USA Statutes : nevada
Title : Title 04 - WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE
Chapter : CHAPTER 47 - GENERAL PROVISIONS; JUDICIAL NOTICE; PRESUMPTIONS
1. This title governs proceedings in the courts of this State and
before magistrates, except:
(a) To the extent to which its provisions are relaxed by a statute
or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation; and
(b) As otherwise provided in subsection 3.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1, the provisions of
chapter 49 of NRS with respect to privileges
apply at all stages of all proceedings.
3. The other provisions of this title do not apply to:
(a) Issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses and search
warrants.
(b) Proceedings with respect to release on bail.
(c) Sentencing, granting or revoking probation.
(d) Proceedings for extradition.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 775; A 1997, 2286)
The purposes of this title
are to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 775)
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and:
(a) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection.
(b) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of
the evidence was made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from
the context within which questions were asked.
2. This section does not preclude taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the judge.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 775)
The
judge may add any other or further statement which shows the character of
the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made and
the ruling thereon. He may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form, and on request shall do so in actions tried without a jury,
unless it clearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any
ground or is privileged.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
1. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the judge, subject to the provisions of
NRS 47.070 .
2. In making his determination he is not bound by the provisions
of this title except the provisions of chapter 49 of NRS with respect to privileges.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
1. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
2. If under all the evidence upon the issue the jury might
reasonably find that the fulfillment of the condition is not established,
the judge shall instruct the jury to consider the issue and to disregard
the evidence unless they find the condition was fulfilled.
3. If under all the evidence upon the issue the jury could not
reasonably find that the condition was fulfilled, the judge shall
instruct the jury to disregard the evidence.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
In
jury cases, hearings on preliminary questions of admissibility, offers of
proof in narrative or question and answer form, and statements of the
judge showing the character of the evidence shall to the extent
practicable, unless further restricted by NRS 47.090 , be conducted out of the hearing of the jury,
to prevent the suggestion of inadmissible evidence.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
Preliminary hearings on the admissibility of confessions or statements
by the accused or evidence allegedly unlawfully obtained shall be
conducted outside the hearing of the jury. The accused does not by
testifying at the hearing subject himself to cross-examination as to
other issues in the case. Testimony given by him at the hearing is not
admissible against him on the issue of guilt at the trial.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
NRS 47.060 to 47.090 ,
inclusive, do not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
When evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but inadmissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
1. When any part of a writing or recorded statement is introduced
by a party, he may be required at that time to introduce any other part
of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may
introduce any other relevant parts.
2. This section does not limit cross-examination.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 776)
JUDICIAL NOTICE
1. The facts subject to judicial notice are facts in issue or
facts from which they may be inferred.
2. A judicially noticed fact must be:
(a) Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or
(b) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,
Ê so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
The laws subject to judicial notice
are:
1. The Constitution and statutes of the United States, and the
contents of the Federal Register.
2. The Constitution of this State and Nevada Revised Statutes.
3. Any other statute of this State if brought to the attention of
the court by its title and the day of its passage.
4. A county, city or town code which has been filed as required by
NRS 244.118 , 268.014 , 269.168 or
the city charter and any city ordinance which has been filed or recorded
as required by the applicable law.
5. The Nevada Administrative Code.
6. A regulation not included in the Nevada Administrative Code if
adopted in accordance with law and brought to the attention of the court.
7. The population category and organization of a city incorporated
pursuant to general law.
8. The constitution, statutes or other written law of any other
state or territory of the United States, or of any foreign jurisdiction,
as contained in a book or pamphlet published by its authority or proved
to be commonly recognized in its courts.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777; A 1973, 6; 1977, 1388; 1985, 231, 366;
2001, 632 )
1. A judge or court may take judicial notice, whether requested or
not.
2. A judge or court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of
taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter to be noticed.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
Judicial notice may be taken at
any stage of the proceeding prior to submission to the court or jury.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
PRESUMPTIONS
1. A presumption, other than a presumption against the accused in
a criminal action, imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than its existence.
2. As applied to presumptions, “direct evidence” means evidence
which tends to establish the existence or nonexistence of the presumed
fact independently of the basic facts.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
When a
presumption is made conclusive by statute or no direct evidence is
introduced contrary to the existence of the presumed fact, the question
of the existence of the presumed fact depends upon the existence of the
basic facts and is determined as follows:
1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence
renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, the
judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the existence of the
presumed fact.
2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence
does not render the existence of the basic facts more probable than not,
the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the
presumed fact.
3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether
the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than
not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to
find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact if they find from the
evidence that the existence of the basic facts is more probable than not,
but otherwise to find against the existence of the presumed fact.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 777)
When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that
the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than
not, but direct evidence is introduced contrary to the existence of the
presumed fact, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is
determined as follows:
1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct
evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than
not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the
presumed fact.
2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct
evidence does not render the nonexistence of the presumed fact more
probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of
the presumed fact.
3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether
the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more
probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an
instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact unless
they find from the direct evidence that its nonexistence is more probable
than its existence, in which event they should find against its existence.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 778)
When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the
evidence does not render the existence of the basic facts more probable
than not, but direct evidence is introduced concerning the existence of
the presumed fact, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an
instruction to determine the existence of the presumed fact from the
direct evidence without reference to the presumption.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 778)
When reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to
whether the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more
probable than not, and direct evidence is introduced concerning the
existence of the presumed fact, the question of the existence of the
presumed fact is determined as follows:
1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct
evidence renders the existence of the presumed fact more probable than
not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the existence of
the presumed fact.
2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct
evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than
not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the
presumed fact.
3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree that the direct
evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than
not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to
find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact if they find from the
evidence that the existence of the basic facts is more probable than not
and unless they find the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable
than not, otherwise to find against the existence of the presumed fact.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 778)
1. In criminal actions, presumptions against an accused recognized
at common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that
certain facts are prima facie evidence of other facts or of guilt, are
governed by this section.
2. The judge shall not direct the jury to find a presumed fact
against the accused. When the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an
element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge may submit the
question of guilt or of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury,
if, but only if, a reasonable juror on the evidence as a whole, including
the evidence of the basic facts, could find guilt or the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under other presumptions, the existence of the
presumed fact may be submitted to the jury if the basic facts are
supported by substantial evidence, or are otherwise established, unless
the evidence as a whole negatives the existence of the presumed fact.
3. Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused
is submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the
law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient
evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it to do so. In
addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the
offense or negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that
its existence must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 779)
The following presumptions,
and no others, are conclusive:
1. A malicious and guilty intent, from the deliberate commission
of an unlawful act, for the purpose of injuring another.
2. The truth of the fact recited, from the recital in a written
instrument between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest
by a subsequent title, but this rule does not apply to the recital of a
consideration.
3. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
4. A tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation.
5. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by titles 2, 3
and 6 of NRS to be conclusive; but such judgment or order must be alleged
in the pleadings if there is an opportunity to do so; if there is no such
opportunity, the judgment or order may be used as evidence.
6. Any other presumption which, by statute, is expressly made
conclusive.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 779)
All other presumptions are
disputable. The following are of that kind:
1. That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.
2. That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act.
3. That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
4. That higher evidence would be adverse from inferior being
produced.
5. That money paid by one to another was due to the latter.
6. That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter.
7. That things which a person possesses are owned by him.
8. That a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of
ownership over it, or from common reputation of his ownership.
9. That official duty has been regularly performed.
10. That a court or judge, acting as such, whether in this State
or any other state or country, was acting in the lawful exercise of his
jurisdiction.
11. That a judicial record, when not conclusive, does still
correctly determine or set forth the rights of the parties.
12. That a writing is truly dated.
13. That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail.
14. That a person not heard from in 3 years is dead.
15. That a child born in lawful wedlock is legitimate.
16. That the law has been obeyed.
17. That a trustee or other person, whose duty it was to convey
real property to a particular person, has actually conveyed to him, when
such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest.
18. In situations not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code:
(a) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid.
(b) That private transactions have been fair and regular.
(c) That the ordinary course of business has been followed.
(d) That there was good and sufficient consideration for a written
contract.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 779; A 1993, 2761)
