USA Statutes : nevada
Title : Title 11 - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Chapter : CHAPTER 125C - CUSTODY AND VISITATION


      1.  Any order awarding a party a right of visitation of a minor
child must:

      (a) Define that right with sufficient particularity to ensure that
the rights of the parties can be properly enforced and that the best
interest of the child is achieved; and

      (b) Specify that the State of Nevada or the state where the child
resides within the United States of America is the habitual residence of
the child.

Ê The order must include all specific times and other terms of the right
of visitation.

      2.  As used in this section, “sufficient particularity” means a
statement of the rights in absolute terms and not by the use of the term
“reasonable” or other similar term which is susceptible to different
interpretations by the parties.

      (Added to NRS by 1993, 2137; A 1995, 1493, 2289)—(Substituted in
revision for NRS 125A.290)


      1.  In a dispute concerning the rights of a noncustodial parent to
visit his child, the court may, if it finds that the noncustodial parent
is being wrongfully deprived of his right to visit, enter a judgment
ordering the custodial parent to permit additional visits to compensate
for the visit of which he was deprived.

      2.  An additional visit must be:

      (a) Of the same type and duration as the wrongfully denied visit;

      (b) Taken within 1 year after the wrongfully denied visit; and

      (c) At a time chosen by the noncustodial parent.

      3.  The noncustodial parent must give the court and the custodial
parent written notice of his intention to make the additional visit at
least 7 days before the proposed visit if it is to be on a weekday or
weekend and at least 30 days before the proposed visit if it is to be on
a holiday or vacation.

      (Added to NRS by 1985, 1892)—(Substituted in revision for NRS
125A.300)


      1.  A custodial parent who fails to comply with a judgment ordering
an additional visit may, upon a judgment of the court, be found guilty of
contempt and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail. During the
period of imprisonment, the court may authorize his temporary release
from confinement during such hours and under such supervision as the
court determines are necessary to allow him to go to and return from his
place of employment.

      2.  A custodial parent imprisoned for contempt pursuant to
subsection 1 must be released from the jail if the court has reasonable
cause to believe that he will comply with the order for the additional
visit.

      (Added to NRS by 1985, 1892)—(Substituted in revision for NRS
125A.310)


      1.  If a custodial parent is imprisoned for contempt pursuant to
NRS 125C.030 and violates any
condition of that imprisonment, the court may:

      (a) Require that he be confined to the county jail for the
remaining period of his sentence; and

      (b) Deny him the privilege of a temporary release from confinement
for his employment.

      2.  A custodial parent, imprisoned for contempt, who fails to
return to the jail at the time required by the court after being
temporarily released from confinement for his employment, may be deemed
to have escaped from custody and, if so, he is guilty of a misdemeanor.

      (Added to NRS by 1985, 1892)—(Substituted in revision for NRS
125A.320)


      1.  Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a parent of an
unmarried minor child:

      (a) Is deceased;

      (b) Is divorced or separated from the parent who has custody of the
child;

      (c) Has never been legally married to the other parent of the
child, but cohabitated with the other parent and is deceased or is
separated from the other parent; or

      (d) Has relinquished his parental rights or his parental rights
have been terminated,

Ê the district court in the county in which the child resides may grant
to the great-grandparents and grandparents of the child and to other
children of either parent of the child a reasonable right to visit the
child during his minority.

      2.  If the child has resided with a person with whom he has
established a meaningful relationship, the district court in the county
in which the child resides also may grant to that person a reasonable
right to visit the child during his minority, regardless of whether the
person is related to the child.

      3.  A party may seek a reasonable right to visit the child during
his minority pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 only if a parent of the child
has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child.

      4.  If a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted
visits with the child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
granting of a right to visitation to a party seeking visitation is not in
the best interests of the child. To rebut this presumption, the party
seeking visitation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is
in the best interests of the child to grant visitation.

      5.  The court may grant a party seeking visitation pursuant to
subsection 1 or 2 a reasonable right to visit the child during his
minority only if the court finds that the party seeking visitation has
rebutted the presumption established in subsection 4.

      6.  In determining whether the party seeking visitation has
rebutted the presumption established in subsection 4, the court shall
consider:

      (a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between
the party seeking visitation and the child.

      (b) The capacity and disposition of the party seeking visitation to:

             (1) Give the child love, affection and guidance and serve as
a role model to the child;

             (2) Cooperate in providing the child with food, clothing and
other material needs during visitation; and

             (3) Cooperate in providing the child with health care or
alternative care recognized and permitted under the laws of this State in
lieu of health care.

      (c) The prior relationship between the child and the party seeking
visitation, including, without limitation, whether the child resided with
the party seeking visitation and whether the child was included in
holidays and family gatherings with the party seeking visitation.

      (d) The moral fitness of the party seeking visitation.

      (e) The mental and physical health of the party seeking visitation.

      (f) The reasonable preference of the child, if the child has a
preference, and if the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity
to express a preference.

      (g) The willingness and ability of the party seeking visitation to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the
child and the parent or parents of the child as well as with other
relatives of the child.

      (h) The medical and other needs of the child related to health as
affected by the visitation.

      (i) The support provided by the party seeking visitation,
including, without limitation, whether the party has contributed to the
financial support of the child.

      (j) Any other factor arising solely from the facts and
circumstances of the particular dispute that specifically pertains to the
need for granting a right to visitation pursuant to subsection 1 or 2
against the wishes of a parent of the child.

      7.  If the parental rights of either or both natural parents of a
child are relinquished or terminated, and the child is placed in the
custody of a public agency or a private agency licensed to place children
in homes, the district court in the county in which the child resides may
grant to the great-grandparents and grandparents of the child and to
other children of either parent of the child a reasonable right to visit
the child during his minority if a petition therefor is filed with the
court before the date on which the parental rights are relinquished or
terminated. In determining whether to grant this right to a party seeking
visitation, the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the visits would be in the best interests of the child in light of the
considerations set forth in paragraphs (a) to (i), inclusive, of
subsection 6.

      8.  Rights to visit a child may be granted:

      (a) In a divorce decree;

      (b) In an order of separate maintenance; or

      (c) Upon a petition filed by an eligible person:

             (1) After a divorce or separation or after the death of a
parent, or upon the relinquishment or termination of a parental right;

             (2) If the parents of the child were not legally married and
were cohabitating, after the death of a parent or after the separation of
the parents of the child; or

             (3) If the petition is based on the provisions of subsection
2, after the eligible person ceases to reside with the child.

      9.  If a court terminates the parental rights of a parent who is
divorced or separated, any rights previously granted pursuant to
subsection 1 also must be terminated, unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that visits by those persons would be in
the best interests of the child.

      10.  For the purposes of this section, “separation” means:

      (a) A legal separation or any other separation of a married couple
if the couple has lived separate and apart for 30 days or more and has no
present intention of resuming a marital relationship; or

      (b) If a couple was not legally married but cohabitating, a
separation of the couple if the couple has lived separate and apart for
30 days or more and has no present intention of resuming cohabitation or
entering into a marital relationship.

      (Added to NRS by 1979, 326; A 1985, 586; 1987, 1193; 1991, 1176;
1999, 726 ; 2001, 2712 )

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
 If custody
has been established and the custodial parent intends to move his
residence to a place outside of this State and to take the child with
him, he must, as soon as possible and before the planned move, attempt to
obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to move the child
from this State. If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent,
the custodial parent shall, before he leaves this State with the child,
petition the court for permission to move the child. The failure of a
parent to comply with the provisions of this section may be considered as
a factor if a change of custody is requested by the noncustodial parent.

      (Added to NRS by 1987, 1444; A 1999, 737 )—(Substituted in revision for NRS 125A.350)


      1.  Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, if a child is
conceived as the result of a sexual assault and the person convicted of
the sexual assault is the natural father of the child, the person has no
right to custody of or visitation with the child unless the natural
mother or legal guardian consents thereto and it is in the best interest
of the child.

      2.  The provisions of subsection 1 do not apply if the person
convicted of the sexual assault is the spouse of the victim at the time
of the sexual assault. If the persons later divorce, the conviction of
sexual assault creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint
custody of the child by the perpetrator of the sexual assault is not in
the best interest of the child. The court shall set forth findings that
any custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately
protects the child and the victim of the sexual assault.

      (Added to NRS by 1993, 105; A 1995, 331)—(Substituted in revision
for NRS 125A.360)


      1.  The conviction of the parent of a child for murder of the first
degree of the other parent of the child creates a rebuttable presumption
that sole or joint custody of the child by the convicted parent is not in
the best interest of the child. The rebuttable presumption may be
overcome only if:

      (a) The court determines that:

             (1) There is no other suitable guardian for the child;

             (2) The convicted parent is a suitable guardian for the
child; and

             (3) The health, safety and welfare of the child are not at
risk; or

      (b) The child is of suitable age to signify his assent and assents
to the order of the court awarding sole or joint custody of the child to
the convicted parent.

      2.  The conviction of the parent of a child for murder of the first
degree of the other parent of the child creates a rebuttable presumption
that rights to visitation with the child are not in the best interest of
the child and must not be granted if custody is not granted pursuant to
subsection 1. The rebuttable presumption may be overcome only if:

      (a) The court determines that:

             (1) The health, safety and welfare of the child are not at
risk; and

             (2) It will be beneficial for the child to have visitations
with the convicted parent; or

      (b) The child is of suitable age to signify his assent and assents
to the order of the court awarding rights to visitation with the child to
the convicted parent.

      3.  Until the court makes a determination pursuant to this section,
no person may bring the child into the presence of the convicted parent
without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of the child.

      (Added to NRS by 1999, 742 ; A 1999, 2975 )


      1.  Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125C.210 and 125C.220 , a determination by the court after an
evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that
either parent or any other person seeking custody of a child has engaged
in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of
the child or any other person residing with the child creates a
rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the
perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the
child. Upon making such a determination, the court shall set forth:

      (a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or
more acts of domestic violence occurred; and

      (b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by
the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of
domestic violence who resided with the child.

      2.  If after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to subsection 1
the court determines that more than one party has engaged in acts of
domestic violence, it shall, if possible, determine which person was the
primary physical aggressor. In determining which party was the primary
physical aggressor for the purposes of this section, the court shall
consider:

      (a) All prior acts of domestic violence involving any of the
parties;

      (b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon
the persons involved in those prior acts of domestic violence;

      (c) The likelihood of future injury;

      (d) Whether, during the prior acts, one of the parties acted in
self-defense; and

      (e) Any other factors that the court deems relevant to the
determination.

Ê In such a case, if it is not possible for the court to determine which
party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant
to subsection 1 applies to each of the parties. If it is possible for the
court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the
presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies only to the party
determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor.

      3.  As used in this section, “domestic violence” means the
commission of any act described in NRS 33.018 .

      (Added to NRS by 1999, 742 )