the court, on written notice to all
interested parties, shall adjudicate the rights of the parties and
enforce the lien. The lien shall not be satisfied out of any recovery
until the attorney's claim for fees and expenses is paid. The state can
file its lien in all cases where punitive damages are awarded upon the
entry of the judgment final for purposes of appeal. The state cannot
enforce its lien until there is a punitive damage final judgment. Cases
resolved by arbitration, mediation or compromise settlement prior to a
punitive damage final judgment are exempt from the provisions of this
section. Nothing in this section shall hinder or in any way affect the
right or ability of the parties to any claim or lawsuit to compromise or
settle such claim or litigation on any terms and at any time the parties
desire.

4. The state of Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene
at any stage of any judicial proceeding pursuant to this section, except
to enforce its lien rights as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

5. There is hereby established in the state treasury the "Legal Services
for Low-Income People Fund", which shall consist of twenty-six percent of
all payments received into the tort victims' compensation fund and all
interest accruing on the principal, regardless of source or designation
including twenty-six percent of the money that upon August 28, 2001, is
in the tort victims' compensation fund. Moneys, funds or payments paid to
the credit of the legal services for low-income people fund shall, at
least as often as annually, upon appropriation, be distributed to the
legal services organizations in Missouri which are recipients of federal
Legal Services Corporation funding and shall be used for no other purpose
than as authorized pursuant to sections 537.675 to 537.693. The funds so
distributed shall be used by legal services organizations in Missouri
solely to provide legal services to its low-income population. Funds
shall be allocated according to the most recent official census data from
the Bureau of Census, United States Department of Commerce for people in
poverty residing in Missouri. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
33.080, RSMo, any balance remaining in the legal services for low-income
people fund at the end of any biennium shall not be transferred to
general revenue, but shall remain in the fund and be distributed in
accordance with the provisions of this section. Moneys in the tort
victims' compensation fund shall not be used to pay any portion of a
refund mandated by article X, section 18 of the constitution. (L. 1987
H.B. 700 § 40, A.L. 1996 S.B. 869, A.L. 2001 H.B. 107)

(2002) Provision permitting state to assert lien on 50% of final judgment
for punitive damages does not violate the excessive fine provision of the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. Hoskins v. Business Men's
Assurance, 79 S.W.3d 901 (Mo.banc).

1. Seventy-four percent of all payments received by the tort
victims' compensation fund regardless of source or designation shall,
upon appropriation, be appropriated to the division of workers'
compensation to assist uncompensated tort victims and shall be used for
no other purpose. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 33.080, RSMo,
any balance remaining in the budget of the division of workers'
compensation for compensation of uncompensated tort victims shall not be
transferred to general revenue but shall remain in the fund. Moneys in
the tort victims' compensation fund shall not be used to pay any portion
of a refund mandated by article X, section 18 of the constitution.

2. The division of workers' compensation shall, pursuant to the
provisions of sections 537.678 to 537.693, have jurisdiction to determine
and award compensation to or on behalf of uncompensated tort victims. The
requirement that the uncompensated tort victim has obtained a final
judgment may be waived by the division based upon the tort-feasor's
bankruptcy, inability to identify the tort-feasor or inability to obtain
service of process on the tort-feasor after making a good faith effort to
do so or the claim against tort-feasor has been settled for the insurance
policy limits available to cover the liability of such tort-feasor and
such policy limits are inadequate in light of the injury suffered by the
tort victim. The division is not required to award compensation, nor is
it required to award the full amount claimed. The division shall base its
award of compensation upon independent verification obtained during its
investigation. In no case shall the amount paid to the individual exceed
the lesser of either the net award granted by the court or jury, or the
amount remaining in the tort victims' compensation fund, provided,
however, that no award shall exceed three hundred thousand dollars.

3. Claims shall be made by filing an application for compensation with
the division. The division shall furnish an application form which shall
include:

(1) The name and address of the uncompensated tort victim;

(2) If the claimant is not the uncompensated tort victim, the name and
address of the claimant and relationship to the victim, the name and
address of any dependents of the victim, and the extent to which each is
so dependent;

(3) The date and nature of the tort on which the application for
compensation is based;

(4) The date and court in which a judgment was rendered against the
tort-feasor, including the judgment amount specifying medical costs, if
available. If no final judgment was obtained and the claimant is
requesting a waiver pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, the
application shall include a statement establishing the basis for a waiver;

(5) The nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the victim, the
names and addresses of those giving medical and hospital treatment to the
victim and whether death resulted;

(6) The loss to the claimant or a dependent resulting from the injury or
death;

(7) The amount of benefits, payments or awards, if any, payable from any
source that the claimant or dependent has received or for which the
claimant or dependent is eligible as a result of the injury or death;

(8) Releases by the claimant authorizing any reports, documents and other
information relating to the matters specified pursuant to this section to
be obtained by the division; and

(9) Any other information as the division determines is necessary.

4. In addition to the application, the division may require that the
claimant submit materials substantiating the facts stated in the
application.

5. If the division finds that an application does not contain the
required information or that the facts stated therein have not been
substantiated, it shall notify the claimant in writing of the specific
additional items or information or materials required and that the
claimant has thirty days from the date of mailing in which to furnish
those items to the division. Unless a claimant requests and is granted an
extension of time by the division, the division may reject, without
prejudice to refiling of another application for the same matter, the
claim of the claimant for failure to file the additional information or
materials within the specified time. Extensions of time to file such
additional information shall be freely granted.

6. The claimant may file an amended application or additional
substantiating materials to correct inadvertent errors or omissions at
any time before the division has completed its consideration of the
original application.

7. Any state or local agency, including a prosecuting attorney or law
enforcement agency, shall make available without cost to the fund, all
reports, files and other appropriate information that the division
requests in order to make a determination that a claimant is eligible for
an award pursuant to sections 537.675 to 537.693.

8. Any notice required pursuant to sections 537.675 to 537.693, with the
exception of the lien notice required by subsection 3 of section 537.675,
shall be sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the party's last
known address or to the last known address of the party's attorney or
other legal representative. (L. 2001 H.B. 107)

1. The following persons shall be eligible for compensation
pursuant to sections 537.675 to 537.693:

(1) An uncompensated tort victim; and

(2) In the case of the death of the uncompensated tort victim as a direct
result of the tort:

(a) The class of persons identified in subsection 1 of section 537.080;
and

(b) Any relative of the uncompensated tort victim who legally assumes the
obligation for, or who has incurred medical or burial expenses as a
direct result of the tort at issue.

2. An uncompensated tort victim that is found personally liable on a
cross-complaint of tort, or found to have been contributorily or
comparatively negligent, shall only be eligible to receive compensation
to the extent of the favorable net amount awarded by the judge or jury.
No uncompensated tort victim or other eligible claimant shall be denied
compensation solely because such person is a relative of the tort-feasor
or was living with the tort-feasor as a family or household member at the
time of the injury or death. The division, however, may award
compensation to a victim or other eligible claimant only if the division
can reasonably determine that the tort-feasor will receive no substantial
economic benefit or unjust enrichment from the compensation.

3. The division may waive the requirements of paragraph (e) of
subdivision (5) of subsection 1 of section 537.675 if it determines that
the interest of justice would be served by doing so.

4. In the case of an uncompensated tort victim or other eligible claimant
who is incarcerated as a result of a conviction of a crime not related to
the incident which is the basis for the claimant's application:

(1) The division shall suspend all proceedings and payments until such
time as the uncompensated tort victim or other eligible claimant is
released from incarceration;

(2) The division shall notify the claimant at the time the proceedings
are suspended of the right to reactivate the claim within six months of
his or her release from incarceration;

(3) The uncompensated tort victim or other eligible claimant may file an
application to request that the case be reactivated not later than six
months after the date he or she is released from incarceration. Failure
to file such request within the six-month period shall serve as a bar to
any recovery. (L. 2001 H.B. 107)

1. A claim for compensation may be filed by a person eligible
for compensation or, if the person is an incapacitated or disabled
person, or a minor, by the person's spouse, parent, conservator or
guardian.

2. A claim shall be filed not later than two years after the judgment
upon which it is based becomes final and all appeals are final, except
with regard to the initial claims period. If there is no judgment, claims
must be filed within time limits prescribed pursuant to section 516.120,
RSMo, except for cases resulting in death, in which case claims must be
filed within time limits prescribed pursuant to section 537.100, except
with regard to the initial claims period. With regard to the initial
claims period, any claim may be filed that is based upon a judgment that
is not expired or that is based upon a claim not reduced to judgment for
a reason allowed by subsection 2 of section 537.678, and which would not
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations if the tort-feasor
could be served with process or had not taken bankruptcy.

3. Each claim shall be filed in person or by mail. The division shall
investigate such claim prior to the opening of formal proceedings. The
director of the division shall assign an administrative law judge,
associate administrative law judge or legal advisor within the division
to hear any claim for compensation filed. The claimant shall be notified
of the date and time of any hearing on the claim. In determining the
amount of compensation for which a claimant is eligible, the division
shall:

(1) Consider the facts stated on the application filed pursuant to
section 537.678;

(2) Obtain a copy of the final judgment, if any, from the appropriate
court;

(3) Determine the amount of the loss to the claimant, or the victim's
survivors or dependents; and

(4) If there is no final judgment, determine the degree or extent to
which the victim's acts or conduct provoked, incited or contributed to
the injuries or death of the victim.

4. The claimant may present evidence and testimony on his or her own
behalf or may retain counsel.

5. Prior to any hearing, the person filing a claim shall submit reports,
if available, from all hospitals, physicians or surgeons who treated or
examined the victim for the injury for which compensation is sought. If,
in the opinion of the division, an examination of the injured victim or a
report on the cause of death of the victim would be of material aid, the
division may appoint a duly qualified, impartial physician to make an
examination and report. A finding of the judge or jury in the underlying
case shall be considered as evidence.

6. Each and every payment shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or
any other remedy available to creditors for the collection of a debt,
provided however, this section shall not in any way affect the right of
any attorney who represents or represented any claimant to collect any
fee or expenses to which he or she is entitled.

7. Payments of compensation shall not be made directly to any person
legally incompetent to receive them but shall be made to the parent,
guardian or conservator for the benefit of such minor, disabled or
incapacitated person.

8. Payment of all claims from the fund shall be made on the following
basis, to wit:

(1) With regard to all claims that are made during the initial claims
period, the division shall determine the aggregated amount of all awards
made on these claims. Such determination shall be made on or before June
30, 2003. If the aggregate value of the awards does not exceed the total
amount of money in the fund, then the awards shall be paid in full on or
before September 30, 2003. If the aggregate value of the awards does
exceed the total amount of money in the fund, then the awards shall be
paid on a pro rata basis on or before September 30, 2003;

(2) With regard to all claims that are made after the initial claims
period, the division shall determine the aggregate amount of all awards
made on those claims filed during an annual claims period. Such
determination shall be made on or before the thirtieth day of June in the
next succeeding year. If the aggregate value of the awards does not
exceed the total amount of money in the fund, then the awards shall be
paid in full on or before the thirtieth day of September in the next
succeeding year. If the aggregate value of the awards does exceed the
total amount of money in the fund, then the awards shall be paid on a pro
rata basis on or before the thirtieth day of September in the next
succeeding year.

9. If there are no funds available, then no claim shall be paid until
funds have accumulated in the tort victims' compensation fund and have
been appropriated to the division for payment to uncompensated tort
victims. When sufficient funds become available for payment of claims of
uncompensated tort victims, awards that have been determined but have not
been paid shall be paid in chronological order with the oldest paid
first, based upon the date on which the application was filed with the
division. Any award pursuant to this subsection that cannot be paid due
to a lack of funds appropriated for payment of claims of uncompensated
tort victims shall not constitute a claim against the state.

10. In the event there are no funds available for payment of claims, then
the division may suspend all action related to valuing claims and
granting awards until such time as funds in excess of one hundred
thousand dollars have accumulated in the tort victims' compensation fund,
at which time the division shall resume its claim processing duties. (L.
2001 H.B. 107)

1. Upon request by the division for verification of injuries of
victims, a medical provider shall submit medical records and other
information requested by the division. Any costs to the claimant for
obtaining and providing such information may be submitted as part of the
claim.

2. Failure to submit the information as required by this section shall be
an infraction. (L. 2001 H.B. 107)

1. Any of the parties to a decision of the division on a claim
heard under the provisions of sections 537.675 to 537.693 may, within
thirty days following the date of notification or mailing of such
decision, file a petition with the labor and industrial relations
commission to have the decision reviewed by the commission. The
commission may allow or deny a petition for review. If a petition is
allowed, the commission may affirm, reverse or set aside the decision of
the division on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such
case or may take additional evidence or may remand the matter to the
division with directions. The commission shall promptly notify the
parties of its decision and the reasons therefor.

2. Any petition for review filed pursuant to subsection 1 of this section
shall be deemed to be filed as of the date endorsed by the United States
Postal Service on the envelope or container in which such petition is
received.

3. Any party who is aggrieved by a final decision of the commission
entered pursuant to the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of this section
may seek judicial review thereof by appealing, within twenty days of a
final decision to the appellate court having jurisdiction in the area
where the appellant resides. In such proceedings the attorney general, on
behalf of the tort victims' compensation fund, shall defend the decision
of the commission. The commission shall not be a party in such actions.
(L. 2001 H.B. 107)

1. Payment of any compensation pursuant to sections 537.675 to
537.693 shall vest in the state of Missouri a right of subrogation to the
extent of such compensation paid, to any right or right of action of the
claimant to recover payments with respect to which the compensation has
been paid and to enforce the underlying judgment against the tort-feasor.
The attorney general may enforce the subrogation interest, and may file
suit to enforce that right of subrogation.

2. The division shall have a lien on any compensation received by the
claimant from the tort-feasor or the tort-feasor's agent after payment by
the division to the claimant, in addition to compensation received
pursuant to the provisions of sections 537.675 to 537.693, for injuries
or death resulting from the incident upon which the claim is based. The
claimant shall retain, as trustee for the division, so much of the
recovered funds as necessary to reimburse the Missouri tort victims'
compensation fund to the extent that compensation was paid to the
claimant from that fund.

3. If a claimant initiates any legal proceeding to recover restitution or
damages or enforce the underlying judgment related to the tort upon which
the claim is based, or if the claimant enters into negotiations to
receive any proceeds in settlement or a claim for restitution or damages
related to the tort, the claimant shall give the division written notice
within fifteen days of the filing of the action or entering into
negotiations. The division may intervene in the proceeding of a claimant
to enforce its subrogation interest. If a claimant fails to give such
written notice to the division within the stated time period or prior to
any attempt by claimant to reach a negotiated settlement of claims for
recovery of damages related to the tort upon which the claim is based,
the division's right of subrogation to receive or recover funds from
claimant, to the extent that compensation was awarded by the division,
shall not be reduced in any amount or percentage by the costs incurred by
claimant attributable to such legal proceedings or settlement, including,
but not limited to, attorney's fees, investigative costs or court costs;
however, if the claimant provides written notice to the division as
required in this section then the subrogation interest of the division
shall be reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage that the
attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the claimant bears to the total
recovery.

4. Whenever the division shall deem it necessary to protect, maintain or
enforce the division's right to subrogation or to exercise any of its
powers to carry out any of its duties or responsibilities, the attorney
general may initiate legal proceedings or intervene in legal proceedings
as the division's legal representative.

5. The division is hereby granted authority to adopt rules and
regulations, consistent with the provisions of sections 537.678 to
537.693, which rules and regulations may govern application for and
distribution of those moneys appropriated to the division from the tort
victims' compensation fund.

6. Any rule or portion of a rule, as that term is defined in section
536.010, RSMo, that is created under the authority delegated in
subsection 5 of this section shall become effective only if it complies
with and is subject to all of the provisions of chapter 536, RSMo, and,
if applicable, section 536.028, RSMo. This section and chapter 536, RSMo,
are nonseverable and if any of the powers vested with the general
assembly pursuant to chapter 536, RSMo, to review, to delay the effective
date or to disapprove and annul a rule are subsequently held
unconstitutional, then the grant of rulemaking authority and any rule
proposed or adopted after August 28, 2001, shall be invalid and void. (L.
2001 H.B. 107)

1. There is hereby created the "Missouri Public Entity Risk
Management Fund", which shall be a body corporate and politic. The board
of trustees of this fund shall have the powers and duties specified in
sections 537.700 to 537.755 and such other powers as may be necessary or
proper to enable it, its officers, employees and agents to carry out
fully and effectively all the purposes of sections 537.700 to 537.755.

2. Unless otherwise clearly indicated by the context, the following words
and terms as used in sections 537.700 to 537.755 mean:

(1) "Board", the board of trustees of the Missouri public entity risk
management fund;

(2) "Fund", the Missouri public entity risk management fund established
by subsection 1 of this section;

(3) "Public entity", any city, county, township, village, town, municipal
corporation, school district, special purpose or taxing district, or any
other local public body created by the general assembly.

3. Any public entity may participate in the Missouri public entity risk
management fund and use public funds to pay any assessment made in
conjunction with the fund. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. All public entities in Missouri shall have the option of
participating in the fund and making annual contributions to the fund in
the amount determined by the board in accordance with the provisions of
section 379.470, RSMo, relating to rates established by insurers.
Participation in the fund has the same effect as purchase of insurance by
the public entity, as otherwise provided by law, and shall have the same
effect as a self-insurance plan adopted by the governing body of any
political subdivision of the state. Moneys in the fund shall be available
for:

(1) The payment and settlement of all claims for which coverage has been
obtained by any public entity in accordance with coverages offered by the
board;

(2) The payment and settlement of tort claims against any officer or
employee of a participating public entity for which coverage has been
obtained by any public entity in accordance with coverages offered by the
board when the claim is upon conduct of such officer or employee arising
out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on
behalf of the participating public entity;

(3) Attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the settlement and defense
of such entities and persons for claims specified in this subsection.

2. No amount in excess of the amount specified by section 537.756 shall
be paid from the fund for the payment and settlement of claims arising
out of any single occurrence.

3. The board of trustees of the fund will negotiate the settlement of and
provide the defense of any claim for which coverage has been obtained by
any public entity in accordance with coverages offered by the board. The
board of trustees of the fund shall make the final determination on the
settlement of any claim, or any portion of any claim, which requires
payment from the fund. For any year in which any public entity does not
make a yearly contribution to the fund, the board of trustees of the fund
shall not be responsible, in any way, for negotiating the settlement of
any claim arising from an occurrence in that year, providing any defense
of any claim arising from an occurrence in that year, making any payment
on any claim arising from an occurrence in that year, or making any
payment on any judgment on any claim arising from an occurrence in that
year. Any public entity which discontinues its participation in the fund
may not resume participation for a period of three years from the date it
discontinues participation.

4. All staff for the Missouri public entity risk management fund shall be
provided by the office of administration except as otherwise specifically
determined by the board. The fund shall reimburse the office of
administration for all costs of providing staff required by this
subsection. Such reimbursement shall be made on an annual basis, pursuant
to contract negotiated between the fund and the office of administration.
As established in section 537.700, the Missouri public entity risk
management fund is a body corporate and politic, and the state of
Missouri shall not be liable in any way with respect to claims made
against the fund or against entities or individuals covered by the fund,
nor with respect to any expense of operation of the fund. Money in the
fund is not state money nor is it money collected or received by the
state.

5. Each participating public entity shall notify the board of trustees of
the fund within seven working days of the time notice is received that a
claim from an occurrence has been made against the entity, or one of its
officers or employees. The public entity shall supply information to the
board of trustees of the fund concerning any claim upon request. It shall
also notify the board of trustees of the fund upon the closing of any
claim.

6. The board may contract with independent insurance agents, authorizing
such agents to accept contributions to the fund from public entities on
behalf of the board upon such terms and conditions as the board deems
necessary, and may provide a reasonable method of compensating such
agents. Such compensation shall not be additional to the contribution to
the fund. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461, A.L. 1993 S.B. 88, A.L. 1999 S.B.
295 & 46)

(2003) Section does not violate payment of punitive damages but does not
prohibit such coverage. Naucke v. Missouri Public Entity Risk Management
Fund, 95 S.W.3d 166 (Mo.App. W.D.).

1. There is hereby established a "Board of Trustees" of the
Missouri public entity risk management fund which shall consist of the
attorney general, the commissioner of administration and four members,
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, who
are officers or employees of those public entities participating in the
fund. No more than two members appointed by the governor shall be of the
same political party. The members appointed by the governor shall serve
four-year terms, except that the original appointees shall be appointed
for the following terms: One for one year, one for two years, one for
three years, and one for four years. Any vacancies occurring on the board
shall be filled in the same manner. In appointing the initial board of
trustees the governor may anticipate which public entities will
participate in the fund, and the appointees may serve the terms
designated herein, unless they sooner resign or are removed in accordance
with law.

2. No trustee shall be liable personally in any way with respect to
claims made against the fund or against entities or individuals covered
by the fund. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. The board shall elect one of their members as chairman. He
shall preside over meetings of the board and perform such other duties as
shall be required by action of the board.

2. The chairman shall appoint another board member as vice chairman, and
the vice chairman shall perform the duties of the chairman in the absence
of the latter or upon his inability or refusal to act.

3. The board shall appoint a secretary who shall have charge of the
offices and records of the fund, subject to the direction of the board.

4. Any summons or writ issued by the courts of the state shall be served
upon the chairman, or, in his absence, on the vice chairman, or upon a
registered agent which the board shall designate. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 &
1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. The board shall meet in Jefferson City, Missouri, upon the
written call of the chairman or by the agreement of any three members of
the board. Notice of the meeting shall be delivered to all other trustees
in person or by depositing notice in a United States post office in a
properly stamped and addressed envelope not less than six days prior to
the date fixed for the meeting. The board may meet at any time by
unanimous mutual consent. There shall be at least one meeting in each
quarter.

2. Four trustees shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business, and any official action of the board shall be based on a
majority vote of the trustees present.

3. The trustees shall serve without compensation but shall receive from
the fund their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance
of their duties for the board.

4. Duties performed for the fund by any member of the board who is an
employee of a public entity shall be considered duties in connection with
the regular employment of such individual, and he shall suffer no loss in
regular compensation by reason of the performance of such duties. (L.
1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. The board shall keep a complete record of all its proceedings.

2. A statement covering the operations of the fund for the year,
including income and disbursements, and of the financial condition of the
fund at the end of the year, showing the valuation and appraisal of its
assets and liabilities, as of July first, shall each year be delivered to
the governor and be made readily available to public entities.

3. The principal office of the fund shall be in Jefferson City, Missouri.
The fund shall have a seal inscribed "Missouri Public Entity Risk
Management Fund", which shall be in the custody of its secretary. The
courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the seal. All copies
of records, books, and written instruments which are kept in the office
of the fund and are certified by the secretary under the seal shall be
proved or admitted in any court or proceeding as provided in section
109.130, RSMo. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. The general administration of, and responsibility for, the
proper operation of the fund, including all decisions relating to
payments from the fund, are hereby vested in the board of trustees.

2. The board shall determine and prescribe all rules, regulations,
coverages to be offered, forms and rates to carry out the purposes of
sections 537.700 to 537.755.

3. The board shall have the power to subpoena witnesses or obtain the
production of records when necessary for the performance of its duties.

4. Subject to the provisions of the constitution and sections 537.700 to
537.755, the board shall have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the
funds and property of the fund.

5. No trustee or staff member of the fund shall receive any gain or
profit from any moneys or transactions of the fund.

6. Any trustee or staff member accepting any gratuity or compensation for
the purpose of influencing his action with respect to the investment of
the funds of the system or in the operations of the fund shall forfeit
his office and in addition shall be subject to the penalties prescribed
in section 576.020, RSMo.

7. The board shall have the authority to use moneys from the fund to
purchase one or more policies of insurance or reinsurance to cover the
liabilities of participating public entities which are covered by the
fund.

8. If such insurance can be procured, the board shall have the authority
to procure insurance covering participating public entities and their
officers and employees for amounts in excess of the amount specified by
section 537.756 per occurrence for liabilities covered by the fund. The
costs of such insurance shall be considered in determining the
contribution of each public entity.

9. The board shall have the authority to use moneys from the fund to
assist participating entities in assessing and reducing the risk of
liabilities which may be covered by the fund. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461,
A.L. 1993 S.B. 88)

1. The board shall set up and maintain a Missouri public entity
risk management fund account in which shall be placed all contributions,
premiums, and income from all sources. All property, money, funds,
investments, and rights which shall belong to, or be available for
expenditure or use by, the fund shall be dedicated to and held in trust
for the purposes set out in sections 537.700 to 537.755 and no other. The
board shall have power, in the name of and on behalf of the fund, to
purchase, acquire, hold, invest, lend, lease, sell, assign, transfer, and
dispose of all property, rights, and securities, and enter into written
contracts, all as may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of
section 537.700 or 537.755.

2. All moneys received by or belonging to the fund shall be paid to the
secretary and deposited by him to the credit of the fund in one or more
banks or trust companies. No such money shall be deposited in or be
retained by any bank and trust company which does not have on deposit
with the board at the time the kind and value of collateral required by
section 30.270, RSMo, for depositories of the state treasurer. The
secretary shall be responsible for all funds, securities, and property
belonging to the fund, and shall give such corporate surety bond for the
faithful handling of the same as the board shall require.

3. So far as practicable, the funds and property of the fund shall be
kept safely invested so as to earn a reasonable return. The board may
invest the funds of the fund as permitted by the laws of Missouri
relating to the investment of the capital, reserve, and surplus funds of
casualty insurance companies organized under the laws of Missouri. (L.
1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. If contributions to the fund do not produce sufficient funds
to pay any claims which may be due, the board shall assess and each
member, including any member who has withdrawn but was a member in the
year in which the assessment is required, shall pay such additional
amounts which are each member's proportionate share of total claims
allowed and due. The board may abate or defer any part of the additional
assessment of a member, if, in the opinion of the board, payment of the
additional assessment would impair the ability of the member to fulfill
its contractual obligations. The provisions of this subsection shall
apply retroactively to the creation of the Missouri public entity risk
management fund.

2. The board, in order to carry out the purposes for which the fund is
established, may select and employ, or contract with, persons experienced
in insurance underwriting, accounting, the servicing of claims, and rate
making, who shall serve at the board's pleasure, as technical advisors in
establishing the annual contribution, or may call upon the director of
the department of insurance for such services. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461,
A.L. 1993 S.B. 88, A.L. 1999 S.B. 295 & 46)

1. Nothing in sections 537.700 to 537.755, shall be construed to
broaden or restrict the liability of the public entities participating in
the fund beyond the provisions of sections 537.600 to 537.610, nor to
abolish or waive any defense at law which might otherwise be available to
any public entity or its officers and employees.

2. All persons and entities protected by the fund shall cooperate with
those persons responsible for conducting any investigation and preparing
any defense under the provisions of sections 537.700 to 537.755, by
assisting such persons in all respects, including the making of
settlements, the securing and giving of evidence, and the attending and
obtaining witnesses to attend hearings and trials. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 &
1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. If the fund will be exhausted by the payment of all judgments
and claims allowed during a particular fiscal year, amounts paid to each
claimant or person obtaining a judgment shall be prorated, with each
person receiving an amount equal to the percentage his own payment bears
to the total of claims and judgments outstanding and payable from the
fund. Any amounts due and unpaid as a result of such proration shall be
paid in the following fiscal year.

2. If, at the end of any fiscal year, the fund has a balance exceeding
projected needs, and adequate reserves, the board may in its discretion
refund on a pro rata basis to all participating public entities an amount
based on the contributions of the public entity for the immediately
preceding year. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461)

Effective 6-20-86

1. Except as provided in subsection 3 of this section, moneys in
the Missouri public entity risk management fund shall not be available to
pay the following:

(1) Claims made under chapter 287, RSMo;

(2) Fines or penalties threatened or imposed for violation of any civil
or criminal statute, administrative regulation or county or municipal
ordinance;

(3) Attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the defense of charges that
criminal statutes or county or municipal ordinances were violated;

(4) Claims against any participating public entity or officer or employee
of a participating public entity which were brought by or rendered in
favor of any participating public entity or officer or employee of a
participating public entity acting in an official capacity;

(5) Claims against those who are independent contractors with a
participating public entity, its officers or employees;

(6) Claims against participating public entities, its officers or
employees who fail to cooperate with the persons conducting any
investigation and preparing any defense as required by section 537.745.

2. No payment shall be made from the fund or any policy of insurance
procured by the fund unless and until the benefits provided to pay the
claim by any other policy of liability insurance have been exhausted.

3. The fund may be available to pay claims on behalf of public entities
to whom or to which a public entity participating in the Missouri public
entity risk management fund is obligated by virtue of a written contract
to provide coverage such as is afforded in the contract, consistent with
rules promulgated by the board of trustees of the Missouri public entity
risk management fund. (L. 1986 H.B. 1435 & 1461, A.L. 1988 S.B. 532)

Effective 6-2-88

1. The maximum amount which may be paid from the fund, as
defined in section 537.700, for the payment and settlement of claims
arising out of any single occurrence, is two million dollars.

2. The limitation on awards for liability provided for in this section
shall be increased or decreased on an annual basis effective January
first of each year in accordance with the Implicit Price Deflator for
Personal Consumption Expenditures as published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce. The current value
of the limitation shall be calculated by the director of the department
of insurance, who shall furnish that value to the secretary of state, who
shall publish such value in the Missouri Register as soon after each
January first as practicable, but it shall otherwise be exempt from the
provisions of section 536.021, RSMo. (L. 1989 H.B. 161 § 1, A.L. 1993
S.B. 88, A.L. 1999 S.B. 295 & 46)

CROSS REFERENCE: Liability of state and public entities, increases to be
effective on certain causes of actions, when, RSMo 537.615

As used in sections 537.760 to 537.765, the term "products
liability claim" means a claim or portion of a claim in which the
plaintiff seeks relief in the form of damages on a theory that the
defendant is strictly liable for such damages because:

(1) The defendant, wherever situated in the chain of commerce,
transferred a product in the course of his business; and

(2) The product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated; and

(3) Either or both of the following:

(a) The product was then in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and the plaintiff was damaged
as a direct result of such defective condition as existed when the
product was sold; or

(b) The product was then unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably
anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics, and the
plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the product being sold
without an adequate warning. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 33)

Effective 7-1-87

(1994) Patient's suit for strict product liability against health care
provider for implant of defective medical device was not barred by
two-year statute of limitations in section 516.105, RSMo, as that section
covers all action for malpractice, negligence, error or mistake related
to health care which all require some type of fault. Strict liability
requires no fault. Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879
S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. S.D.).

1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as
a seller in the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a products
liability claim as provided in this section.

2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in which
another defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly before the
court and from whom total recovery may be had for plaintiff's claim.

3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section within the time
for filing an answer or other responsive pleading unless permitted by the
court at a later time for good cause shown. The motion shall be
accompanied by an affidavit which shall be made under oath and shall
state that the defendant is aware of no facts or circumstances upon which
a verdict might be reached against him, other than his status as a seller
in the stream of commerce.

4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct discovery on the
issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The court for good cause
shown, may extend the time for discovery, and may enter a protective
order pursuant to the rules of civil procedure regarding the scope of
discovery on other issues.

5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss under this
section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of this section are
met, and no party comes forward at such a hearing with evidence of facts
which would render the defendant seeking dismissal under this section
liable on some basis other than his status as a seller in the stream of
commerce, the court shall dismiss without prejudice the claim as to that
defendant.

6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to divest a
court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the action
was commenced. A defendant dismissed pursuant to this section shall be
considered to remain a party to such action only for such purposes.

7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocutory until
final disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or judgment and may
be set aside for good cause shown at anytime prior to such disposition.
(L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 34)

Effective 7-1-87

1. As used in this section, "state of the art" means that the
dangerous nature of the product was not known and could not reasonably be
discovered at the time the product was placed into the stream of commerce.

2. The state of the art shall be a complete defense and relevant evidence
only in an action based upon strict liability for failure to warn of the
dangerous condition of a product. This defense shall be pleaded as an
affirmative defense and the party asserting it shall have the burden of
proof.

3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the rights of
an injured party to maintain an action for negligence whenever such a
cause of action would otherwise exist.

4. This section shall not be construed to permit or prohibit evidence of
feasibility in products liability claims. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 35)

Effective 7-1-87

1. Contributory fault, as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery
in a products liability claim, is abolished. The doctrine of pure
comparative fault shall apply to products liability claims as provided in
this section.

2. Defendant may plead and prove the fault of the plaintiff as an
affirmative defense. Any fault chargeable to the plaintiff shall diminish
proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages but shall not
bar recovery.

3. For purposes of this section, "fault" is limited to:

(1) The failure to use the product as reasonably anticipated by the
manufacturer;

(2) Use of the product for a purpose not intended by the manufacturer;

(3) Use of the product with knowledge of a danger involved in such use
with reasonable appreciation of the consequences and the voluntary and
unreasonable exposure to said danger;

(4) Unreasonable failure to appreciate the danger involved in use of the
product or the consequences thereof and the unreasonable exposure to said
danger;

(5) The failure to undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of
the product would take to protect himself against dangers which he would
reasonably appreciate under the same or similar circumstances; or

(6) The failure to mitigate damages. (L. 1987 H.B. 700 § 36)

Effective 7-1-87

(1993) Where skier suffered head injury while using an experts-only ski
that was unreasonably dangerous for skier of plaintiff's ability, skier
did not assume risk by using dangerous ski because defendant failed to
warn against added danger and unpredictability caused by ski design.
Hopfinger v. Kidder International, Inc., 827 F.Supp. 1444 (W.D. Mo.).

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